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Although the question of the role of empathy in our experience of fiction is 
currently an active one in psychology, most of the relevant research has been 
conducted on popular literature and film. This dissertation seeks to change that by 
using cognitive approaches to literature to examine how and why postmodern texts 
disrupt the reader or viewer’s expected empathic connection with the narrator or 
protagonist. Drawing on research by both cognitive psychologists and cognitive 
cultural theorists, I examine first how this disruption is accomplished, through 
techniques of both narrative and ethical estrangement, such as: narrative unreliability 
or non-cooperation; mindreading puzzles that can never be solved; moments of 
intimacy and empathy that are deliberately thwarted; and the presence of the 
disgusting or the grotesque in the text. Ultimately, I argue that in the wake of the 
disastrous failure of empathy that was World War II, postmodern writers and directors 
have sought to render moral judgment and decision-making conscious and deliberate, 
rather than unconscious and emotion-based. Principle authors and texts include Günter 
Grass’s Die Blechtrommel, W.G. Sebald’s Die Ausgewanderten and Austerlitz, and 
Michael Haneke’s films, Die Klavierspielerin, Das weiße Band, and Amour. This 
argument has implications for not only the field of cognitive cultural studies, but also 
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Questioning the primacy of empathy at our particular moment — a moment in 
which the need for more and greater empathy in an increasingly globalized world 
seems pressing — is a risky one. In a 2014 essay entitled “Against Empathy,” 
philosopher and psychologist Paul Bloom states that to do so is akin to declaring that 
one hates kittens. Empathy, traditional wisdom goes, is what allows us to be good 
people. It is the basis of compassion. It is what allows for neighborly love, agape. If 
people were educated in how to be more empathic, in how to exercise their 
imaginations so as to understand more thoroughly what it is like to be someone else, 
even someone very removed from themselves, the world would be a better place. And 
fiction, those who wish to defend the humanities as something worthy of study say, is 
part of that empathic education. Fiction teaches us to be more empathic, and it is 
therefore a force for good in the world. 
It appears that the first half of this statement may, in fact, be generally true. 
Studies by Raymond Mar and others, which I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 
1, have shown that those who read fiction do tend to be more empathic than those who 
do not. But this dissertation will question the leap that is made from the first claim to 
the second: that this makes fiction a force for good in the world. In fact, this 
dissertation will question whether empathy itself is, truly, a force for good in the 
world. The fiction, both written and visual, that I will discuss in the following 
chapters, indicates something very different. In a wide variety of ways, Grass’s Die 
Blechtrommel, Sebald’s Die Ausgewanderten and Austerlitz, and Haneke’s La 
Pianiste, Das weiße Band, and Amour demonstrate that empathy is, in fact, deeply 
problematic as a moral lens. They demonstrate that we are better off cultivating an 
ethic of skepticism rather than an ethic of empathy if we truly want to live ethical 
lives. And they do so not by inviting empathy, as so much realist fiction does, but 
rather by disrupting it, both narratively and ethically.  
It is no coincidence that the works I will consider all originate with writers and 
directors from post-1945 Germany. Beginning with the emergence of psychoanalysis 
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at the end of the 19th century, humanity stared into the abyss of its own mind and 
realized it had no idea what might be looking back. The development of cognitive 
neuroscience today has only made us more certain that we do not truly know our own 
minds. Twentieth century literary movements therefore distinguish themselves from 
previous centuries through their fascination with the unconscious and the irrational, 
and through their concern for that which is suppressed, unknowable, or unspeakable. It 
is the crevasses and chasms of the human mind, the dark, secret places inhabited by 
sex and violence, fear and disgust, that the art of the twentieth century insisted on 
making its own. And there was plenty of violence, fear, and disgust to be found in 
Germany after the Second World War — not to mention, I will argue, the conviction 
that empathy and emotion had utterly failed as modes of moral decision-making. The 
literature and film I will consider reflects this failure.  
The questions at the heart of this dissertation therefore have to do with the 
frustration and disruption of empathy in postmodern literature and film — with what I 
will call a dialectic of empathy and estrangement within these works. I will argue that 
these works demonstrate the limits of human empathy and attempt to push us to move 
beyond these limits, a process that is not possible without a great deal of cognitive 
effort and emotional discomfort. When we read a novel or watch a film, our first 
impulse is toward empathy; estrangement is, unsurprisingly, alienating and off-
putting. And yet both exist to varying degrees within these works. Ultimately, the 
aesthetic purpose of these works is to inculcate within the reader a strong sense of 
doubt by drawing attention to the unreliability of narrative — not only of that 
particular work, but of all narrative. Rather than an ethic of empathy or affect, these 
works therefore push the reader or viewer toward an ethic of skepticism.  
To this end, I am concerned with the cognitive processes that underlie our 
abilities to perceive the minds of others, a process that is referred to in cognitive 
science as mindreading. The relationship between mindreading and empathy is a 
crucial one, and for this reason, it has been a particularly fruitful concept for scholars 
in the area of cognitive cultural studies, such as Blakey Vermeule, Lisa Zunshine, 
Murray Smith, and Carl Plantinga, to name only a few. By introducing mindreading 
into the study of literature, scholars are able to approach such vexing questions as: 
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Why do humans find fiction — whether visual or written — compelling? Why and 
how does it move us emotionally, even when we are well aware that the events never 
happened and the people never existed? How does literature achieve the sort of 
immersive experience that readers and viewers desire and expect? What makes some 
fictions more difficult than others?  
This dissertation will address, to varying degrees, all of these questions, but 
this issue of “difficulty” is particularly relevant to the study of postmodern literature. 
Notably, much of the work that has been done by scholars such as Vermeule and 
Zunshine has been on eighteenth or nineteenth century texts; however, I argue that 
when one approaches twentieth century works in this way, the relevant questions 
change. No longer are we able to ask, “How do we read the minds in this text?” 
Rather, very often we must ask instead, “Why can’t we read the minds in this text?” 
The minds of characters in Postmodernist works are often illegible to us. Furthermore, 
they are often “difficult” in another sense: they actively resist cooperating with their 
audience.  Such texts deny the readers and viewers the sort of “immersive” experience 
that he or she desires. Ultimately, by disrupting processes of mindreading, these texts 
also disrupt processes of empathy that are at the core of what readers and viewers 
expect from their fiction.  
This dissertation is, therefore, deeply concerned with the relationship between 
the text and the reader. I assume a reader who is an active participant in the 
construction of the narrative, and who has a relationship with both the work’s implied 
author and with the narrator. These relationships have an enormous impact on the 
emotional affect of the text for the reader, and I will be continuously concerned with 
them throughout the dissertation. I would like to note, however, that the reader that I 
am assuming is more similar to the reader that cognitive science assumes than the one 
that is often assumed by literary studies. Cognitive science and cognitive psychology 
assume a reader who is looking for an immersive, empathic experience; these 
expectations stem largely from our experiences of realist fiction, which are widespread 
in mainstream media and literature. Most of the work that has been done so far in 
psychology and neuroscience on the relationship between literature and empathy has 
been done using “normal” — that is, non-professionally trained — readers and realist 
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fiction. There are potential pitfalls to this, but in general, I believe it is important for 
literary scholars to recall that they are not the average reader or viewer of a text. Even 
though we might constitute a larger-than-average percentage of the readers of non-
immersive texts such as the ones I am interested in, we are still not the only readers of 
these texts. Cultural impact is impossible, I argue, when readership (or viewership) is 
limited solely to those who are professionally trained in how to read difficult texts. 
Therefore, we should ask ourselves how other readers — intelligent readers, to be 
sure, but readers without our professional training — approach such texts. This seems 
to me to be crucial in expanding the conversation about these texts.  
That having been said, I readily admit that my project is not truly a cognitive 
science project. It is, first and foremost, a literature project, just as I am, first and 
foremost, a literature scholar. For that reason, the readings that I provide are, in the 
end, my own readings. I have attempted to imagine how other readers might approach 
such texts and what sorts of effects the narrative techniques, styles, and content of the 
novels might have on such readers. But readings of texts are as diverse as the people 
who read them, and in the end it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions. There 
will always be readers who say, “But that is not at all how I experience Die 
Blechtrommel or Austerlitz.” As a scholar, I am interested the points at which friction 
is created between how readers expect to experience fiction and how these texts 
prompt us to experience it, and for that reason I will, admittedly, be making some 
assumptions that might not be accurate for everyone. In the future, a cognitive science 
or cognitive psychology project related to these texts might be fruitfully undertaken 
that would explore such questions more empirically. For now, however, I will 
approach these questions as I have been trained to approach them: through the texts 
themselves.  
In Chapter One: Reading the Postmodern Mind, I establish the relevant theory 
for my project, examining the cognitive science and psychological research that has 
been undertaken regarding the concept of empathy and its relationship to fiction. The 
vast majority of this research, as I have already stated, has been conducted using 
realist fiction. Therefore, in the second half of this chapter, I take up the question of 
what happens when this research is applied to non-realist fiction, in this case 
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postmodern fiction and film. I argue that empathy — that is, the empathic relationship 
between reader and narrator-protagonist — is disrupted in these works, though that 
does not mean that it has vanished altogether. Indeed, I argue that both empathy and 
estrangement are present in a dialectic. Finally, I argue that the disruption of empathy 
within these works underscores many of the problematic aspects of empathy as a way 
of making moral decisions, and that the roots of this aesthetic maneuver lie in an 
understanding of Nazi Germany as a failure of empathy and emotion-based decision-
making.  
In Chapter Two: Slippery as an Eel: The Rise of Skepticism in Grass’s ‘Die 
Blechtrommel’, I discuss the quintessential postwar German novel: Günter Grass’s Die 
Blechtrommel (1959). This novel disrupts empathy at every turn, through both the 
uncooperative narration offered by the narrator, Oskar Matzerath, and through 
thematic moments of the grotesque and the disgusting in the text, which are 
continuously inflicted upon the reader. The emotional dissonance between the reader 
and Oskar calls into question everything that Oskar says, and reading the text 
empathically leads only to an impoverished understanding of the text. Therefore, 
Grass not only disrupts the reader’s empathic, emotional experience of the text, but 
also begins to replace it with what I am calling an ethic of skepticism — an ethic, he 
implies, that is necessary to avoid repeating the disaster that was Nazi Germany. 
Empathy and emotion within Grass’s text are highly suspect, and yet the relationship 
between them is not static; indeed, there are moments when empathy is strongly 
invoked, particularly during the Glaube-Hoffnung-Liebe chapter. But these are 
precisely the same moments in which the problematic aspects of empathy are 
underscored.  
In Chapter Three: . . . sagte Austerlitz: W.G. Sebald’s Mediated Narration and 
the Ethics of Empathy, I turn my attention to a very different author: W.G. Sebald. 
Writing thirty years after Grass, Sebald’s concern with regard to the Second World 
War is quite different from Grass’s. Grass gives very little thought to the victims of 
fascism; indeed, in 1959, to attempt to imagine the experience of a victim of fascism 
was not even possible in Germany. With the three intervening decades, however, such 
an act of imagination became possible — to a certain degree. Direct representation and 
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the subsequent establishment of empathy between reader and protagonist, however, 
remains problematic and perhaps even unethical. Sebald circumvents these issues 
through what I will call “hypermediated narration.” This narration has the effect not 
only of tempering the emotional experience of the reader, but also of calling attention 
to the constructedness of all narratives, especially those based on memory; in this 
narrative maneuver, we may see echoes of the ethic of skepticism that is so strongly 
present in Grass. At the same time, other aspects of Sebald’s texts, in particular the 
photographs that he includes, provoke the reader toward mind reading and empathy. 
The dialectic of empathy and estrangement is therefore re-negotiated in Sebald’s texts 
in a way that allows for empathy, even while drawing attention to its limitations.  
In Chapter Four: Dark Fables, Impossible Puzzles, and Franz Schubert: The 
Redemption of Empathy in the Films of Michael Haneke, I examine three films by 
Austrian director Michael Haneke: La Pianiste (2001), Das weiße Band (2009), and 
Amour (2012). Both narrative and ethical estrangement is present in each of these 
films, but the relationship between empathy and estrangement is constantly 
renegotiated. In La Pianiste, there is a re-negotiation of empathy from the novel to the 
film, with Haneke placing granting his viewer far more access to his version of Erika 
Kohut than Jelinek does to hers through particular “scenes of empathy” and through 
the film’s diegetic music, even while reinforcing our inability to really “know” 
anything about Erika. With Das weiße Band, doubt and skepticism are introduced 
from the very first moment of the film as an ethical necessity; what was implied in La 
Pianiste is here clearly articulated. But alongside the skepticism and other estranging 
elements of the text, there are moments of tenderness that seem to exist solely to 
provoke empathy on the part of the viewer — even if that empathy can never be 
rewarded. Finally, in Amour we see the fruits of this renegotiation: a film that uses 
empathy, rather than estrangement, to shock the viewer. 
Recent discoveries in cognitive neuroscience have raised serious and as-yet-
unanswerable questions of personal responsibility, agency, justice, empathy, 
compassion, and, indeed, what it means to be human; in other words, science has 
begun tackling questions that were previously the province of the humanities. This is 
actually less of a new development than one might assume; historically psychology 
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and psychoanalysis have had a close relationship with art. Nobel-prize winning 
neurobiologist Eric R. Kandel argues in The Age of Insight that this relationship may 
now be reviving, albeit in a different form, due to revolutions in our understanding of 
the biology and physiology of the human mind. It is therefore not particularly 
surprising that some literary and film theorists have turned to cognitive science for 
answers to questions that we could previously only theorize about. But it is not a 
perfect marriage; indeed, much of the tension that exists between the two fields today 
stems from the fact that the answers offered up by current cognitive science are not 
always particularly pleasing to humanists. But that does not mean that the two fields 
do not have much to say to each other. Kandel argues that although some scholars may 
be uncomfortable with an approach that “reduces”	  art to biochemical and neurological 
processes, in fact “reductionism can expand our vision and give us new insights into 
the nature and creation of art. These new insights will enable us to perceive 
unexpected aspects of art that derive from the relationships between biological and 
psychological phenomena”	  (xvii). It is my hope that this dissertation will contribute to 
this dialogue between science and art, in this case literature and film, and that it will 
access some of the insights Kandel mentions. Although literary studies has been 
utilizing psychoanalysis for decades now, the influx of cognitive science into the field 
is much more recent. It is now time, I argue, to consider certain familiar questions, 
such as those around memory, representation, and emotional affect, in a new light: the 





Reading the Postmodern Mind 
 
In the very first scene of W.G. Sebald’s final novel Austerlitz (2001), the 
reader is startled to turn the page and find a series of four photographs. Each is of a 
pair of eyes; the top two are of the eyes of nocturnal animals, such as the narrator 
encounters in the Nocturama of the Antwerp Zoo; the bottom two are of human eyes. 
The first set of human eyes are those of German artist Jan Peter Tripp (Straus 44), and 
the last are those of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. The narrator provides a 
clear connection between the eyes of the nocturnal animals and the eyes of the painter 
and philosopher, writing,	  
Von den in dem Nocturama behausten Tieren ist mir sonst nur in 
Erinnerung geblieben, daß	  etliche von ihnen auffallend große Augen 
hatten und jenen unverwandt forschenden Blick, wie man ihn findet bei 
bestimmten Malern und Philosophen, die vermittels der reinen 
Anschauung und des reinen Denkens versuchen, das Dunkel zu 
durchdringen, das uns umgibt.1 (7) 	  
The narrator thus prompts the reader to linger over the photographs, attempting to see 
in them the similarities he proposes between the animals and the humans. Where in 
these photographs of eyes can we locate the ability of the philosopher and the artist to 
pierce the darkness that surrounds all of us, to bridge the chasm that separates each of 
us from understanding others or even ourselves?	  
Our attempt to see in the eyes of Tripp and Wittgenstein the ability ascribed to 
them by the narrator is partly an exercise in imagination; it is also inevitably an 
exercise in reading the mind behind the eyes. It is not a coincidence that very similar 
photographs are used in the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test”	  developed by 
cognitive psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen, in which subjects are asked to look at a 
                                                
1	  “[A]ll	  I	  can	  remember	  of	  the	  denizens	  of	  the	  Nocturama	  is	  that	  several	  of	  them	  had	  strikingly	  
large	  eyes,	  and	  the	  fixed,	  inquiring	  gaze	  found	  in	  certain	  painters	  and	  philosophers	  who	  seek	  to	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pair of eyes and decide what emotion lies behind them. This is a test of our ability to 
read the minds of others and this is precisely what we find ourselves doing when 
presented with the four sets of eyes at the beginning of Austerlitz. That two of the sets 
of eyes are not human makes very little difference. We may still read surprise in the 
wide eyes of the bush baby at the top or shrewdness in those of the owl just below, 
even as we acknowledge that our interpretations probably are not accurate. But it is 
without a doubt the eyes of Tripp and Wittgenstein that prompt us to pause the 
longest. There may be some surprise and some shrewdness in both their gazes, but it is 
possible to read in them amusement and curiosity as well. Most significantly, Tripp 
and Wittgenstein appear to look back at us from the page, as though attempting to read 
us in return.	  
This set of four photographs serves a plethora of functions in the text. I argue, 
however, that one of its main functions is to prime the reader for the “mindreading”	  
exercise he or she is about to undergo. Wittgenstein’s eyes are particularly enigmatic, 
and indeed, as Bettina Mosbach points out, it is these eyes that we are meant to 
superimpose onto Sebald’s, just as the narrator superimposes Wittgenstein’s face onto 
that of Austerlitz: 	  
Mehr und mehr dünkt es mich darum jetzt, sobald ich irgendwo auf 
eine Photographie von Wittgenstein stoße, als blicke mir Austerlitz aus 
ihr entgegen, oder, wenn ich Austerlitz anschaue, als sehe ich in ihm 
den unglücklichen, in der Klarheit seiner logischen Überlegungen 
ebenso wie in der Verwirrung seiner Gefühle eingesperrten Denker, 
dermaßen auffällig sind die Ähnlichkeiten zwischen den beiden.2 
(Austerlitz 60)	  
It is Wittgenstein gazing back at us from the page, but it is also Austerlitz. And it is 
Austerlitz’s mind, the mind behind the eyes, that the reader must attempt to read 
                                                
2	  “And	  now,	  whenever	  I	  see	  a	  photograph	  of	  Wittgenstein	  somewhere	  or	  other,	  I	  feel	  more	  and	  
more	  as	  if	  Austerlitz	  were	  gazing	  at	  me	  out	  of	  it,	  and	  when	  I	  look	  at	  Austerlitz	  it	  is	  as	  if	  I	  see	  in	  him	  
the	  disconsolate	  philosopher,	  the	  man	  locked	  into	  the	  glaring	  clarity	  of	  his	  logical	  thinking	  as	  
inextricably	  as	  into	  his	  confused	  emotions,	  so	  striking	  is	  the	  likeness	  between	  the	  two	  of	  them”	  
(Austerlitz	  39)	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throughout the rest of the novel —	  an attempt which can only ever be partially 
successful.	  
 This example from Sebald’s Austerlitz, a novel that I will discuss at length in 
my third chapter, is illustrative of some of the quandaries I will be dealing with in this 
dissertation. The question of mindreading and empathy is a central one for fiction of 
all kinds. In this chapter, I consider much of the research that has been done already in 
this area, both by literary and film studies scholars and by psychologists. 
Psychologists such as Raymond Mar and Keith Oatley who have worked on the close 
relationship between reading fiction and empathy have tended to base their findings on 
readers’ “immersive” experiences of texts: “What makes literary fiction unique is how 
fiction stories enable us to be ‘transported’ into an imagined world . . . offering a form 
of cognitive simulation of the social world with absorbing emotional consequences for 
the reader” (“The Function of Fiction” 174). My own work differs from theirs, 
however, in its concern for what I will call “non-immersive” texts. Postmodern works, 
such as Sebald’s Austerlitz, resist readerly immersion. Works such as these force us to 
carry out cognitive processes of mindreading consciously, much as the reader must 
linger over the photograph of Wittgenstein and consider the question of what is 
happening behind the eyes of the great philosopher. It is not obvious, and many of the 
minds I will consider in this dissertation are just as opaque as Wittgeinstein’s is here. I 
will argue that this is a large part of what renders postmodern works notoriously 
“difficult” for their readers. But it is in their very difficulty, I will argue, that such 
works are valuable, for in forcing conscious mental activity upon us, they also force us 
to question our implicit emotional reactions. This questioning, I will show, has 
consequences for a reader’s experience of a particular text as well as our impulse 




Mindreading and Empathy 
 
The cognitive function known as mindreading is, simply put, knowing – or 
believing we know – what other people are thinking or feeling. It is the cognitive 
activity that is at the very core of human social interaction, for without it we would all 
be bags of flesh to each other, completely opaque. We mindread so easily and 
automatically that we hardly ever realize we are doing it; it is effortless, even if it is 
not always accurate. We do it constantly in our day-to-day interactions with people, 
using facial expressions, body language, and other forms of behavior to postulate 
about what others are thinking and feeling. We mind read so easily, in fact, that we do 
it to creatures and things that are not human at all, such as animals (particularly pets) 
and inanimate objects (such as “misbehaving” electronics). Some scholars, such as 
Jesse Bering, have argued that this impulse to assign motive to behavior — to read 
minds — lies also behind the human penchant for reading the “mind” behind 
“behavior” such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and droughts; in doing so, Bering says, we 
have created deities the world over. 
Mindreading has a plethora of implications for understanding human social 
interactions and for understanding the basis of human morality. How we treat 
ourselves, each other, and our environment, as well as the rules we have developed to 
regulate that treatment, are based on our understanding of other people as being 
somehow like us – that is, on our ability to represent another individual’s mind. It is 
also clearly the basis of certain moral emotions, such as compassion and sympathy; 
these emotions are based on seeing others as souls, rather than simply bodies, and 
treating them as such. Without the mindreading abilities that humans evolved for a 
variety of practical reasons, these emotions would be impossible. It is generally 
agreed, therefore, that mindreading is crucial to understanding how humans relate to 
other humans. What is not agreed upon, however, is how we do it or even what, 
exactly, empathy is.  
I will begin with the question of how we mindread, which is currently at the 
center of a vigorous debate in cognitive science. In Simulating Minds, psychologist 
Alvin Goldman outlines three current theories: theory theory, rationality theory, and 
12 
simulation theory (3-4). Of the three theories, the two that have been most important 
for cognitive cultural studies are theory theory and simulation theory. Fundamental to 
theory theory is the notion that we possess an innate and usually unconscious “folk 
psychology.” Simulation theory, in contrast, argues that “mind readers exploit their 
own mind as a prototype, or model, of the target’s mind” and engage in “mental 
mimicry” to decide what the target is likely to do (Goldman, “Mindreading by 
Simulation” 6). Goldman notes that this process is likely to evince a high level of 
“mindreading error — specifically, egocentric error, reflecting the penetration of the 
mindreader’s own genuine desires, beliefs, and emotions into the interpersonal 
tracking process” (“Mindreading by Simulation” 8). In other words, mindreading by 
simulation forces us to believe that others are perhaps more like us than they truly are; 
this is a disadvantage in real life, but it may also be a disadvantage when reading 
fiction in which the minds we are expected to read are very different from our own. 
Goldman himself comes down on the side of simulation theory, but other cognitive 
psychologists, such as Simon Baron-Cohen and Alan Leslie, have argued in favor of 
theory theory, while others, including Raymond Mar, believe that it is likely that we 
use some combination of the two. It is therefore important to bear in mind that it might 
not be possible to completely delineate the two theories as starkly as some theorists 
have. 
 The question of how, exactly, we might define “empathy” is actually much 
more difficult than it appears at first glance. In the colloquial usage, “empathy” 
generally implies a sense of caring, but as Goldman says, discussions of mindreading 
from the perspective of cognitive science bracket off the “emotive and caring 
connotation” of the term (Simulating Minds 4). Empathy in the sense that cognitive 
science uses it has a much broader applicability: it is the ability to understand or 
imagine the emotional state of another individual. Moral emotions such as sympathy 
or compassion do not, however, follow inevitably from empathy; one can understand 
how another person feels and yet have no sympathy for him or her. C. Daniel Batson 
has actually identified “eight related but distinct phenomena” that might be understood 
as empathy. These eight phenomena are wide-ranging; Batson argues that this is the 
case because researchers use the term “empathy” to try and answer two very different 
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questions: “How can one know what another person is thinking and feeling? What 
leads one person to respond with sensitivity and care to the suffering of another?” (3) 
 I will not address in detail all eight phenomena here, but I think it is useful 
consider the different ways the term “empathy” is used and the reasons that defining it 
is so difficult. We might think of these eight phenomena as existing on a spectrum, 
with those that answer solely the first question on one end and those that answer solely 
the second question on the other. Phenomena that Batson mentions that answer solely 
the first question include “knowing another person’s internal state, including his or her 
thoughts and feelings” (Batson 4) and “adopting the posture or matching the neural 
responses of an observed Other” (Batson 5). Neither of these implies any compulsory 
emotional reaction, although both of them may lead to other, more explicitly 
emotional phenomena, such as “intuiting or projecting oneself into another situation” 
(Batson 6) or “imagining how another is thinking and feeling” (Batson 7). It is easy to 
understand how these cognitive phenomena might eventually lead to those on the end 
of the spectrum that mostly address Batson’s second question: “feeling distress at 
witnessing another person’s suffering” (Batson 8) and “feeling for another person who 
is suffering” (9).  
I argue that these last two phenomenon might be understood better as 
sympathy derived from empathy. Both sympathy and empathy are important for my 
discussion, since together they engender much of the emotional experience of reading 
or watching a novel or film. However, it is important not to confuse the two. It is 
possible to understand what someone is thinking or feeling, and even experience 
physical responses based on watching that person’s face on a screen, without 
experiencing distress or happiness on their behalf. Viewers of a film, for example, 
may feel empathy for a character they dislike, but it is less likely that they will feel 
sympathy for him or her. The reverse statement, however – that is, that it is possible to 
feel sympathy without empathy – is less plausible. Sympathy and compassion are both 
heavily predicated upon processes of mindreading and empathy, but they are not 
inevitable results of those processes. For this reason, while the research I will detail in 
the following section indicates that reading fiction may increase a reader’s empathy, 
we should not take that to mean that reading fiction makes us better — that is, more 
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compassionate — people. Indeed, as I will discuss in more detail later in this chapter, 
psychologist and philosopher Paul Bloom argues that empathy has a significant 
disadvantages as a way of understanding the world and making moral decisions.  
 
 
Mindreading and the Experience of Written Fiction 
 
Having discussed how we experience empathy, as well as what empathy is, I 
will now turn to one of the questions at the heart of this dissertation: What do 
mindreading and empathy have to do with our experience of fiction? Specifically, can 
these concepts explain why humans the world over are so hungry for fiction in all its 
forms? 
It is possible to examine the question I have just posed from a number of 
angles. The question of how people experience texts was taken up in the mid-to-late 
twentieth century by reader response theorists such as Stanley Fish, Wolfgang Iser, 
and Roland Barthes. Cognitive cultural studies is in many ways the intellectual 
descendant of reader response theory, in that both fields are concerned with the active 
participation of the reader in the construction of texts. Indeed, many cognitive cultural 
theorists, particularly those trained in literary studies such as myself, remain focused 
on the text, asking such questions as, How do particular texts engage our mindreading 
abilities? Such scholars do so, however, using recent research from the fields of 
psychology and neuroscience that considers real flesh-and-blood readers and proposes 
to answer these questions empirically. In the interaction between literary studies and 
neuropsychology lies both the value and the tension that currently exists between the 
humanities and the mind sciences; although the underlying questions of both fields are 
similar, the methods are extraordinarily different — and the results may very well be 
different, too. For now, I will describe several studies that have been undertaken in 
this area, particularly by Raymond Mar, before moving on to discuss the approaches 
taken by more text-centered cognitive cultural theorists, such as Lisa Zunshine and 
Blakey Vermeule. 
Recent studies in cognitive psychology have attempted to measure the impact 
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that reading fiction may have on our mindreading skills. Mar’s findings indicate that 
there may, indeed, be a positive correlation between reading more fiction over one’s 
lifetime and having more finely honed empathic or mindreading skills, though notably, 
not between reading fiction and being a kinder or more sympathetic person. In a 2009 
study of 225 individuals, Mar and his collaborators found that “fiction print-exposure 
predicts performance on an empathy task” (“Exploring the Link” 420), even after they 
controlled for the subject’s gender, age, fluency in English, and for certain personality 
traits, such as openness to new experiences and a “tendency to be transported into a 
narrative” (412).  It therefore seems that psychology may be proving what humanists 
have long believed: that reading fiction makes us more empathic. In this same vein, 
Mar argues that fiction is a way of allowing us to “simulate” and “abstract” social 
experience, allowing readers to “project themselves into the represented events” (“The 
Function of Fiction” 173). According to Mar, this renders “complex social 
information” more understandable, a hypothesis that coincides with what certain 
cognitive cultural theorists, such as Blakey Vermeule, have also argued. In this view, 
characters become “mental models” that the reader is meant to simulate. This is not a 
passive process; indeed, because all fictions are “abstractions,” readers are required to 
participate in their construction. 
What is not immediately evident in Mar’s description of “the function of 
fiction” is the emotional affect of a fictional narrative. Elsewhere, however, Mar has 
investigated this very question, for the emotions that we experience while reading are 
undeniably one of the most important aspects of readerly simulation and abstraction. 
Through having readers engage in self-reporting techniques while reading a text, Mar 
has identified five different types of emotions that readers typically experience: 
emotions of sympathy, emotions of identification, emotions of empathy, relived 
emotions, and remembered emotions. These emotions fall into two categories, Mar 
notes: emotions “derived from engagements with characters” and emotions that are 
“rooted in memory” (“Emotion and Narrative Fiction” 826). The former has to do 
with the reader’s empathic connection with the narrator or protagonist and with her 
ability to simulate the emotions of the narrator or protagonist. The latter has to do with 
the reader’s reaction based on her own lived experience; this, I argue, accounts for 
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much of the variation in readers’ experience of a single text. These memories may be 
experienced largely unconsciously, but they are crucial to how we experience a text; 
furthermore, I argue that there are similarities between how we construct narratives 
and how we reconstruct memories — similarities that will become more clear in 
Chapter 3, when I discuss W.G. Sebald’s novel Austerlitz — and it is therefore 
unsurprising that memory appears to play such a strong role in our emotional 
experience of texts. 
Although Mar draws a distinction between these two different types of 
emotional engagement with texts, it is important not to delineate them too strictly; the 
five different types of emotions can interact with each other in complex ways, 
sometimes complementing and bolstering each other, at other times opposing each 
other. Understanding this helps explain the deeply emotional reactions that we 
sometimes have toward fiction, even when we know quite well that the events the text 
describes (and which we simulate) are not real. Patrick Colm Hogan has argued that in 
general, the fictionality of a work simply does not matter: “One function of emotion 
for humans, and one important reason for the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in 
emotion circuits, is to guide our selection of future behaviors” (246). Hogan goes on to 
note the importance of emotion to the imagination and in our responses to imagined 
events. Such emotional responses include the fear one feels while vividly imagining, 
with or without the help of a cinematic image or literary description, a stalking lion or 
a coiled snake about to strike. Ultimately, Mar, Hogan, and Goldman all agree that the 
pretend but still genuinely affective emotional effects of fiction are an enormous part 
of what makes fiction pleasurable, even if they differ slightly in their 
conceptualization of the emotive states provoked by fiction.  
This is quite a different argument from some of those made by certain 
cognitive cultural theorists who are invested in a stricter definition of mindreading. In 
Lisa Zunshine’s Why We Read Fiction, for example, Zunshine uses theory theory to 
discuss unreliable narration and how “metarepresentation” or “source-tagging” (that 
is, attributing certain thoughts to certain sources) drives certain genres, such as 
detective fiction. Zunshine argues that although our theory of mind abilities evolved 
for use in face-to-face interactions, literature – and fiction in general, I would add – 
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“capitalizes and stimulates” (10) these abilities. Zunshine goes so far as to argue that 
“the novel, in particular, is implicated with our mind-reading ability to such a degree 
that I do not think myself in danger of overstating anything when I say that in its 
currently familiar shape it exists because we are creatures with ToM [theory of mind]” 
(10). Although Zunshine’s argument is persuasive, one of its major weaknesses is that 
it conflates “mindreading” with “theory of mind,” making no mention of simulation 
theory, and neglects the emotional, affective experience of fiction. Surely the reason 
that generations of readers of Pride and Prejudice have wished for Elizabeth and Mr. 
Darcy to reconcile their differences and find happiness cannot be entirely reduced to 
the demands the book makes on our ability to track sources or “metarepresentations.”  
Therefore, while I take Zunshine’s argument in favor of the relevance of theory 
theory seriously, I argue that it tells only part of the story. Admittedly, we do not react 
to everything in a fictional text the way we would if it were real; both Blakey 
Vermeule and Gregory Currie note that when we read the mind of another through a 
work of fiction, we run our mental processes in a “decoupled” (Vermeule) or “off-
line” (Currie) mode, so that we do not take the physical actions indicated by our 
“readings.” Nevertheless, the emotions that result from fiction are, in a 
neurobiological sense, genuine. Arguments about fiction based heavily on theory 
theory do not adequately account for our genuinely emotive experiences of fictional 
texts. Arguments that favor simulation theory, on the other hand, tend to account for 
these experiences both more easily and more convincingly, but they struggle with the 
question of why and how that affective experience is produced. For it is certainly true 
that the emotional experience of the reader or viewer might actually be different from 
that of the protagonist whose mind we are simulating; in fact, in the texts that I will be 
analyzing, these emotional experiences are often quite at odds with each other. 
Despite these issues, which I will address elsewhere, simulation theory has 
been taken up by cognitive cultural theorists in interesting and innovative ways. One 
such argument is put forth by Blakey Vermeule, who explores both theory theory and 
simulation theory, but ultimately argues that simulation theory is the more promising 
of the two hypotheses for explaining how and why humans find fiction so compelling. 
Vermeule states that “simulation theory captures crucial aspects of literary 
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experience” (41), namely that “narrative can be seen as a vehicle by which people test 
various scenarios without risking too much” (41), and the way we do this is by 
empathically “hooking” our minds onto someone else’s – in most cases the 
protagonist’s. This is similar in many ways to Mar’s argument that the purpose of 
fiction is “social simulation and abstraction”; from our experiences of fiction, we are 
able to simulate social contexts and abstract information about them, thus engaging in 
a relatively risk-free form of social learning. Also like Mar, Vermeule notes the 
importance of the discovery of mirror neurons in support of simulation theory. Mirror 
neurons, the presence of which have been confirmed in certain monkeys and which 
humans are strongly suspected to also possess, fire both when an action is observed 
and when it is enacted. Therefore, when we watch another person experiencing pain or 
fear or disgust, our mirror neurons fire, and we experience it as well.  
Mirror neurons may therefore very well be the neurological basis for at least 
some types of simulation. Goldman argues that such neurons are mostly important in 
what he calls “low level mindreading”; this sort of mindreading primarily functions 
through a process of emotion mirroring, wherein the perception of others as feeling 
certain emotions or even experiencing certain sensations, such as pain, leads to an 
activation of the parts of their own brain responsible for processing such emotions or 
sensations (“Mindreading by Simulation” 10-14). But according to Goldman, this is 
not the type of mindreading we typically engage in when we read fiction. Fiction, 
rather, calls for “high level mindreading,” which Goldman defines as mindreading that 
targets complex mental states, is subjected to a certain extent to voluntary control, or 
which is at least partially conscious rather than unconscious (Simulating Minds 147). 
This sort of mindreading, being voluntary and conscious rather than automatic and 
unconscious, requires far more effort from us than “low level” mindreading. It often 
involves targets that the mind reader cannot perceive in the traditional sense; in these 
cases, which include mindreading scenarios in which the targets are fictional, 
Goldman argues that the cognitive process engaged is not mirroring, but rather self-
projection (“Mindreading by Simulation” 26); according to Goldman, this is the sort 
of mindreading that fiction - written fiction, at least - engages.  
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It seems likely, however, that mirror neurons play an even greater role in our 
comprehension of visual modes of fiction, such as television and film, than they do in 
our understanding of written fiction. For this reason, I will now turn my attention 
toward the more visual storytelling medium of film. 
 
 
Mindreading and the Experience of Visual Fiction 
 
Discussing film and literature together is not an uncommon practice, and in 
many ways it seems intuitive; clearly, novels and films are both narratives, and for our 
purpose, they are both forms of fiction that contain recognizable, discretely 
constructed characters. Both forms encourage us to engage in practices of mindreading 
with these characters, thereby engendering empathy. But there is no denying that the 
way we experience film and literature is very different. David T. Levin, Alicia M. 
Hymel, and Lewis Baker argue that the visual nature of film provides us with a 
context for mindreading that is much closer to how we do it in everyday life (250); 
logically, one can imagine that film exercises our mindreading abilities more easily 
than literature does, since many of the facial and body language cues we use to read 
“real” people are also utilized by actors in films. In written fiction, these must be filled 
in by the reader, but in film they can be entirely controlled by the actor and director. 
Films therefore give rise to what Gregory Currie calls “perceptual imagining” (Image 
and Mind 9): imagining based on our sensory experience of what is happening on the 
movie screen. Novels and other prose fiction, in contrast, give rise to “symbolic 
imagining” (Image and Mind 9 ): imagining based on description, which is necessarily 
much vaguer than what we perceive on a movie screen.  
These differences in sensory experience have a crucial impact on the film 
audience’s emotional experience of the text. Perceptual imagining is what allows for 
the greater importance of mirror neurons, which Carl Plantinga argues are extremely 
important in our experience of film: 
Visual narratives are made possible by the workings of mirror neurons. 
One could argue that to watch a movie is to engage in the virtual 
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rehearsal of movement. Brain processes involving mirror neurons 
enable us to understand faces and bodies in action and link us to other 
people’s activities and feelings. [. . .] Building on the intensely social 
nature of humanity, a great actor uses his or her movements to light up 
the mirror neurons of others, and thus to affect them powerfully. 
Psychologists and biologists have discerned over and again that the 
mirror neurons are activated not merely when actions are seen and 
heard, but also when moving photographic images and recorded sounds 
of actions are seen and heard. In part, this accounts for the affective 
power of the audiovisual media. (“Affective Power,” 101) 
Therefore, if mirror neurons are activated by literature, then how much more are they 
activated by audiovisual media, which so closely approximates the experience of real-
life mindreading? The mindreading we do when reading fiction is undoubtedly related 
to the mindreading we do with real people. But one might argue that written fiction 
requires greater adaptation on our part and perhaps, generally speaking, greater 
cognitive activity, while the audiovisual nature of film makes mindreading much less 
arduous. Perhaps for this very reason, one could argue that film provokes deep 
emotion within its audience more regularly and with greater ease than does literature. 
Indeed, cognitive film critic Noël Carroll argues that emotional provocation is the 
overriding reason for cinema’s enduring popularity (Engaging the Moving Image, 62). 
One source of emotional provocation in film, as in literature, is our empathy for a 
film’s characters. 
But what does it mean to empathize with a character in a film? Thus far, I have 
argued that in literature, this means taking that particular character’s point of view by 
“hooking” our minds into theirs, to reprise Blakey Vermeule’s metaphor. This makes 
sense in literature, which is often told from a first or third person perspective. But does 
the same thing happen when we watch a film? Some critics, such as Noël Carroll and 
Carl Plantinga, argue that it does not; no matter how emotionally involved the viewer 
is in the film, he or she remains an observer and can never directly simulate the 
emotions of the protagonist herself. However, Murray Smith offers a somewhat more 
nuanced view when enumerating three concepts that will be central to my discussion 
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of film: recognition, alignment, and allegiance. Although these three concepts are 
drawn from Smith’s work in film studies, I argue that they also have relevance for 
cognitive literary studies. For our purposes, the most important of Smith’s concepts 
are alignment and allegiance; recognition — that is, “the perception of a set of textual 
elements, in film typically cohering around the image of a body, as an individuated 
and continuous human agent” (Engaging Characters 82) – is not called greatly into 
question by any of the texts that I will be considering. Alliance and allegiance, on the 
other hand, are continually complicated by the postmodern novels and films that I will 
examine. It is therefore useful to begin with a discussion of both concepts.  
Smith describes alignment in the following way: “The term alignment 
describes the process by which spectators are placed in relation to characters in terms 
of access to their actions, and to what they know and feel” (Engaging Characters 83). 
Smith goes on describe a “structure of alignment,” comprised of “two interlocking 
functions, spatio-temporal attachment and subjective access” (Engaging Characters 
83). Attachment refers to the way a narrative limits itself to the actions of a 
protagonist or protagonists, while subjective access refers to the degree of accessibility 
we are given to a single character’s subjectivity or inner life. The structure of 
alignment is what, in literature, would be called “focalization” or, more colloquially, 
“point of view.” There are a number of visual and filmic techniques available to the 
filmmaker for aligning the viewer to the character and providing him or her with 
subjective access to the character’s inner thoughts and feelings. Two of the most 
important techniques are the point-of-view (POV) shot and the close-up.  
Smith argues that the value of the POV shot has generally been exaggerated or 
at least misused in cognitive film studies. He calls its misuse “the fallacy of POV,” 
that is “the assumption that POV shots somehow wire us directly into the mind of a 
character” (“Imagining from the Inside” 418), thereby allowing us to simulate directly 
the mind of the character, much in the same way that Vermeule argue we “hook” our 
mind into the mind of a literary protagonist or narrator. But POV shots in film do not 
function the say way that point-of-view functions in a novel, and a POV shot does not 
by itself allow subjective access to a character’s mind. Smith does not deny the 
importance of the POV shot, but argues that it must work in context with other shots, 
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particularly with reaction shots of the character’s facial expressions and body 
language. Smith argues that alignment is not achieved merely through knowing what a 
character is looking at, but through POV shots in combination with “a larger structure 
of multifaceted alignment” ((“Imagining from the Inside” 417) that includes reaction 
shots, multiple shots edited together in particular ways, and non-diegetic music. Put 
together, a sequence of shots can create alignment, quite possibly through the 
activation of mirror neurons. But in order for mirror neurons to activate, we must be 
able to see the actor’s face, not only what he or she is looking at.  
One particular shot that Smith does not mention in his discussion of POV 
structures, but which I argue is critical to the creation of alignment (and thereby, as we 
shall see, allegiance) is the close-up. Carl Plantinga calls attention to the importance of 
the human face in what he calls “scenes of empathy”: “In this kind of scene . . . we see 
a character’s face, typically in closeup, either for a single shot of long duration or as 
an element of a point-of-view structure alternating between shots of a character’s face 
and shots of what she or he sees” (“The Scene of Empathy” 239). Crucial here is the 
understanding that, like POV shots, close-ups rarely work in isolation, but rather as 
part of a larger cinematic narrative structure. But Plantinga’s main point is that the 
duration of a scene of empathy must be too long to be justified solely in terms of 
conveying information to the viewer; rather, such scenes, and particularly the actors’ 
faces in such scenes, are actually meant to elicit emotion from the viewer. Close-ups 
and the POV structures of which they are a part do this through processes of 
“emotional contagion,” particularly facial feedback and affective mimicry (“The 
Scene of Empathy” 242). In brief, when a viewer sees a human face in close-up, we 
are apt to unconsciously mimic the expressions we see on that face, and that mimicry, 
in turn, causes us to actually catch the emotion from the character (“The Scene of 
Empathy” 243). This creates empathy within the viewer for the subject of the scene. 
However, Plantinga is careful to note that the creation of empathy is not automatic 
when a close-up or even a POV structure is placed before a viewer, and indeed a 
viewer is more likely to respond with empathic emotion if he or she already likes the 
character that is the subject of the scene. But certainly close-ups can and do serve as 
an integral part of structures of alliance and, as I will come to now, allegiance. 
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The alignment of a viewer with a particular character usually, though not 
always, leads to allegiance: “Allegiance depends upon the spectator having what she 
takes to be reliable access to the character’s state of mind, on understanding the 
context of the character’s actions, and having morally evaluated the character on the 
basis of this knowledge” (Engaging Characters 84). Smith notes that allegiance is the 
closest to what has traditionally been referred to as “character identification,” which 
has strong implications of both simulation theory and empathy. Smith, however, 
argues that we are not simulating the character’s mind directly, but rather morally 
evaluating the character. Smith notes, “Evaluation, in this sense, has both cognitive 
and affective dimensions . . . On the basis of such evaluation, spectators construct 
moral structures, in which characters are organized and ranked in a system of 
preference” (84). A slightly different way to think of allegiance is in terms of goals 
and problem-solving; Keith Oatley, for example, has argued that “[a]t a film (or when 
reading prose fiction or attending a play), we put aside our own goals and plans and 
insert goals and plans (as indicated by the author) into our own planning processor” 
(276). These adopted goals are key to our emotional experience of the narrative. Goal-
alignment, I argue, occurs only once the viewer has made moral evaluations of a 
character and decided that the character deserves her allegiance, and therefore not only 
her empathy but also her sympathy. 
 These are, therefore, some of the cinematic techniques for establishing 
allegiance and inducing empathy. Although some are exclusive to film, the overall 
concepts of alliance and allegiance might be readily applied to written fiction as well. 
Furthermore, Murray Smith and Noël Carroll’s arguments about the importance of an 
audience’s moral approval of a character easily apply to both film and literature. Noël 
Carroll argues that “what bonds us to the protagonists affectively is sympathy, which 
is emotional attachment secured primarily by moral considerations and, contrariwise, 
what engenders antipathy toward the villains is their discernible moral failings” 
(“Movies, the Moral Emotions, and Sympathy” 15). This does not mean, however, 
that all characters with whom we feel allegiance must be objectively morally “good,” 
only that the film provokes us into approving of them. If a filmmaker wants to 
provoke allegiance in his or her viewers for a morally reprehensible character – such 
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as, for instance, Jonathan Demme does in Silence of the Lambs (1991) with Hannibal 
Lector – then traditional structures of alignment may not be enough. Lector’s ability to 
win over his audience is a complex mix of factors, including but not limited to: his 
gentlemanly behavior toward Clarice Starling; a stunning performance by an 
enigmatic, handsome, and charismatic Anthony Hopkins; and a reflexive comparison 
between Lector and his fellow serial killer, Buffalo Bill, who lacks Lector’s 
intelligence and wit or Hopkins’s charming and affective countenance. We therefore 
find ourselves approving of Lector morally in ways that we would not normally, and 
this paves the way for a strange and unexpected sense of allegiance. Allegiance allows 
for empathy, and empathy, in turn, allows the viewer to feel emotions that correspond 
(even if they are not identical to) the protagonist’s. Whether or not we feel-as Lector 
(and most viewers would say that they do not) the same way that we might feel-as 
Clarice Starling, we certainly feel-for and perhaps even feel-with him.  
It is extremely important to note that this process of moral judgment is one that 
takes place primarily at the unconscious level. Most movie-goers (and, indeed, fiction 
readers) do not make conscious decisions about who to root for and against. This 
renders the moral decision-making that humans make regarding fictional narratives 
not very different from the moral decisions that we make in real life. Cognitive 
psychologist and moral philosopher Jonathan Haidt has argued that moral decision-
making for humans is, generally-speaking, an unconscious, emotional process: 
Moral reasoning is usually an ex post facto process used to influence 
the intuitions (and hence judgments) of other people. In the social 
intuitionist model, one feels a quick flash of revulsion at the thought of 
incest and one knows intuitively that something is wrong. Then, when 
faced with a social demand for a verbal justification, one becomes a 
lawyer trying to build a case rather than a judge searching for the truth. 
(814). 
Haidt calls this phenomenon “the moral dog wagging the rational tail.” If pressed, 
movie-goers could probably give reasons for having either sympathy or antipathy 
toward certain characters, but their moral judgments are not made consciously or 
rationally, and the reasons they give may not be their real reasons at all. Indeed, this 
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unconscious and effortless experience of empathic emotion is assumed to be the 
reason that most people go to the movies (or choose to experience fiction more 
generally). But moral judgment of fictional characters, particularly in mainstream 
fiction, tends to be much easier than moral judgment is in real life, with no pesky 
complications to get in the way; the good guys are clearly good and the bad guys 
clearly bad most of the time, and if we ended up morally approving of one of the bad 
guys (as viewers do in Silence of the Lambs), there are usually strong reasons for it. 
But not all texts render moral judgments easy and not all of them invite this experience 




Verfremdungseffekte: Empathy and the Non-Immersive Text  
 
It is notable that the vast majority of research on empathy and fiction (whether 
visual or written) has been done on popular cinema and literature — on texts in which 
we do, indeed, care about literary or cinematic characters, to borrow Vermeule’s 
phrasing, and do so with relative ease. This limitation is not difficult to explain: The 
mode of fiction that has predominated in the Western world, and the mode that most 
Western readers (and, in the last hundred years, viewers) seem predisposed to enjoy, is 
one that allows us to easily read the minds of others, be that through mechanisms of 
simulation or theorizing. Such a mode of fiction is, in other words, one that 
encourages the easy and automatic establishment of readerly empathy. In All is True: 
The Claims and Strategies of Realist Fiction, Lilian R. Furst writes:  
“All is true” and its analogues . . . were remarkably successful in their 
own time in attaining their primary goal: to program readers to perceive 
the text not as an aesthetic artifact but as a record of the vicissitudes of 
human existence under the given circumstances of a particular place at 
a particular time. They encouraged a referential reading of the fiction as 
a replica or extension of readers’ own experiences. (12) 
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In other words, in accepting the claim of realist fiction that “all is true,” readers are 
able to receive the fictional work largely without question. Furthermore, they are able 
to project their own experience onto that of the characters, which were generally not 
unlike themselves. Both the belief in the “truth” — the realism — of the narrative and 
the proximity of the protagonist’s experience to the reader’s own, facilitates an easy 
establishment of empathy. But not all texts do this, and this dissertation is dedicated to 
thinking through the impact of the research that has been done on popular or 
immersive fiction and film for “unpopular” or non-immersive fiction and film. Clearly 
we experience these texts differently than we do their popular cousins. But how do we 
experience them differently, and, perhaps more importantly, to what end? Why did 
writers and filmmakers after 1945 turn to such “difficult” forms? 
Mine is not the first attempt to explain the cognitive difference between “easy” 
and “difficult” texts. Cognitive film theorist David Bordwell uses the term 
“dedramatization” to describe post-World War II European film that avoids many of 
the techniques common to immersive films. Hallmarks of the “dedramatized film,” 
according to Bordwell, include: no non-diegetic music or POV structures, which we 
have already established are crucial for establishing alignment and therefore 
allegiance; longer shots of figures in large, open spaces; silence and “dead time,” in 
which nothing much important or dramatic occurs; a muted acting style; what 
Bordwell calls “dorsality,” or the turning of the characters’ backs to the camera at 
particularly intense moments (14). Taken together, the result is films that are generally 
considered “difficult.” Sometimes, this is because they seem to evoke no emotion in 
us; they seem flat, affectless, and boring. At other times, it is because the emotions 
they evoke are unpleasant. Perhaps most aggravating of all is when characters’ goals 
are left entirely up in the air at the end of a film, and the audience has no way of 
knowing whether the hopes and aspirations they have adopted as their own have come 
to pass. All of these techniques are employed to varying degrees in the films of 
Michael Haneke, which I will discuss in Chapter 4.  
In a different vein, Lisa Zunshine accounts for the difficulty of certain texts by 
arguing that they require us to track our sources of information in ways that do not 
come naturally to us. For example, novels with unreliable narrators require us to 
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constantly bracket everything the narrator tells us with, The narrator claims that . . ., 
rather than simply taking the narrator’s information at face value, as we would in other 
novels. This, I argue, disrupts the establishment of the usual reader-narrator “pact”: 
that is, the “agreement,” in an admittedly anthropomorphic sense, that both the reader 
and the narrator will cooperate in the construction of the narrative. I concur with 
Zunshine insofar as she claims that such texts — which include, but are certainly not 
limited to, texts with unreliable first person narrators, such as Lolita and Die 
Blechtrommel — incur a large cognitive cost; however, I argue that this cognitive cost 
is not only due to the source monitoring itself, but what it does to our emotional 
experience of the fictional text. If what makes fiction accessible to us in general is the 
establishment of empathy and allegiance, then what makes fiction challenging is when 
those processes are disrupted.  
As I have already noted, this disruption is particularly common in 20th century 
postmodern texts, which very deliberately do not allow the mental states of their 
characters to be readily read or simulated by their readers or viewers. Mindreading 
becomes more difficult when the protagonist or narrator whose mind we would 
generally simulate is very different from ourselves, and it is more difficult still when, 
through narrative techniques, the mind of the protagonist or narrator is deliberately 
obscured. Gregor Currie notes the existence of such texts in Image and Mind, when he 
argues that, “Through incompetence and sometimes through design, the characters of 
fiction resist simulation: their responses to situations, their words, and even their 
thoughts (in so far as the author lets us know what they are) seem not to be those we 
would have in their situations” (155). In such cases, Currie notes, the reader must rely 
more heavily than usual on what he or she knows about the author’s intentions and 
about the genre of the work; however, I argue that such inferences are not enough. In 
such cases, I argue, the attempt to read the mind or minds in the text continues, but at 
the conscious level, a laborious and effortful process. It is these moments of empathic 
failure in which I am principally interested: moments in which the empathic, 
emotional experience that we expect from our fiction is disrupted. Although it would 
seem at first that the disruption of empathy would be an ethically murky narrative 
move, in fact, I will argue that postmodern writers do this not to decrease empathy, 
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though that is one effect, but rather to undercut the primacy of emotion in the 
rendering of moral judgments. In this section, I will discuss further certain 
distinguishing characteristics of modern and postmodern narratives, particularly the 
use of Verfremdungseffekte, or estrangement effects. Although I take my terminology 
here from Brecht, I think it will become clear that what I mean by Verfremdungseffekt 
must differ slightly from Brecht’s own definition, given our present-day understanding 
of how readers and viewers experience their texts.  
The most basic definition of the Verfremdungseffekt, or estrangement effect, is 
that the audience is prevented from immersing itself through identification with the 
characters. Brecht’s epic theater achieves the estrangement of its audience through a 
variety of theatrical techniques designed to diminish the effects of “first person” 
emotion in favor of epic or third person emotion. Such techniques include the denial of 
the fourth wall through the direct address of the audience and the creation of 
characters that are “flat” or otherwise unbelievable. The purpose of such distancing or 
estrangement is for the audience to remain aware of the text as fiction and therefore 
maintain a certain critical distance from its events. For Brecht, the audience’s 
empathic connection with a protagonist is a bourgeois distraction that prevents us from 
considering unpleasant truths. As Fredric Jameson says in his text Brecht and Method, 
the purpose of the estrangement effect is “[to] make something look strange, to make 
us look at it with new eyes,” which “implies the antecedence of a general familiarity, a 
kind of perceptual numbness” (39). Verfremdungseffekte render the familiar world 
strange to us and thereby resist the immersive experience; this stands in opposition to 
art that mimics the familiar world, allowing us to immerse ourselves comfortably 
within its fictions.  
Brecht called what I have termed immersive fictions “the culinary,” and was 
well known for his opposition to them; however, as Jameson points out, he was not 
opposed to them because they were entertaining, but rather because the bourgeoisie 
consumed them in such a way that allowed for the repression of “real thought,” 
“unpleasant truths,” and “ideas of action which either promise guilt or ask you to 
change your life” (37). It was this self-repression to which Brecht objected on 
ideological grounds, and which led Brecht, early in his career, to strongly oppose the 
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establishment of readerly (or viewerly) empathy vis-à-vis “identification.” For Brecht, 
there was no such thing as identification to begin with. He argued for “third person 
acting,” that is, “the quoting of a character’s expressions of feeling and emotion” 
(Jameson 53), as a result of the realization that what we think of as the “self” does not 
exist as such:  
. . . what we call our ‘self’ is itself an object for consciousness, not our 
consciousness itself: it is a foreign body within an impersonal 
consciousness, which we try to manipulate in such a way to lend some 
warmth and personalization to the matter. The simplest models of 
identification are therefore rendered meaningless by this situation, in 
which at best, in a Lacanian complexity, two self-objects would 
entertain a complex and mediated relationship with each other across 
the gaps of isolated consciousness as such. (53-54) 
In light of my discussion of empathy and its cognitive bases, Jameson’s description of 
identification seems to be fairly accurate; empathy in fiction between the reader and 
the narrator is indeed “a complex and mediated relationship” that bridges “gaps of 
isolated consciousness” between two “self-objects” – but that does not mean that it 
does not exist, nor does it mean that we should join Jameson in dismissing its power.  
Indeed, according to Douglas Robinson in Estrangement and the Somatics of 
Literature, Brecht himself eventually came to a more complicated understanding of 
the relationship between estrangement and empathy. Later in life, Brecht began “to 
rethink dialectically his youthful resistance to emotion and even empathy” (211). In 
contrast to the younger Brecht, for the older Brecht emotion did have a place in the 
theater; empathy and estrangement, rather than existing in a dichotomy or in pure 
opposition to each other, instead have a dialectical relationship. As Brecht himself 
states in his essay on Verfremdungseffekte in Chinese acting: “The alienation [or 
estrangement] effect intervenes, not in the form of absence of emotion, but in the form 
of emotions which need not correspond to those of the character portrayed. On seeing 
worry, the spectator may feel a sensation of joy; on seeing anger, one of disgust” (qtd 
in Robinson 94). In other words, the spectator, far from being immersed in the worry  
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of the character or in the anger of the character, is guided toward emotions that may be 
quite at odds with that of the characters.  
This dialectic of estrangement and empathy is the form of Verfremdungseffekt 
in which I am most interested, for there is no denying that reading texts such as 
Grass’s Blechtrommel or Sebald’s Austerlitz creates an emotional effect in the reader. 
But the emotional experience of the reader/viewer is very different from, and 
sometimes at odds with, the emotional experiences of the narrator-protagonists, and 
this creates a certain emotional dissonance. This dissonance is the result of the 
dialectical relationship between estrangement and empathy that Brecht identified later 
in his career. At times these narratives may also cause us to feel shame and extreme 
discomfort, if we feel that we are implicated in the societal structures being criticized. 
These emotions are moral ones. But at the same time, the dialectic I have identified 
renders actual moral judgment muchmore difficult. This is striking in contrast to 
popular film and literature, in which the moral judgments we make about characters 
tend to be clear — far clearer than they ever are in real life — and unconscious. I will 
now consider the reasons, both historical and moral, that postmodern writers might 
have wished to complicate the emotional decision-making process. 
 
 
History’s Emotional Dog and Postmodernism’s Rational Tail 
 
The roots of Postmodernism’s dialectic of estrangement and empathy certainly 
lie in the modernist movements of the early twentieth century, particularly post-World 
War I. But it is significant that the decades after 1945 saw a proliferation of these 
texts. I believe that historian Hayden White may offer some insight on the 
proliferation of ethically and emotionally difficult literature in the 20th century. In his 
groundbreaking essay “The Modernist Event,” White argues that in the twentieth 
century, “[t]he notion of the historical event has undergone radical transformation as a 
result of the occurrence in our century of events of a scope, scale, and depth 
unimaginable by earlier historians” (72). White calls such events “modernist events” 
and argues that they are possible only in the twentieth century. These events have had, 
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in his view, a profound effect on the type of storytelling in which postmodern authors 
have engaged. White writes: 
Modernist literary practice effectively explodes the notion of those 
characters who had formerly served as the subjects of stories or at least 
as representations of possible perspectives on the events of the story; 
and it resists the temptation to emplot events and the actions of 
characters so as to produce the meaning-effect derived by 
demonstrating how one’s end may be contained in one’s beginning. 
(74) 
For my own purposes, I am interested in understanding how such modernist events 
“implode” the notion of “character” as the nineteenth century understood it. If that is 
the case, then what are postmodern “characters” and how are readers to interact with 
them? By “interact,” I refer to several of the functions I have discussed so far in this 
essay, including the formation of allegiance, as well as feelings of antipathy or 
sympathy. In other words, White implies that modernist events have complicated our 
potential empathic reactions to literary (or, indeed, cinematic) characters. Thus, to 
White’s argument, I add that the change in our conception of character has been 
accompanied by a significant change in how we experience postmodern texts 
emotionally. The empathic connection between reader/viewer and protagonist has 
become dislocated, and the easy, automatic, pleasurable emotional experience of 
reading a novel or watching a film has become something far more complicated and 
difficult. 
The reasons for this seem, on the one hand, relatively intuitive, but for myself, 
they were surprisingly difficult to articulate. In order to do so, I would like to return 
once more to Jonathan Haidt’s emotional dog and its rational tail: that is, to the idea 
that human beings are generally inclined to make moral decisions and judgments 
emotionally and unconsciously, and then, later, reason backward. It is possible for 
people to change their minds about a moral judgment, but reason triumphs only rarely 
over emotion; much more often, we learn from Haidt, reason is emotion’s servant, 
even when we believe otherwise. If this is true, then we must consider how incredibly 
vulnerable and easily corrupted is our process of moral judgment. Many of Hayden 
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White’s modernist events have been precipitated by extreme outpourings of emotion. 
The most infamous example of this is, of course, the rise of National Socialism and the 
corresponding rise of antisemitism in Germany between 1933 and 1945. The perverse 
morality of National Socialism was predicated on the Nazis’ ability to create strong 
emotional affect in their constituents. Although the Nazis provided pseudoscientific 
data as the basis for their racist policies, this data was, in fact, a classic example of 
Haidt’s notion of “the rational tail” being wagged by “the emotional dog”; far from 
being the actual basis for Nazi policies, the Nazis’ pseudoscience of race provided an 
ostensibly rational basis for moral decisions that had already been made emotionally.  
 The emotional intensity of the National Socialist movement may be easily seen 
in the most famous propaganda film of the era, Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph des 
Willens (1935). Ostensibly a documentary of the 1934 “Reichsparteitag” in 
Nuremberg, a convention that celebrated the National Socialist Party and honored 
Adolf Hitler, the film is in fact generally agreed to be one of the most masterful pieces 
of political propaganda ever produced despite never explicitly espousing any 
particular ideological position. Writing about the film, Frank P. Tomasulo argues that,  
Although Triumph of the Will was made about the party convention, it 
does not really articulate any specific political policy or substantive 
ideology. Instead, preliterate symbolic imagery and vague patriotic 
appeals are used to address the emotional concerns of the populace. 
Indeed, Hitler repeatedly stressed that one could not sway the masses 
with arguments, logic, or knowledge, only with feelings and beliefs. 
(101, emphasis mine) 
From the very first shot of the film, this is what Riefenstahl sets out to do: “to appeal 
to the irrational character structure of its malleable mass audience” (Tomasulo 102). 
Hitler knew instinctively what it would take cognitive science another sixty years to 
prove: when it comes to decisions, such as which political party or leader to support, 
logic has very little to do with it. Admittedly, Triumph des Willens appears to have 
been most effective with those who had already bought what the Nazis were selling, so 
to speak; others, such as certain international reviewers who viewed the film at the 
Venice Film Festival in 1935, were much less impressed (Morgan 37). Within 
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Germany, however, the film encountered an audience that was primed for the 
emotional experience it offered, and there it was overwhelmingly successful.  
 Triumph des Willens has already been discussed at length by critics, both from 
film studies and historical perspectives, and I do not wish to retread old ground here. 
Instead, I will consider a few particular elements of the film in light of my preceding 
discussion of cognitive film, particularly the concepts of alignment and allegiance. 
Once we move beyond the intertitles that establish our point in history and remind the 
German audience of their humiliation in the Treaty of Versailles, the very first shot of 
the film is a POV shot from Hitler’s own point of view. We see the view from his 
plane as he descends, with extended shots of the clouds, the majestic buildings of 
Nuremberg from above, and the shadow of Hitler’s plane as it falls over the city. The 
vast majority of German citizens would have had no opportunity to experience flight, 
and so this would have been an extremely impressive sequence in 1935. But not only 
is it visually impressive, it also draws the viewer into alignment with Hitler himself 
extremely early in the film, before he has even landed in Nuremberg. Hitler is 
immediately constructed not as hero but as Messiah, descending from heaven to save 
the German people (Tomasulo 104).  
Despite these early techniques of alignment, the Führer himself remains 
largely out of the viewer’s emotional reach. There is no sense of subjective access to 
Hitler’s mind, no sense that the viewer might possibly understand what it is like to be 
him. These early scenes certainly align the viewer with Hitler, and they contribute to a 
strong sense of being uplifted, thanks to both the heavenly imagery and the music, 
which is peaceful and serene. But even as the film progresses, there is little chance for 
the viewer to achieve allegiance with Hitler. Hitler’s face is rarely expressive enough 
to provoke the sort of automatic responses that are so crucial to the establishment of 
empathy, and his physical appearance throughout the vast majority of the film 
“evinces stiff and rigid postures” (Tomasulo 114); when not returning the Sieg Heil 
salute being offered to him by the people, his arms are frequently folded over his 
chest. In general he appears unmoved by the displays of devotion that are shown to 
him. But in terms of the film’s agenda, that is to be expected: one does not render  
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moral judgment upon one’s own Messiah, nor should one ever presume to know what 
he is thinking.  
There is one exception to this trend, and that is Hitler’s final speech in the film, 
which is far more physical and visceral than any of the others. Even here, Riefenstahl 
does not indulge in extreme close-ups of the Führer, but the midrange shots of him 
behind his podium emphasize the increased emotional intensity of this scene. 
Tomasulo argues that this scene serves as “a fitting conclusion to a motion picture that 
has emphasized duty, submission, and a rein on one’s emotions”; furthermore, it 
“allows the audience to experience national catharsis and orgastic release at the 
climax” (114) of the film. I agree with Tomasulo insofar as this scene provides 
catharsis to the viewer, as the inaccessible and unemotional Hitler finally breaks, but I 
disagree that the film in general emphasizes the importance of having a “rein on one’s 
emotions.” Hitler certainly presents a stoic and unemotional visage, but other 
“characters” in the film, particularly ordinary Germans, do not. Tomasulo’s mistake is 
in assuming that Hitler is meant to be the source of the viewer’s emotional experience. 
If he were a hero in the traditional sense, he would be, but as I have already 
established, he is not a hero, he is a Messiah, and the viewer’s relationship to him is 
accordingly very different. 
For this reason, it is not Hitler but rather ordinary Germans that are the source 
of the viewer’s own emotional experience; it is the ordinary Germans with whom the 
viewer is most closely aligned and with whom he or she feels the most allegiance. 
This is clear when we return to the opening scene; once Hitler lands in Nuremberg, the 
POV structures shift away from him and toward the crowd. Close-ups are reserved for 
shots of ordinary citizens, such as those for whom the film was intended. This is 
particularly significant in the opening sequence, when Hitler lands and makes his way 
down a main boulevard of Nuremberg toward the hotel where he is staying. In these 
scenes, the focus is on the crowd, particularly on its size and the intensity of its 
emotions. The music swells, and there are multiple close-ups of children’s faces, alight 
with excitement. Everything in this early sequence works to inspire the viewer to 
similar emotional heights, through facial feedback, affective mimicry, and emotional 
contagion. Subsequent sequences are dryer in tone, as the film conveys the content of 
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the Reichsparteitag speeches, but the viewer is meant to remain buoyed up by this 
early emotional high and, perhaps more importantly, the film’s underscore. 
 Triumph des Willens resembles in parts a silent film, with music the only 
commentary that is offered to the viewer. Writing about the film, Ben Morgan notes 
that “[t]he effect of the film, both as an event of cultural importance, and as a 
spectacle that gripped its audience derived in no small measure from the musical 
framing and the score itself” (41). The film’s music was composed by Herbert Windt, 
but much of it is a montage of music that German viewers would have already been 
familiar with. Morgan addresses the opening sequence at some length, noting the 
musical quotations from a wide variety of sources: Wagner’s Meistersinger, his Ring 
cycle, and the Tannhäuser overture, as well as German folk music, military marches, 
and the Horst Wessel Anthem (Morgan 42). One function of this musical montage is 
historical depth (Morgan 42), but another effect, I argue, is the stirring of the viewer’s 
emotions vis-à-vis nostalgic impulses. Particularly coming on the heels of such stark 
reminders of the tragedy of Germany’s recent history, the music awakens within the 
viewer a longing for the past. Without these associations, it is no wonder that 
international reviewers found themselves bored by the film. For German viewers, 
however, Windt’s music serves as a reminder of German history, the glories of days 
now gone, and, more importantly, the promised glories of days to come. This is 
especially true when the music is coupled with the shots of statues and buildings in old 
Nuremberg, decorated with swastikas and the German flag. Whatever wagging of the 
rational tail that may have followed, the emotional dog lives in this opening sequence.  
 What I have attempted to show with this reading of Triumph des Willens is the 
intense emotionality that National Socialism deliberately evoked within its followers. 
Although the Nazis used pseudoscience to explain their racist policies, this “science” 
should never be understood as the source of those policies, nor of ordinary citizens’ 
collaboration with them. The science that Nazis used to explain themselves was 
merely one example of “reasoning backward” from a moral decision that had already 
been made emotionally, and it is possible to see in Triumph des Willens just how adept 
the Nazis were at stoking the fire of these emotions: the opening intertitles remind the 
German audience of their suffering and humiliation after World War I; the music and 
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the images evoke both nostalgia and eleation, reminding them of past glories, and 
promising new glories in the days to come; the close-ups of German faces, exclusively 
Aryan and alight with joy at the sight of their Führer, provoke similar joy in the 
viewer; and finally, the image of Hitler, breaking through his characteristic stoicism to 
passionately promise a better future for the German people, allows for cathartic 
release. These elements provided the emotional basis that eventually allowed the 
Nazis’ racist policies to succeed.  
 1945 represented a break, a schism, not only in Germany, but throughout the 
world. In its wake, writers, artists, and filmmakers struggled to make sense of what it 
would mean to produce art, poetry, fiction, beauty, after such an event. One effect of 
these struggles, I have already argued, is that literature and film became less inclined 
to invite empathy on the part of the viewer. This is not true for all post-1945 literature 
and film, of course, but only for the relatively small segment of films and novels that 
might be called “postmodern.” But why did these novels and films choose to 
complicate processes of empathy and “identification” that underpinned most of the 
fiction produced in the 19th century? When one considers the context of this artistic 
decision, it seems rather counter-intuitive. It would be both foolish and difficult to 
argue with the idea that National Socialism and particularly its racist policies were a 
failure of empathy. But would it not therefore seem logical that literature and film 
after 1945 should encourage more empathy in its readers and viewers, rather than less?  
Not so, it seems. Cognitive science and history have both taught us that there 
are limits to human empathy, and those limits severely impact the concrete moral 
decisions that we make. Such limits may be expanded, but their expansion happens 
only with time, conscious effort, and a certain amount of discomfort. Postmodern texts 
notably require all three of these from their audience. The onerous burden that these 
texts place on their readers and viewers is not a side effect of their project, but at the 
very heart of the project itself. Empathy-based moral decision-making is facile and, as 
I have demonstrated through my analysis of Triumph des Willens, it is also highly 
subject to emotional manipulation. And this, states psychologist and philosopher Paul 
Bloom in his essay “Against Empathy” in The Boston Review and “The Baby in the 
Well” in The New Yorker, is only the beginning of empathy’s problems: “Empathy is 
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biased; we are more prone to feel empathy for attractive people and for those who look 
like us or share our ethnic or national background. And empathy is narrow; it connects 
us to particular individuals, real or imagined, but is insensitive to numerical 
differences and statistical data” (“Against Empathy”). Bloom goes on to argue that,  
In light of these features, our public decisions will be fairer and more 
moral once we put empathy aside. Our policies are improved when we 
appreciate that a hundred deaths are worse than one, even if we know 
the name of the one, and when we acknowledge that the life of 
someone in a faraway country is worth as much as the life a neighbor, 
even if our emotions pull us in a different direction. (“Against 
Empathy”) 
Bloom’s arguments here are an acknowledgment of the limitations of empathy as a 
way of making moral decisions; of the way that the emotional dog tends to wag the 
rational tail, thereby resulting in decisions that are less “fair and moral” than they 
might be, even if they can be retroactively justified.  
 This is, in many ways, a difficult argument to make. Bloom himself 
acknowledges that being “against empathy” is “like announcing you hate kittens” 
(“Against Empathy”). And indeed, Bloom is not against all empathy; that would be 
ludicrous and impossible. But he is against thinking of empathy as a panacea for all of 
humanity’s ills. He is against the idea that if we only expand our capacity for empathy 
infinitely, we will achieve some longed-for utopia. This is as impossible as eschewing 
empathy entirely. We need, in other words, different ways of making moral decisions, 
if not instead of empathy, then certainly in addition to empathy. While emotional 
plays in a role to some degree in all decisions, there are ways of viewing the world 
that are not entirely based on empathy and emotion. The works that I consider in this 
dissertation deliberately provoke their reader or viewer to consider other ways, one of 
the most prominent of which might be skepticism. Indeed, as I will argue in the 
following chapters, the postmodern literature and film that I examine promotes an 
ethic of skepticism, of doubt, of questioning. 
The ways in which each work does this varies considerably, but they relate 
closely to the dialectic of empathy and estrangement that I have already identified. 
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With each text and author, an examination of the narrative structure will prove critical 
to the ideas that I intend to develop. All of the texts I am interested in deliberately 
complicate the relationship between the reader, the narrator (who is often but not 
always also the protagonist), and the implied author. Some of them do this by 
problematizing processes of alignment, rendering it difficult for the reader to read the 
mind of the narrator or to empathize with him. We might think of techniques that 
disrupt alignment as modes of narrative estrangement. Other techniques allow and 
encourage alignment but complicate processes of allegiance, by making it impossible 
for the reader to ever judge the narrator or the protagonist morally. These texts are 
often deliberately and inherently unreliable, so that even if we feel empathy toward the 
protagonist or narrator, the “relationship” we have with him is so uncertain that we can 
never quite be sure where we, as readers, stand. These techniques, which disrupt 
allegiance, are modes of ethical estrangement. Narrative and ethical estrangement are 
both present to some degree in all the texts I will discuss; together, they produce 
severe ambivalence and very often frustration in the reader. The nature of this 
frustration, however, varies considerably from one text to the next. The uncertainty 
produced by Günter Grass in Die Blechtrommel, which has to do with Oskar 
Matzerath's refusal to cooperate with his reader to construct a coherent narrative, is 
quite different from that produced by the hypermediated narration of W.G. Sebald’s 
Austerlitz.  
In this dissertation, I will argue that the disruption of empathy represents the 
attempt to introduce rationality and, more specifically, skepticism, into moral 
decision-making. The films and novels that I will consider make rendering moral 
judgment about the characters that we encounter very difficult, if not impossible. For 
example, it is nearly impossible to say by the end of Die Blechtrommel whether Oskar 
Matzerath is a hero or a murderer, a resistance fighter or a fascist. We are never able to 
comfortably judge him one way or the other — and we are not meant to. We must 
instead struggle with our own ambivalence and uncertainty; furthermore, our struggle 
with Oskar becomes, on some level, a struggle with ourselves. These postmodern texts 
engage our cognitive and moral faculties in ways that popular literature written in the 
tradition of realism does not. Such texts do not allow us to make emotional judgments 
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and then reason backward; rather, we must attempt to feel our way, blindly, toward a 
moral resolution, using both reason and emotions to guide our way. The dialectic of 
empathy and estrangement that I have described in this first chapter is visible in all the 
texts I will discuss, but it is not always visible to the same degree. I hope to 
demonstrate that the texts produced soon after 1945, such as Die Blechtrommel, are 
more inclined toward estrangement, while texts produced toward the end of the 
twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, such as Sebald’s novels and 
Haneke’s films, show signs of a drift back toward empathy. In a sense, the trajectory 
of history from 1945 to our present day might therefore be understood as a trajectory 




Slippery as an Eel: The Rise of Skepticism in Grass’s Die Blechtrommel 
 
Who is Oskar Matzerath? Is he a magician, a madman, a murderer? From the 
first page to the last of Günter Grass’s magnum opus Die Blechtrommel, it is almost 
impossible to say for sure. For all his impressive verbiage, Oskar remains stubbornly 
elusive. Although he seems to invite us into his mind with effusive enthusiasm, his 
mind itself is so slippery (not entirely unlike, one is tempted to say, an eel) that we 
never grasp it, nor are we quite sure we want to. It is a frustrating, at times infuriating, 
at times completely disgusting text, and yet it is almost inarguably the quintessential 
postwar German novel. It was published in 1959 into a Germany that had not yet 
begun the long and arduous process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, whose citizens 
may or may not have been ready for it. Grass offers a scathing critique of this society, 
particularly in Book Three, and it is clear that he is entirely uninterested in providing 
his (presumptively German) reader with a therapy session. Rather, Grass estranges his 
readers in the most shocking ways his can manage to force them to consider their own 
culpability in the moral failures of Nazi Germany. At the same time, there are, on 
occasion, surprising moments of intimacy between Oskar and his reader. These 
moments, however, serve primarily to problematize empathy and render it subject to 
skepticism and suspicion. 	  
The principal means by which Grass estranges his reader is through Oskar 
Matzerath himself. Oskar is what Gregor Currie calls a “controlling narrator,”	  
meaning that he is, fictionally, behind the actual narrative production. Indeed, I would 
argue that Oskar is the controlling narrator par excellence. Everything the reader is 
told is at his behest. If something is left out, it is his choice; when something is 
included, it is his choice. All interpretations are his. All evaluations are his. And with 
this power, he deliberately and with a great deal of skill sets out to destroy the maxim 
of realism as discussed by Lilian R. Furst: “All is true.”	  For Oskar, all is true and 
nothing is true. As Patrick O’Neill writes, “The problem with Oskar’s story is that it is 
precisely Oskar’s story, not only the story of Oskar but also and very emphatically the 
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story by Oskar”	  (Revisited, 30). This prevents Oskar’s reader from relaxing into the 
narrative, but rather induces a constant state of suspicion and, indeed, a certain amount 
of irritation. I argue that these negative emotional states also prevent the reader from 
forming the empathic connection with Oskar that readers of realist fiction expect to 
form with an narrator-protagonist; his mind is not fully open to us, for each time we 
come close to reading it, he aggressively estranges us. And yet, because Oskar is a 
controlling narrator, there is no other mind we may read. Grass, therefore, asks us to 
take up the mantle of Oskar’s madness and to consider Oskar’s own alien morality 
from the inside. Furthermore, even if some part of us recoils from doing so, we cannot 
help but stare in what Bernard McElroy in his work on the grotesque in Die 
Blechtrommel calls “fascination-repulsion”	  —	  much like Agnes Matzerath in the 
infamous eel scene, who is nauseated by what she sees and yet never turns fully away. 
Oskar’s mind cannot be read; he is too strange, too distant, too estranged from us. And 
yet we are compelled to try. The emotional dissonance that results from this failure is 
the essence of what I have defined in Brechtian terms as the dialectic between 
empathy and estrangement.	  
 This dissonance between the reader and Oskar as narrator is created by the 
very first line of Die Blechtrommel: “Zugegeben: ich bin Insasse einer Heil- und 
Pflegeanstalt” (9)3. This line immediately foregrounds Oskar’s unreliability and, in 
John Reddick’s words, “puts the reader on his guard” (83). He does not seek to hide 
this unreliability; indeed, he himself calls his stories “hoffentlich genaues 
Erinnerungsvermögen”4 (10). Are Oskar’s stories flat-out lies? Exaggerations? Insane 
ramblings? Memories? If they are memories, how accurate are they? These are the 
questions that confront Oskar’s reader, for Grass has chosen to “[present] a mad epoch 
through the eyes of a madman” (McElroy 97). It is the improbability of Oskar’s time, 
McElroy goes on to say, that allows improbability itself to become “an instrument of 
the artist” (97). There are limitless possibilities here, but also artistic problems, which 
Oskar himself lays out for the reader as he asks himself how he might begin: 
                                                
3 “Granted: I’m an inmate in a mental institution” (3). All English translations of Die Blechtrommel 
quotations are taken from the 2011 Breon Mitchell translation.  
4 “recollections, which [he hopes] will be accurate” (4). 
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Man kann eine Geschichte in der Mitte beginnen und vorwärts wie 
rückwärts kühn ausschreitend Verwirrung anstiften. Man kann sich 
modern geben, all Zeiten, Entfernungen wegstreichen und hinterher 
verkünden oder verkünden lassen, man habe endlich und in letzter 
Stunde das Raum-Zeit-Problem gelöst. Man kann auch ganz zu Anfang 
behaupten, es sei heutzutage unmöglich einen Roman zu schreiben, 
dann aber, sozusagen hinter dem eigenen Rücken, einen kräftigen 
Knüller hinlegen, um schließlich als letztmöglicher Romanschreiber 
dazustehen. Auch habe ich mir sagen lassen, dass es sich gut und 
bescheiden ausnimmt, wenn man anfangs beteuert: Es gibt keine 
Romanhelden mehr, weil es keine Individualisten mehr gibt, weil die 
Individualität verloren gegangen, weil der Mensch einsam, jeder 
Mensch gleich einsam, ohne Recht auf individuelle Einsamkeit ist und 
eine namen- und heldenlos einsame Masse bildet. Das mag alles so sein 
und seine Richtigkeit haben. (11-12)5 
All that may be true, but Oskar could hardly care less. Here, Oskar situates himself 
firmly in the tradition of Modernism — and then rejects it. He is a hero, Oskar insists, 
and he is an individual, and he is going to start at the beginning — before the 
beginning, even — and continue until he is done, even if that takes him longer than the 
five hundred sheets of “unschuldiges Papier” (11) that he has available to him, even if 
the reader starts to suspect that what he writes on his “unschuldiges Papier” is not 
quite true. As critics such as Volker Neuhaus have pointed out, it is strange for a 
narrator-protagonist to lay out a Romanästhethik in a book that is, ostensibly, a fiction 
biography: “In der Regel behaupten die fiktiven Verfasser fiktiver Autobiographien 
nichts anderes zu schreiben als ihre reale Lebensgeschichte, ‘Roman’ wird sie erst auf 
                                                
5 “You can start a story in the middle, then strike out boldly backward and forward to create confusion. 
You can be modern, delete all reference to time and distance, and then proclaim or let someone else 
proclaim that at the eleventh hour you’ve finally solved the space-time problem. Or you can start by 
declaring that novels can no longer be written, and then, behind your own back as it were, produce a 
mighty blockbuster that establishes you as the last of the great novelists. I’ve also been told it makes a 
good impression to begin modestly by asserting that novels no longer have heroes because individuals 
have ceased to exist, that individualism is a thing of the past, that all human beings are lonely, all 
equally lonely, with no claim to individual loneliness, that they all form some nameless mass devoid of 
heroes. All that may be true.” (4-5) 
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der Ebene des Titelsblatts, auf dem der Autor sich nennt, der Biographie wie 
Biographie erfunden hat. [. . .] Indem Oskar sich zur Romanästhetik äußert, stiftet er 
aber zugleich zusätzliche Verwirrung” (26).6 This “confusion” Neuhaus identifies 
might also be described as skepticism. By exploring the idea of Romanästhethik for 
his supposedly factual project, Oskar furthers his project of inculcating skepticism in 
the reader — a skepticism, I argue, that is not only an important element in the novel’s 
aesthetic project, but also in Grass’s ethical one.  
It is possible that this is a project that may only be undertaken by a narrator 
who has already accepted his own madness. Oskar himself attributes the accuracy of 
his “Erinnerungsvermögen” to his drum, through which he is able to conjure up details 
of the past: “Hätte ich nicht meine Trommel, der bei geschicktem und geduldigem 
Gebrauch alles einfällt, was an Nebensächlichkeit nötig ist, um die Hauptsache aufs 
Papier bringen zu können, und hätte ich nicht die Erlaubnis der Anstalt, drei bis vier 
Stunden täglich mein Blech sprechen zu lassen, wäre ich ein armer Mensch ohne 
nachweisliche Großeltern” (22).7 Oskar’s drum, then, is the means through which he 
reconstructs the past; it is what allows him to eschew the timelessness and 
spacelessness of Modernism in favor of a historical specificity all his own. But the 
reconstructed nature of the past, which Oskar emphasizes primarily through the things 
he admits his drum has not told him — like the fate of his arsonist grandfather — 
demonstrates the relationship between narrativizing the past and memory itself. That 
is, the reconstructed memories conjured up by Oskar on his drum demonstrate the 
intimate relationship between memory, narration, and fiction; in a sense, every 
narrative is a reconstructed one, and therefore unreliable. Thus, through Oskar’s 
particular and peculiar brand of unreliability, Grass demonstrates the inherent 
unreliability present in all narration.  
  
                                                
6 “Generally, fictional authors of fictional biographies do not claim to be writing anything other than 
the real stories of their lives. ‘Novel’ is written on the title page, on which is also the name of the author 
who invented the biography as biography. [. . .] By articulating a novel-aesthetic, however, Oskar 
creates confusion.” (My translation) 
7 “If I didn’t have my drum, which, when handled properly and patiently, recalls all the little details I 
need to get the essentials down on paper, and if I didn’t have the institute’s permission to let my drum 
speak three or four hours each day, I would be a poor fellow with no known grandparents” (12). 
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In this chapter, I will trace the threads of both narrative and ethical 
estrangement present in Die Blechtrommel. Oskar as unreliable — or more accurately, 
uncooperative — narrator is the source of most of the narrative estrangement in the 
novel, which renders the reader’s relationship with the text tenuous and at times 
contentious. The ethical estrangement of the text, characterized by a nearly constant 
emotional dissonance between Oskar and his reader, is induced largely through the 
text’s grotesque and disgusting elements. There are several scenes throughout the 
novel that appear to exist for no reason other than provoke a reaction of disgust within 
the reader; I argue that these scenes exist to estrange the reader viscerally as well as 
intellectually from the text. And yet, despite everything — despite his lying 
tendencies, despite his refusal to cooperate in the construction of a coherent and 
believable narrative, despite his propensity for describing the most vile things in 
excruciating detail — the reader is not without empathy for Oskar. I will end the 
chapter by discussing one of the most empathic moments in the text and what it means 
for the problematizing of empathy as a mode of moral decision-making: the 
Kristallnacht scene at the end of Book One. 
 
 
Narrative Estrangement: Oskar the Uncooperative Narrator 
  
Oskar Matzerath is an unreliable narrator. This statement has been accepted as 
fact since the publication of Die Blechtrommel. Oskar himself admits that he’s in an 
insane asylum, and there are times when, having related a particular event, he 
backtracks and underscores his own lies. The result is total confusion on the part of the 
reader. As Patrick O’Neill has written, “While a central discursive function of most 
traditional narratives, fictional or otherwise, is thus to assist us in our readerly 
endeavors to reconstruct the story, The Tin Drum gains much of its distinctive 
fascination precisely from the way in which the discourse hinders us in determining 
exactly what the story told really is” (Revisited, 30). Ultimately, O’Neill goes on to 
say, “the only thing we can be sure of about Oskar is that he does indeed narrate” 
(Revisited, 35). But the veracity of his narration is never resolved for the reader. 
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Unreliable narration is not, in and of itself, an unusual literary device, and it is 
certainly not unique to Die Blechtrommel. In Living to Tell about It, one of the most 
thorough and thoughtful recent studies of unreliable narration, James Phelan describes 
an unreliable narrator in the following way: “A character narrator is ‘unreliable’	  when 
he or she offers an account of some event, person, thought, thing, or other object in the 
narrative world that deviates from the account the implied author would offer”	  (49). 
There are two terms here that Phelan uses that require some unpacking. The first is 
“character narrator”; this sort of narrator, also often referred to as a “diagetic”	  narrator, 
is a narrator that is also a character in the narrative itself, such as Oskar Matzerath.  
The second term that requires unpacking is “implied author.”	  In the landscape of post-
Barthesian literary criticism, in which to speak of “the Author”	  is taboo, the “implied 
author”	  is “the implicit image of an author in the text, taken to be standing behind the 
scenes and to be responsible for its design and for the values and cultural norms it 
adheres to”	  (Prince qtd. in Zunshine 80). The implied author Günter Grass is to be 
confused neither with the real Günter Grass nor with the narrator Oskar Matzerath; 
indeed, as Phelan’s definition of an unreliable narrator implies, the goals of Grass and 
the goals of Oskar may be at complete odds with each other. It is this gap between the 
(sometimes implicit but often explicit) goals of the character narrator and the (usually 
only implicit) goals of the implied author that produces a work’s unreliability; it is 
also this gap that produces the estrangement effects in the reader, as the emotional 
experience of the reader is grounded in the goals of the implied author, rather than the 
goals of the narrator, even as the narrator’s mind is the only one to which we have 
access.	  
Phelan identifies six different types of unreliable narration in which an 
unreliable narrator may engage: misreporting, misreading, misevaluating, 
underreporting, underreading, and underregarding (51). Furthermore, these different 
types of unreliable narration occur upon three “axes of unreliability”: “the axis of 
characters, facts, and events,”	  “the axis of knowledge and perception,”	  and “the axis of 
ethics and evaluation”	  (50). Phelan’s framework for thinking about unreliability 
conceives of unreliability not only in terms of events but also in terms of narrative 
ethics and evaluation. This is particularly useful when considering Oskar’s particular 
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brand of unreliability, because the misevaluating or underregarding of the ethical 
implications of narrative events, both acts of unreliable narration that generally occur 
along the axis of ethics and evaluation, are a strong component of what estranges the 
reader and thereby renders the mind of the narrator difficult to read. What Phelan’s 
framework does not consider, however, is the level of deliberation with which a 
character narrator such as Oskar might deceive — and estrange — his reader. Gregor 
Currie does so, albeit rather implicitly, when he differentiates between two types of 
character narrators: embedded and controlling. An embedded narrator, according to 
Currie, is one whose telling of the narrative is reported by the text; however, an 
embedded narrator “is not, fictionally, responsible for the text we read”	  (Image and 
Mind 266). In contrast, a controlling narrator produces (in a fictional sense) the text 
that we read. Both controlling and embedded narrators may be considered unreliable 
within Phelan’s framework, but it is far more likely that a controlling narrator will 
engage in the sort of deliberate deception that I identify within Oskar Matzerath’s 
narration. Although Oskar’s presumed madness is certainly an important element in 
his unreliability from the first sentence of the text, I argue that not all of Oskar’s 
unreliability can be traced to this. There is also an element of deliberate deception that 
serves to widen the already profound chasm between Oskar and his reader. This 
deliberate deception, and the amount of effort it requires on the part of the reader to 
read against Oskar’s narration, renders Die Blechtrommel what Currie calls an 
unreliable work.	  
Die Blechtrommel as an unreliable work is distinct from (though also related 
to) Oskar’s status as an unreliable narrator. In Art and Minds, Currie argues that 
“[u]nreliable works . . . raise important questions about our access to works, and about 
the ways our presuppositions can mislead us in dealing with them. From the point of 
view of narrative theory, unreliable narrators are most interesting when they result in 
unreliable works”	  (138). Some works, such as Die Blechtrommel are blatant about 
their unreliability, though it is possible that one type of unreliability — Oskar’s self-
proclaimed madness and occasional confessed deception, which put the reader on the 
alert —	  may in fact mask other types of unreliability. I argue that Oskar is not 
unreliable —	  or not only unreliable —	  because he accidentally misreads, misregards, 
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misevaluates, or underreports certain events. He is also unreliable because he 
deliberately does these things, thereby deceiving his reader, with huge consequences 
for both the narrative and its reader. Unreliable narrators generally, but uncooperative 
narrators specifically, I argue, cause a break in communication between author and 
audience. In such a case, the reader is not able to pick up on the ethics of the text —	  
meaning those of the implied author —	  by empathically projecting his or her mind 
onto the character narrator. In such cases, says Phelan, a reader must either 
supplement the account offered by the unreliable narrator or else, in an even more 
radical and difficult readerly move, reject it outright (50-51); both supplementation 
and rejection require considerable cognitive effort on the part of the reader, because 
they require him or her to construct an alternate and presumably more reliable 
narrative that compensates and accounts for the narrator’s deception. If we understand 
Oskar not as well-intentioned but mad, but rather as a deliberate and perhaps 
pathological liar, then that significantly changes Oskar’s character and his relationship 
to his reader. An Oskar who is, admittedly, insane, but who does not deliberately 
deceive his reader (with whom he is engaged in a mutual process of narrative 
construction and confabulation) does not at least violate the pact of social cooperation 
established between narrator and reader. An Oskar who deliberately violates this pact, 
on the other hand, is not only unreliable, but also uncooperative. This creates a 
contentious relationship between Oskar and his reader, as well as a reading experience 
that is almost schizophrenic: one must constantly question what is happening in the 
novel and attempt to account for Oskar’s madness and/or lies.	  
However, as Patrick O’Neill argues, to attempt to interpret Oskar’s stories 
reasonably is “to fall spectacularly into the hermeneutic mantrap that is the central 
characteristic of Die Blechtrommel as a whole, namely, that we take seriously stories 
that are quite literally entirely impossible to believe” (Acts of Narrative, 111). What 
makes Die Blechtrommel such an uncomfortable or frustrating reading experience is 
that “because Oskar calls himself ich and tells us the story of his life, we diligently and 
even obsessively set about turning Oskar into a human being with all the 
psychological attributes we feel comfortable in assuming such a human being in such 
a set of circumstances would very likely possess or be possessed by” (O’Neill, Acts of 
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Narrative, 111-112). O’Neill goes on to argue that this compulsion on the part of the 
reader to provide psychologically reasonable explanations for Oskar’s stories is due to 
our desire for a rational explanation; my argument, in contrast, is that we do this 
because reading Oskar’s mind — the mind of the narrator-protagonist who “calls 
himself ich” — is something we are compelled to do, both by our experiences with 
other humans and our experiences with the psychologically realistic fiction with which 
most Western readers are familiar. We turn Oskar into a human being whose mind 
may be read and attempt, again and again, to “hook” our minds into his, even when 
Oskar himself scorns and ironizes our attempts at empathy. 
One of the primary techniques by which Oskar undermines his own reliability 
throughout the course of the novel is by offering multiple versions of the same event, 
or else returning to a straightforwardly narrated event later and correcting himself, as 
though compelled by his conscience to do so. The former happens for the first time 
very early in the text, as Oskar recounts his grandfather’s escape from the authorities 
and (probable) subsequent death beneath a lumber raft: “Man hat die Leiche meines 
Großvaters nie gefunden. Ich, der ich fest daran glaube, daß er unter dem Floß seinen 
Tod schaffte, muß mich, um glaubwürdig zu bleiben, hier dennoch bequemen, all die 
Version wunderbarer Rettungen wiederzugeben”8 (35). “Um glaubwürdig zu bleiben” 
is a highly ironic phrase coming from someone who has already admitted that he is in 
an insane asylum and who therefore has very little credibility to maintain. Even if he 
did, the logic behind this statement is difficult to parse: Why would Oskar feel 
compelled to recount what he clearly labels false versions in order to maintain his 
credibility with the reader? Far from building his credibility with the reader, by 
recounting multiple versions of events, Oskar brings his own telling of the events even 
more into question than it already was. As Neuhaus says, “Wie Oskar von Anfang an 
das Urvertrauen seiner Leser in ihn zerstört, so verspielt er an solchen Stellen auch 
jeden vielleicht in der Zwischenheit erworbenen Kredit und vergrößert ihn nicht etwas 
durch seine ‘Ehrlichkeit’ — warum sollte man dem, der einmal gelogen hat, die 
                                                
8 “My grandfather’s body was never found,” Oskar tells us. “Though I firmly believe that he met his 
death beneath the raft, I feel compelled, in order to maintain my credibility, to recount all the versions 
in which he was miraculously saved” (23). 
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nächste Version mehr glauben?”9 (23) Oskar appears to want to shake our faith in him, 
even as he declares the “false” versions of his grandfather’s story to be “Unsinn und 
Fischergeschwätz” (36) — especially the last story, about which he claims to give 
“keinen Pfifferling” (36), even as he tells it in loving detail.   
As the text progresses, Oskar’s deceptions grow bolder. In his telling of the 
deaths of both of his “presumed” fathers, Jan Bronski and Alfred Matzerath, Oskar 
tells the story one way, and then, in the subsequent chapter, admits that he has lied 
about it. In the case of Jan’s death, which occurs at the battle of the Polish Post Office, 
Oskar confesses once the action is over that he “embellished” [übertreiben] his 
previous account in certain small ways. He embellished, first of all, Jan’s final hand in 
the grisly game of skat he was playing with Oskar and Kobyella, the dying janitor, 
which was “kein Grandhand, sondern ein Karo ohne Zwein” (300)10. More 
significantly, however, he confesses that as they left the mailroom, “stellte sich Oskar 
schutzsuchend zwischen zwei onkelhafte gutmütig wirkende Heimwehrmänner, 
imitierte klägliches Weinen und wies auf Jan, seinen Vater, mit anklagenden Gesten, 
die den Armen zum bösen Mann machten, der ein unschuldiges Kind in die Polnische 
Post geschleppt hatte, um es auf polnisch unmenschliche Weise als Kugelfang zu 
benutzen” (300)11. Oskar does this solely for the sake of saving his drum, and save it 
he does, even as the German soldiers beat his presumptive father. Oskar tells that 
reader that “an jenem Tag datierte sich meine zweite große Schuld” (301)12, for he 
says, “Ich kann es mir nie, selbst bei wehleidigster Stimmung nicht verschweigen: 
meine Trommel, nein, ich selbst, der Trommler Oskar, brachte zuerste meine Mama, 
                                                
9 “Just as Oskar from the beginning destroys the reader’s original trust in him, so does he gamble away 
in such places any credit he may have accrued in the meantime and does not increase it through his 
‘honesty’ - for having been lied to once, why should we believe the next version any more?” (My 
translation) 
10 “not a grand but a diamond without two” (229) 
11	  “Oskar,	  seeking	  protection,	  inserted	  himself	  between	  two	  avuncular	  and	  seemingly	  good-­‐
natured	  members	  of	  the	  Home	  Guard,	  put	  on	  a	  show	  of	  pathetic	  weeping,	  and	  pointed	  at	  Jan,	  his	  
father,	  with	  accusatory	  gestures,	  transforming	  the	  poor	  man	  into	  a	  villain	  who	  had	  dragged	  an	  
innocent	  child	  to	  the	  Polish	  Post	  Office	  in	  typically	  barbaric	  Polish	  fashion	  to	  use	  as	  a	  human	  
shield”	  (229) 
12 “that day marks the assumption of my second great burden of guilt” (229) 
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dann den Jan Bronski, meinen Onkel und Vater ins Grab” (301)13. Oskar’s deception 
here, short-lived though it is, indicates that he has some qualms about allowing the 
reader to understand the “große Schuld” that he carries. Yet in the end he is compelled 
to confess to his crime, bringing the reader inside the privileged circle of Oskar’s guilt.   
The death of Oskar’s second presumptive father, Matzerath — and Oskar’s 
assumption of his third great burden of guilt — strongly echoes Jan Bronski’s earlier 
death. Matzerath dies in the chaos that follows the Russian liberation of Danzig, when 
he swallows his Nazi party pin out of panic that he will be found out. The pin is open, 
and the needle sticks in Matzerath’s throat, choking him until he is eventually shot by 
one of the Russian soldiers. Upon Oskar’s initial description, his role in Matzerath’s 
death seems minor: he merely hands Matzerath the pin. “Man kann jetzt sagen, dass 
hätte ich nicht tun sollen,” Oskar tells the reader. “Man kann aber auch sagen: 
Matzerath hätte nicht zuzugreifen brauchen” (488)14. Therefore, in this initial scene, 
Oskar accepts and then immediately rejects his guilt for Matzerath’s death. If he is 
responsible, then so is Matzerath himself.  
We are well into the next chapter (and Matzerath’s funeral) when Oskar finally 
admits that Matzerath’s death was more than tangentially his fault, confessing to 
himself, “daß er Matzerath vorsätzlich getötet hatte, weil jener aller 
Wahrscheinlichkeit nach nicht nur sein mutmaßlicher, sondern sein wirklicher Vater 
war; auch weil er es satt hatte, sein Leben lang einen Vater mit sich herumschleppen 
zu müssen” (502)15. Furthermore, Oskar adds,  
So stimmte es auch nicht, daß die Nadel des Parteiabzeichens schon 
offen war, als ich mir den Bonbon vom Betonfußboden klaubte. 
Aufgemacht wurde die Nadel erst in meiner geschlossenen Hand. 
Sperrig und stechend gabe ich den klebenden Bonbon an Matzerath ab, 
                                                
13 “I can never silence that inner voice, be it ever so plaintive: It was my drum, no, it was I myself, 
Oskar the drummer, who sent first my poor mama, then Jan Bronski, my uncle and father, to the grave” 
(230) 
14 “Now you might say I shouldn’t have done that. But you might also say that Matzerath didn’t have to 
reach out for it” (374). 
15 “Oskar confessed to himself that he had deliberately killed Matzerath because of the high probability 
that he was not only his presumptive father, but his real father as well; and because he was fed up with 
having to haul a father around with him all his life” (385). 
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damit sie den Orden bei ihm finden konnten, damit er sich die Partei 
auf die Zunge legte, damit er daran erstickte — an der Partei, an seinem 
Sohn; denn das mußte ein Ende haben!16 (502)  
Oskar accepts his guilt, therefore, though he does not seem to feel guilty in the same 
way he does regarding Bronski’s death. Matzerath’s death was necessary, in the way 
that every generation’s death is necessary. Still, it is at such moments that Die 
Blechtrommel is at its most confessional; it is at these moments that we might come 
close to believing Oskar, even if it is hard to empathize with his patricidal tendencies. 
 However, when one digs below the narration offered by Oskar, one starts to 
wonder if Oskar’s confessions are not somewhat disingenuous. By lying to the reader 
and then confessing to the lie, Oskar seems to believe that he increases his credibility 
with the reader. But this is, I would like to argue, deliberate disingenuity on Oskar’s 
part. Although the scene at Matzerath’s funeral contains one confession, it also 
contains a deception. Oskar originally claims that he throws his drum and his 
drumsticks in the grave and then, entirely by his own choosing, begins to grow (504). 
It is not until the next chapter that Oskar reveals what really happened: His 
“angeblicher” [presumptive] son Kurt throws a rock at the back of Oskar’s head, 
which causes Oskar to fall into Matzerath’s grave, right behind his drum. Oskar insists 
that his growth began before then, but as far as the rest of his family is concerned, the 
growth was caused when Kurt threw the stone. Oskar himself points out that this 
provides a parallel to his third birthday. Though Oskar insists that he chose to stop 
growing, the “grownups” claimed that his growth was halted by a tumble down the 
cellar stairs (509). If Oskar’s intention here is to increase his credibility with his 
audience by confessing to an earlier lie, than his attempt backfires. Oskar’s admitted 
deception throws his claims about choosing to grow into a strange light — and, by 
association, his earlier claims about refusing to grow. Oskar himself simultaneously 
recognizes and refutes the reader’s growing skepticism, when he says that, “Man mag 
                                                
16 “Nor was it true that the Party pin was open when I picked the bonbon up off the concrete floor. The 
pin was first opened within my closed hand. I passed the sticky bonbon on to Matzerath, pointed and 
jagged, so they would find the badge on him, so that he would choke on it - on the Party, on me, on his 
son; for this had to stop!” (385) 
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in diesen Erklärungen die verständliche Sucht des Menschen erkennen, die da jedem 
Wunder den Beweis liefern möchte. Oskar muß gestehen, daß auch er jedes Mirakel 
genaustens untersucht, bevor er es als unglaubwürdige Phantasterei zur Seite schiebt” 
(509).17 “Unglaubwürdige Phantasterei” might be a good way of describing Oskar’s 
own story, but of course in this case, as in the much earlier scene wherein Oskar 
purportedly refuses to grow, the reasonable explanation provided is, according to 
Oskar, patently false. He either does not recognize that he is asking his reader to 
believe in miracles, or else he does recognize it, in which case this passage is a subtle 
joke on the reader. The question then becomes how much of Oskar’s deception is self-
deception? Is he lying to the reader or is he simply that deluded? It may be impossible 
to say for sure. But I would like to argue that these cycles of deception and confession 
attempt to distract from the much deeper deceptions that run throughout the narration 
of Die Blechtrommel. These deeper deceptions cannot be explained by Oskar’s 
“burden of guilt”; they are not deceptions that are meant to draw the reader in 
empathically and render him more comprehensible. They are not the unconscious 
deceptions of a madman. Rather, they are the deliberate deceptions of a liar — or of a 
fiction writer.  
Two prime examples of moments in which Oskar very probably deceives the 
reader and does not confess are those in which he seemingly turns the narrative over to 
someone else. The first of these comes at the end of Book Two, when Oskar turns the 
narrative over to his keeper, Bruno. Although Oskar claims that he is dictating his 
narrative to Bruno at this point, it seems in many ways unlikely. Indeed many critics, 
such as Bernard McElroy and Patrick O’Neill, have argued that it is equally possible, 
if not more so, that this entire scene is a fabrication by Oskar himself. If Oskar is in 
fact lying to us here, then that means that he is deliberately tricking us into believing 
that we are experiencing an outside perspective on Oskar — an objective perspective 
— when in fact we are experiencing no such thing. We trust Bruno, perhaps, more 
than we trust Oskar; Bruno, after all, is not an inmate in an insane asylum. By 
                                                
17 “One recognizes in these explanations mankind’s reasonable desire to provide a rational basis for 
every miracle. Oskar has to confess that he too examines miracles from all angles before casting them 
aside as totally implausible fantasies” (391).  
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provoking us into trusting Bruno, Oskar temporarily provokes us into trusting him as 
well, into putting more stock into his reliability than is generally the case.  
Ironically, Oskar provokes the reader into trusting Bruno by using Bruno to 
cast doubt upon Oskar himself, making this the perfect example of how Oskar masks 
deeper deceptions with surface ones. The circumstances of this change in narrator are 
that memories of the very painful trip Oskar made from Danzig into the west, during 
which he grew for the first time since the age of three, have caused Oskar’s fingers to 
stiffen and swell; therefore, Oskar asks Bruno to write for him. Bruno’s retelling of 
Oskar’s story includes certain linguistic quirks and narrative asides that disclose his 
own doubt in the veracity of the stories. For example, he uses such phrases as “mein 
Patient behauptet,” “behauptet Herr Matzerath,” and “möchte mein Patient sagen” 
(524-525) to distance himself from the narration. In other places he goes yet further, 
and more or less calls Oskar a liar: For example, he describes one of the other 
inhabitants of the boxcar in which Oskar, Maria, and Kurt traveled toward Germany as  
ein junges Mädchen mit Kopftuch, in welchem Herr Oskar Matzerath 
ein gewisses Fräulein Luzie Rennwand erkannt haben will. Nach 
mehreren Anfragen meinerseits gibt mein Patient aber zu, daß jenes 
Mädchen Regina Raeck hieß, spricht aber weiterhin von einem 
namenlos dreieckigen Fuchsgesicht, das er doch immer wieder by 
Name nennt, Luzie ruft; was mir nicht hindert, jenes Mädchen hier als 
Fräulein Regina einzutragen.18 (522) 
In this scene, Oskar lies unsuccessfully to Bruno, who then reports the lie to the 
reader; but I concur with McElroy, who argues that the true deception of this scene is 
not in the details that Oskar supplies to Bruno, but rather in the fact that Bruno is not 
telling the story at all, not even second-hand; Oskar is. If this is true, then Oskar is 
deliberately deceiving the reader without a subsequent confession. 
 
                                                
18 “a young woman in a scarf, whom Herr Matzerath claimed to have recognized as a certain Fräulein 
Luzie Rennwand. Upon further questioning on my part, however, my patient admits that the young 
woman’s name was Regina Raeck, but continues to speak of a nameless triangular fox face he 
repeatedly refers to by name as Luzie; which does not stop me from entering the young woman’s name 
here as Fräulein Regina” (402). 
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Similarly, toward the end of the novel, Oskar appears to turn the narrative over 
to someone else, in this case, to his friend Vittlar. At the time that Vittlar assumes 
responsibility for the narrative, he is testifying against Oskar in his murder trial, for he 
is accused of having murdered the nurse, Sister Dorothea. Even more than Bruno, 
Vittlar’s narrative voice bears an uncanny resemblance to Oskar’s own, even where he 
claims to diverge from Oskar’s own account of events, such as when he when he 
relates how he and Oskar first met: “Bis heute kann ich nicht begreifen, warum der 
Angesprochene in mir, nur weil ich im Apfelbaum lag, das Symbol einer Schlagen 
sehen wollte. Auch verdächtigte er die Kochäpfel meiner Mutter, sagte, die seien 
gewiß paradiesischer Art” (704).19 In Oskar’s account, it is Vittlar who brings the 
apples into their conversation, telling Oskar not to be suspicious, and Oskar who 
denies that he is. This exchange shifts the center of madness, or at least of 
unreliability, from Oskar onto Vittlar and back again. Even before this, however, it 
should be noted that Vittlar is not trustworthy in the same way that Bruno is; Vittlar is, 
by his own admission, just as much of a liar and a fraud as Oskar himself. He does not 
turn Oskar out of any sense of justice. Indeed, he does not turn Oskar in at all for over 
a year, and when he does it is because Oskar tells him to, so that Vittlar will fulfill his 
lifelong dream of committing some feat great enough to make newspaper headlines. 
All of what follows — Oskar’s flight into France, his trial and Vittlar’s testimony, 
even his commitment to an asylum — is but “ein von uns erfundenes Spiel, ein 
Mittelchen mehr, unsere Langeweile und Einsamkeit zu zerstreuen und ernähren” 
(704).20 But while there is much about Vittlar that is untrustworthy, he does not 
appear to lie to the reader outright; indeed, his deceptions are quite out in the open, in 
much the same way that Oskar promptly admits, in the novel’s opening line, that he is 
a patient in an insane asylum. Furthermore, his testimony — if it is indeed his 
testimony — calls into question Oskar’s own claim that he is innocent. The reader is 
left wondering whether Oskar did, indeed, murder Dorothea; that he may have done so 
                                                
19 “I still can’t understand why the accused saw me as the symbol of a snake, simply because I was 
lying in an apple tree. He was suspicious of my mother’s cooking apples too, and said they must 
certainly be of the Paradise variety” (541).  
20 “a game we invented, just one more small way of diverting and nourishing our boredom and 
loneliness” (541). 
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does not seem out of the realm of possibility, given Oskar’s instability and his history 
with the woman in question. This narrative act therefore casts further suspicion onto 
Oskar and recalls the question with which I began this chapter: Who is Oskar 
Matzerath? After seven hundred pages, it is still impossible for the reader to say for 
certain. 
In the fifty-five years since the publication of Die Blechtrommel, much work 
has been done to attempt to untangle Oskar’s lies from his truths. This is heavy 
cognitive work that requires a conscious rejection of Oskar as a reliable narrative; it 
requires, in fact, that we work at cross-purposes with Oskar, in violation of the 
traditional narrator-reader pact of social cooperation that we are used to from realist 
fiction. But we do so because we sense that Oskar himself has already violated this 
pact and done so deliberately. This ensures that our emotional experience will never 
— or nearly never — be in step with Oskar’s own. This dissonance is the source of 
much of the irony in the text, as well as our estrangement. Oskar never tells us what 
we should feel, and his own feelings are certainly no reliable moral compass. Rather, 
we are led through Die Blechtrommel by what I am calling an ethic of skepticism: by 
the general rule that nothing is to be believed and everything is to be questioned. This 
ethic underscores the problematic aspects of empathy, namely that it requires a certain 
amount of gullibility on the part of the reader, and this gullibility, I will show, is a 
major sin for implied author Grass. He therefore ensures, through both the narrative 
estrangement I have discussed in this section and the ethical estrangement I will 
discuss in the next, that only the most determinedly gullible reader will fall into 
Oskar’s hermeneutic trap.  
 
	  
Ethical Estrangement: The Alchemy of the Grotesque and the Disgusting 
  
In an oft-quoted review of The Tin Drum immediately after its publication in 
1959, Hans Magnus Enzensberger offered the following insights into the text: 
Die Blechtrommel kennt keine Tabus. Gewalttätig wirkt dieser 
Roman, weil er alles berührt, als wäre es antastbar. [. . .] Immer 
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wieder tritt die Erzählung in jene verbotenen Sphäre ein, wo sich Ekel 
und Sexualität, Tod und Blasphemie begegnen. Was Grass in dieser 
Hinsicht einerseits von aller Pornographie trennt, andrerseits von dem 
sogenannten ‘schonungslosen Realismus’ der amerikanischen Schule 
unterscheidet, Was seine brüsken Eingriff legitimiert, ja zu 
künstlerischen Ruhmestaten macht, das ist die vollkommene 
Unbefangenheit, mit der er sie vornimmt. Grass jagt nicht wie Henry 
Miller, hinter dem Tabu her: er bemerkt es einfach nicht. Zu Unrecht 
wird man ihn der Provokation verdächtigen. Er ist dem Skandal weder 
aus dem Weg gegangen, noch hat er ihn gesucht; aber gerade dies 
wird ihn hervorrufen, daß Grass kein schlechtes Gewissen hat, daß für 
ihn das Schockierende zugleich das Selbservständliche ist. 
(Enzensberger 9-10)21 
This passage concisely details much of what is both difficult and yet magnificent 
about Die Blechtrommel. However, I do not quite concur with Enzensberger when he 
argues that Grass “simply doesn’t notice” taboos; I would argue that Grass recognizes 
them just fine. It is Oskar who does not notice them, and since it is Oskar’s head we 
occupy when we read Die Blechtrommel, it is Oskar who shocks us by taking that 
which we believe he should find shocking or disgusting for granted. The reader’s 
disgust and, moreover, the gap between the reader’s disgust and Oskar’s lack of it, 
create a profound chasm, one that the reader feels compelled to try and cross. This 
attempt at empathy, however, is bound to fail, and this empathic failure is, I argue, a 
fundamental aspect of the text’s ethics. In this section, I will discuss the significance 
of both the grotesque and the disgusting for this failure and for the dialectic of 
empathy and estrangement in the text. The grotesque, I will show, asks us to imagine a 
                                                
21	  The	  Tin	  Drum	  knows	  no	  taboos	  .	  .	  .	  Again	  and	  again	  the	  narrative	  enters	  the	  forbidden	  sphere	  
where	  disgust	  and	  sexuality,	  death	  and	  blasphemy	  meet.	  What	  differentiates	  Grass	  in	  this	  respect	  
both	  from	  any	  form	  of	  pornography,	  and	  from	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘stark	  realism’	  of	  the	  American	  school,	  
what	  legitimates	  these	  blunt	  forays,	  indeed	  elevates	  them	  to	  acts	  of	  artistic	  brilliance,	  is	  the	  total	  
objectivity	  with	  which	  he	  presents	  them.	  Unlike	  Henry	  Miller,	  Grass	  does	  not	  seek	  out	  taboos;	  he	  
simply	  doesn’t	  notice	  them.	  It	  would	  be	  unfair	  to	  accuse	  him	  of	  deliberate	  provocation.	  He	  neither	  
avoids	  scandal	  nor	  invites	  it;	  but	  that	  is	  precisely	  what	  will	  give	  rise	  to	  scandal:	  Grass	  doesn’t	  have	  
a	  guilty	  conscience,	  he	  takes	  what	  we	  find	  shocking	  for	  granted.	  (Mitchell	  translation,	  2)	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world that truly is as we fear our own might be. Disgust, however, does not require 
any such imaginative effort on our part; disgust and the disgusting are far more “real” 
to us than the grotesque. Although the grotesque and the disgusting appear at first to 
have a great deal in common, in the end we must conclude that they serve opposing 
functions: the grotesque fascinates us, even as we can never quite fathom it, while the 
disgusting — mundane and fathomable though it is — repels us. 
 What is therefore worth examining in Die Blechtrommel is where the grotesque 
and the disgusting meet in the character of Oskar. He is both, at least at certain points 
in the novel, but what makes him both are not the same qualities. We could imagine an 
Oskar who is grotesque but not disgusting: He might be a liar, he might be a madman, 
but he would not seem to delight in relating to the reader things that he knows force us 
to control our gag reflexes. Such a character might, potentially, be far more 
charismatic than the Oskar we know; we might it far easier to be drawn in by him, to 
“hook” our minds into his. Empathizing with an Oskar who is grotesque but not 
disgusting might not be impossible. Conversely, we can imagine an Oskar who is 
disgusting but not grotesque, but such a figure lacks the charisma of our own Oskar; 
he is merely repellant. When the grotesque and the disgusting are brought together, 
however, something almost alchemical occurs. Together, the grotesque and the 
disgusting serve in Die Blechtrommel to create a character who is strangely rooted in 
both fantasy and reality and who both fascinates and repels the reader in equal 
measure. The push-pull of the grotesque and the disgusting in The Tin Drum forces us 
to maintain a certain defensive (and critical) distance, even as we continually attempt 
to bridge that distance.  
Grass is hardly alone among postmodern writers in his use of the grotesque in 
his novels. The relationship between modernity and the grotesque has already been 
explored at some length by critics. John R. Clark, for example, argues that the modern 
and postmodern affinity for the grotesque stems both from an increased understanding 
of the irrationality of our own minds and from contact with Hayden White’s 
“modernist events.” The world is no longer the rational place the 19th century felt it to 
be, and we are no longer its rational masters; science may lower the infant mortality 
rate and explain to us the neurological workings of our brains, but it also is responsible 
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for the atomic bomb and for countless atrocities that have been committed in its name 
throughout the last hundred years. For the novelists with whom Clark is concerned, 
which include Franz Kafka, William Faulkner, Samuel Beckett, and Gabriel García 
Márquez in addition to Grass, there is nothing left but to either laugh or weep at our 
own absurdity and that of our chaotic, entropic world. This postmodern estrangement 
is markedly different from Brecht’s attempt to unveil the capitalist underpinnings of a 
corrupt society. According to Clark, for modernist and postmodernist authors, 
estrangement is less a technique and more a way of being that is predicated on and 
necessitated by living in the 20th century. For such authors, humanity in the 20th 
century is distinctly less human than it was in the 19th, and as a result the characters 
who populate the fiction of these writers are less transparent to us than characters in 
literature of the 19th century; their humanity is obscured because, for Kafka, for 
Grass, for Márquez, our own humanity is obscured as well. 
 It is, therefore, not at all surprising that the grotesque in the 20th century is 
intimately related to processes of dehumanization. Indeed, the definition of the 
grotesque offered by a number of scholars, including Bernard McElroy and Shun 
Liang-Chao, is that it is, above all else, transformational. McElroy describes the 
grotesque in the following way:	  
The most pervasive effect of . . . animalism and corporeal degradation 
in grotesque art is to direct our attention to the undignified, even gross 
physicality of existence, and to emphasise it by exaggeration, 
distortion, or unexpected combination. The result may be thought of as 
an arc ranging from the entirely animal, through the human-animal, to 
the entirely human. (11)	  
Therefore, the literal transformation of a human into an animal, such as in Kafka’s 
“Die Verwandlung,”	  is clearly, by McElroy’s definition, grotesque. But perhaps more 
interestingly, McElroy describes the “entirely human”	  grotesque in two ways: first, 
“[t]he depiction of humans so deformed as to be astonishingly ugly and suggest an 
aberration of nature”	  (11-12); second, “[t]he depiction of humans in some state so 
bizarre, macabre, or gross that human dignity is obliterated and even identity is 
threatened”	  (12). In other words, the process by which something becomes grotesque 
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is also the process of dehumanization, and this process is hardly limited to literal 
transformations such as Gregor Samsa’s. Oskar is also, by McElroy’s definition, 
grotesque, for he is a strange, disturbing amalgamation of man and child, “at once 
barrenly infantile and sexually potent”	  (Clark 23). 	  
However, it is not only Oskar’s amalgamated qualities that are the source of 
the grotesque in Die Blechtrommel. The events of the novel itself, or rather Oskar’s 
interpretations of them (unreliable and uncooperative though they may be), also 
contribute significantly to it. Both McElroy and Liang-Chao note that the grotesque is 
unmistakably uncanny, an effect that Liang-Chao says may be attributed to “the 
happening of fantastic events in a verisimilar setting,”	  which leads to “the cognitive 
confusion of fantasy and reality, the alien and the familiar, the ‘I’	  and ‘not I’”	  (10). 
Similarly, McElroy argues that the grotesque perverts the relationship between the 
familiar and the fantastic, when he writes that, “The grotesque transforms the world 
from what we ‘know’	  it to be to what we fear it might be. It distorts or exaggerates the 
surface of reality in order to tell a qualitative truth about it. The grotesque does not 
address the rationalist in us or the scientist in us, but the vestigial primitive in us, the 
child in us, the potential psychotic in us”	  (5). This displacement of reality and the 
rendering of the world we know into something monstrous is one aspect of what 
makes mind reading in “grotesque”	  texts difficult; the world such texts exposes us to is 
similar to, but not quite, our own, and the people we encounter there are like those that 
populate Lewis Carroll’s Wonderland: too strange, too distorted to be fully or easily 
understood. In such a world, neither the psychologies nor the emotional landscapes of 
those who live there are likely to be anything like our own. 	  
It is for this reason that Bernard McElroy argues that the source of the 
grotesque in Die Blechtrommel is Oskar’s madness. He notes that Grass is hardly 
unique in the pantheon of twentieth century literature for having a madman as his 
narrator; however, he argues that “[among] this bizarre gallery of deranged narrators . 
. . Oskar Matzerath is unique and preeminent, not only because of the brilliance of the 
characterisation, but because of Grass’s ability to use his narrator as a perspective, a 
way of seeing and presenting a whole epoch of collective madness”	  (96). It is 
therefore not Oskar’s personal madness that so elevates Die Blechtrommel in 
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McElroy’s view, but rather the relationship of that madness to the madness of the era 
in which Oskar lived that allows “improbability”	  to become “an instrument of the 
artist”	  (97). It is this improbability that allows the narrator Oskar to ask us to believe 
in certain improbable or even impossible aspects of Die Blechtrommel: Oskar’s ability 
to choose to stop growing (and, later, to choose to grow again) and his ability to 
singshatter glass, and the various magical properties of his drum, which range from 
controlling people to conjuring up history that Oskar has no way of knowing. “[It] is 
through such incidents,”	  writes McElroy, “that Grass transforms the historical world 
of Nazi Germany and the bourgeois postwar era into the grotesque private world of his 
narrator”	  (97).	  
 The grotesque in Die Blechtrommel is therefore intimately related to Oskar’s 
unreliability or uncooperativeness as narrator. The result of Oskar’s narrative madness 
is that the reader becomes deeply disoriented, as he or she is forced to engage in the 
sort of analysis I performed earlier in this chapter to untangle the web of Oskar’s 
truths and lies. But this attempt is doomed to failure: 
We can never quite pin down at what point credulity rebels and we see 
the narrator, and behind him the author, making mad additions and 
grotesque embellishments. By raising the question of Oskar’s sanity 
and then refusing to settle it finally, Grass creates a fluidity of 
perspective, multiplying the possibilities for bizarre incidents by 
diminishing the differences between sane and insane, subjective and 
objective, historical and fantastic — a fluidity that proves invaluable in 
dealing with a period when history was fantastic and behavior insanity 
in an international scale. (McElroy 99) 
It is impossible to entirely untangle the sane from the insane, the historical from the 
fantastic, the real from the grotesque, the truth from the lies, for they are like the house 
of cards that Jan Bronski builds during his own episode of madness during the defense 
of the Polish Post Office: If one card is removed the whole thing crumbles. Die 
Blechtrommel is essentially Clark’s argument about modernity synthesized into 
fiction. Indeed, each of the texts that I consider in this dissertation makes this  
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argument in some way. But what neither Clark nor McElroy addresses is how the 
grotesque in Die Blechtrommel is paired with the disgusting.  
There is certainly a close association between the disgusting and the grotesque, 
both within Die Blechtrommel and elsewhere. Although that which is disgusting is not 
always grotesque, the visceral, body-based emotion of disgust nearly always plays a 
role in our reaction to the grotesque. Furthermore, disgust as an emotion is not limited 
to the physical realm. On a daily basis, we encounter the language of disgust used to 
describe those whom we find morally repulsive, and the ethical consequences of such 
language, which cannot be dismissed as “mere”	  metaphor, is enormous. William Ian 
Miller ultimately argues in The Anatomy of Disgust that the transcendence of disgust is 
about love –	  or perhaps, as we might think of it here, about the purer state of empathy 
engendered by love. Where love exists, so must mind reading and empathy; but where 
love does not exist, empathic reactions in the face of disgust become extremely 
difficult, if not impossible. Disgust has the distinct tendency to render the minds of 
those whom it objectifies completely opaque. 	  
As a historical example of this phenomenon, Miller recounts how the emotion 
of disgust functioned in the exclusion of lepers and Jews in the Middle Ages, noting 
that lepers “were associated with rotting flesh and cadavers,”	  while Jews “were 
associated with excrement and menstrual blood”	  (155). But the association in these 
two instances ran in opposite directions: it was the physical disgust that people felt 
toward lepers that led them to believe that they were also morally disgusting, while it 
was the belief in Jewish moral depravity that led Christians to believe that the body of 
the Jew “must then be as disfigured as his soul”	  (156). Miller’s analysis here strikes at 
the interdependence between physical and moral disgust. That which we find 
physically disgusting, we are also apt to find morally disgusting, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, he alludes to the contaminative nature of disgust: that which is 
disgusting can contaminate everything around it or associated with it. On this basis, 
the exclusion of certain groups from communities has been justified; such groups 
become incontrovertibly, disgustingly Other. Similarly, philosopher and psychologist 
Paul Bloom writes, “The potential to think of people and their actions as disgusting is 
intimately related to whether you see someone as a physical body, in which case 
62 
disgust is hard to avoid, or as a soul, in which case you can transcend it”	  (156-157). In 
other words, Miller and Bloom agree that disgust helps us separate those who are like 
us from those are not; those who fall within what Paul Bloom calls the moral circle 
from those who do not; those who are worthy of empathy from those who are not. 
Disgust makes empathy difficult, if not impossible, and that is why it is such a 
dramatically successful estrangement technique.	  
It is, furthermore, an estrangement technique that Grass uses repeatedly 
throughout Die Blechtrommel. Volker Neuhaus has written about disgust in Die 
Blechtrommel: “Die von den ersten Rezensionen an so oft monierten vielen ekelhaften 
Szenen in der Blechtrommel hängen damit zusammen, daß	  Oskar eine 
außergewöhnliche Befähigung zum Sich-ekeln mitbringt, an dem er seine Leser 
offensichtlich gern teilhaben läßt”	  (46)22. This argument implies that Oskar and his 
reader are on the same page when it comes to their feelings of disgust; however, I 
argue that it is precisely the opposite. One manifestation of Oskar’s madness is that he 
fails to be disgusted by things that the reader finds disgusting (or at the very least he 
fails to express that disgust). It is Oskar’s failure to be disgusted that creates the chasm 
between himself and his reader. But to what end? To explore this question, I will 
examine the most famous disgusting moment in the text: the infamous eel scene. 	  
John Reddick has called this scene “the most penetrating evocation of vileness 
in the novel” and notes that it has “earned Grass more calumny than anything else” 
(25). Oskar, Jan, Matzerath, and Agnes go to the shore on Good Friday and encounter 
there a docker, whom Matzerath dubs “Onkel,” fishing for eels. This scene contains an 
abundance of disgusting imagery, beginning before Onkel has even revealed his bait, 
with Oskar’s graphic, matter-of-fact, and by most standards excessively detailed 
description of the docker spitting. This is a foreshadowing of the disgusting depths to 
which Oskar intends to drag his reader in this scene, which grows yet more revolting 
when it is revealed that the docker is fishing with “einen Pferdekopf, einen frischen, 
wie echten Pferdekopf, den Kopf eines schwarzen Pferdes, eine schwarzmähnigen 
                                                
22	  “The	  many	  disgusting	  scenes	  that	  have	  been	  criticized	  from	  the	  first	  reviews	  onward	  have	  to	  do	  
with	  the	  fact	  that	  Oskar	  has	  an	  unusual	  ability	  to	  be	  disgusted,	  which	  he	  obviously	  shares	  gladly	  
with	  his	  readers.”	  (My	  translation)	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Rappenkopf also, der gestern noch, vorgestern noch gewiehert haben mochte; den faul 
war der Kopf nicht, höchstens nach Mottlauwasser; aber danach roch alles auf der 
Mole” (177)23. But it is not the smell that revolts the reader; rather, it is Oskar’s 
matter-of-fact descriptions of the “wütend hellgrün kleine Aale” (177)24. And then it 
grows yet worse: “Und als der Stauer . . . mit beiden Händen hineingriff in den Rachen 
des Gaules und gleich zwei auf einmal herausholte, die mindestens armdick waren und 
armlang, da riß es auch meiner Mama das Gebiß auseinander: das ganze Frühstück 
warf sie, kumpiges Eiweiß und Fäden ziehendes Eigelb zwischen Weißbrotklumpen 
im Milchkaffeeguß über die Molensteine” (178)25. 
At no point in this scene does Oskar comment upon his own disgust; his focus 
instead is entirely on his mother, and it is indeed Agnes for whom this scene seems to 
be most significant. Critics have noted repeatedly the association between death and 
sexuality in this scene, linked through the symbolism of the eels themselves. Volker 
Neuhaus argues that it is this association which becomes clear to Agnes Matzerath in 
the scene, and which leads to her suicide by fish in the following chapter. According 
to Neuhaus, Agnes glimpses in this moment “plötzlich etwas von den furchtbaren 
Kette von Tod, Leben, Tod und Leben . . . Ihr geht auf, daß der Kreislauf des 
Sinnlosen, in den sie ihr eigenes Leben hineingebannt sieht, nicht Zufall ist, nicht ihr 
privates Unglück, sondern Weltgesetz” (67)26. Similarly, John Reddick argues that 
Agnes senses here “a deadness in existence, and especially her own existence, that is 
too much for her to bear” (27-28). Moreover, the connection between death and sex 
here is a disgusting one: the eels, an obviously phallic symbol, have been feasting on 
the corpses of dead sailors. Agnes is revolted by this to the point of vomiting. If the 
                                                
23	  “a	  horse’s	  head,	  a	  fresh	  head,	  a	  real	  one,	  the	  head	  of	  a	  black	  horse	  with	  a	  black	  mane,	  which	  
only	  yesterday	  or	  the	  day	  before	  may	  still	  have	  been	  whinnying,	  for	  the	  head	  was	  not	  yet	  rotten,	  
did	  not	  stink,	  smelled	  at	  most	  of	  the	  Mottlau,	  like	  everything	  else	  on	  the	  jetty”	  (136).	  
24	  “small	  light	  green	  eels	  [that	  were]	  were	  furiously	  wriggling”	  (136)	  
25	  “And	  when	  the	  docker	  .	  .	  .	  reached	  into	  the	  horse’s	  gullet	  with	  both	  hands	  and	  pulled	  out	  two	  at	  
once,	  at	  least	  as	  thick	  as	  his	  arm	  and	  just	  as	  long,	  my	  mama’s	  jaw	  dropped:	  she	  spewed	  her	  whole	  
breakfast,	  clumps	  of	  egg	  white	  with	  yolk	  trailing	  threads	  among	  lumps	  of	  bread	  in	  a	  gush	  of	  coffee	  
and	  milk,	  onto	  the	  stones	  of	  the	  jetty”	  (137).	  
26	  “suddenly	  something	  of	  the	  fearful	  chain	  of	  death,	  life,	  death	  and	  life	  .	  .	  .	  She	  realizes	  that	  the	  
senseless	  circle,	  in	  which	  she	  sees	  her	  entire	  life	  imprisoned,	  is	  not	  random,	  is	  not	  her	  own	  private	  
unhappiness,	  but	  the	  law	  of	  the	  world.”	  (My	  translation)	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reader has empathy in this scene for anyone, it is for Agnes herself, whose nauseated 
disgust matches our own. 
Our narrator-protagonist Oskar, however, is not revolted. Indeed, Oskar seems 
to revel in the disgusting detail he provides, which he underscores with his 
characteristic irony. The question here is, as is so often the case with Oskar, the extent 
to which he does this deliberately. Does Oskar, unmoved and undisgusted himself, not 
realize the effect that his descriptions have on the reader? Or does Oskar realize very 
well the effect they have (either because he is himself actually disgusted or because he 
understands the disgust of others, particularly his mother) and yet proceeds with it 
anyway, deliberately provoking his reader to revulsion? In contrast to Enzensberger, I 
argue that Oskar knows precisely what effect he has on the reader. As I have already 
noted, disgust renders the minds of its objects opaque; in this case, the reader’s disgust 
at this scene and the dissonance that results from Oskar’s lack of articulated disgust 
renders mind reading even more difficult than it usually is in Die Blechtrommel.  
Significantly, this scene leads directly into the chapter in which Oskar loses his 
beloved mama. Oskar’s feelings about his mother’s death are complex; he seems at 
first to reject having played any role in it, only to embrace it later as his first burden of 
guilt. What he does not want, it appears, is empathy from his reader. Indeed, I argue 
that the infamous eel scene disrupts the empathy we might feel for Oskar at the death 
of his mother, and that Oskar, as the controlling narrator of the text, does this quite 
deliberately. He estranges us just prior to a moment in which we might feel real 
empathy for him. Furthermore, this remains a pattern for Oskar over the course of the 
novel. He doesn’t always use disgust to accomplish it; indeed, with the deaths of his 
remaining two presumptive parents he uses deception and then revelation to do it: 
telling us one story and then, in the next chapter, revealing that he has lied and that the 
“true” story implicates him in Jan and Matzerath’s respective demises. The 
consequence is that our emotions remain ever out of step with Oskar’s; even as we 
attempt to hook our minds into his, it slides away from us, as slippery as an eel. 
The use of disgust as an emotion to undercut empathy in the face of tragedy or 
grief continues throughout Die Blechtrommel. In Book Three, Oskar takes up 
gravestone cutting as a profession and begins spending a great deal of time in 
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graveyards. The chapter “Fortuna North” contains a detailed description of a 
piecemeal exhumation of a woman:  
. . . kam sie hoch in die Frische und lag noch nicht lange unten, seit 
letztem Herbst erst im Dunkeln und war doch schon forgeschritten, wie 
ja überall Verbesserungen vorgenommen wurden, und auch die 
Demontage an Rhein und Ruhr Fortschritte machte, hatte sich jene Frau 
während des Winters – den ich in der Löwenburg vertändelt hatte – 
ernsthaft unter der gefrorenen Erdkruste des Braunkohlenreviers mit 
sich selbst auseinandergesetzt und mußte nun, während wir Beton 
stampften und den Sockel legten, stückweise zur Umbettung überredet 
warden. Aber dafür war ja die Zinkkiste da, daß nichts, auch die 
Kleinste nicht verloren ging . . . (566-567)27 
Death and rotting corpses are probably one of the most easily understood objects of 
disgust; our sense of disgust was likely developed originally to protect us from rotting 
food and especially rotting corpses. Few people, when faced with a half-rotted corpse, 
and particularly with the smell of such a corpse (which, Oskar mentions off-handedly, 
is not too terrible, it being March), could avoid a sense of revulsion. Furthermore, 
there is what William Ian Miller in calls the “partibility” of the corpse — not only is it 
rotten, it is falling apart: “There are few things that are more unnerving and disgust-
evoking than our partibility. [. . .] Part of death’s horror is that it too is a severance of 
body and soul and then, via putrefaction, of the body’s integrity” (Miller 27). We 
witness this “putrefaction” first-hand in this scene. The reader might be tempted to 
protect herself from the horror of the corpse’s severability by focusing on the more 
intellectual elements of Oskar’s description, namely the connection he draws between 
the “progress” of the corpse’s decomposition in the ground and the economic 
“progress” made in that part of Germany at the time. But Oskar makes his point about 
                                                
27 . . . she came up for fresh air, had not been down in the dark that long, just since last fall, yet still 
she’d made progress, kept pace with improvements underway on all sides; and just as progress had been 
made dismantling the industrial Rhineland and Ruhr, so too had this woman, in the course of the winter 
- which I’d frittered away at the Löwenburg - made serious progress, taking herself so gravely to task 
beneath the frozen crust of the soft-coal district that now, while we poured concrete and set the pedestal, 
she could be persuaded to move her remains only piecemeal. But that’s what the zinc casket was for, so 
not even the tiniest piece would be lost . . . (436) 
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the effects of such progress not despite the disgust he inflicts on his reader but rather 
through it. To this end, he will not allow his reader to pretend the corpse is anything 
other than it is. John Reddick has pointed out how many elements of this scene serve 
to dehumanize the woman entirely, including: its ironic tone; the way in which 
Oskar’s narration switches back and forth between the exhumation and other unrelated 
subjects; and Oskar’s repetitious underscoring of the “severability” of the corpse. 
Furthermore, according to Reddick, the Hamlet-Yorick scene that follows directly on 
the heels of the exhumation scene “supplies an effective contrast, for Grass’s treatment 
of the exhumation is quite without that warm solace of emotions that characterises 
Shakespeare’s famous scene” (37). The empathy that imbues Shakespeare’s scene, in 
other words, is largely — though perhaps not entirely — missing from Grass’s own. 
 In counterpoint to this, I argue that the biographical details that Oskar provides 
about the dead woman, which appear to be gratuitous to his project, are actually 
crucial to understanding the nuance of the scene and its relationship to disgust and 
empathy in the text. Though many of these details are speculative in nature, they still 
forcibly remind the reader that this is a person who is being removed, piecemeal, from 
the ground: “in die große Stadt, wo immer was los war und neunzehn Kinos 
gleichzeitig, dahin wollte die Frau heimkehren”28 (567). The reader is hereby 
prompted to imagine the girl as she once was, in horrific contrast to how she now is. 
Like so much of Oskar’s narration, these details may or may not be true. But I argue 
that they serve to emphasize the horror of the exhumation itself. Oskar speculates 
rather coldly on the girl’s origins and motivations, and his disgust at the exhumation is 
subdued in comparison to the reader’s own. But the reader’s disgust may in fact be 
coupled with a pity that Oskar seems to lack: The girl in the ground might have once 
been the reader’s sister, daughter, or friend; she might stand in for someone the reader 
lost during the war. But whoever she was, she is now reduced to so much putrefied 
meat. Oskar’s narration focuses on the dehumanizing effects of war, death, and  
 
                                                
28	  “the	  big	  city	  was	  where	  she	  wanted	  to	  go,	  where	  there	  was	  always	  something	  happening,	  and	  
nineteen	  movie	  houses	  playing	  at	  once”	  (437)	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capitalist progress, but the small details he offers about the woman at hand invite more 
empathic feelings on the part of the reader.  
For John Reddick, this scene reveals a central ambivalence about death in Die 
Blechtrommel. In some cases, he argues, such as this one, “the text avoids almost all 
mention of the dead person, the attendant group is reduced to insignificant, almost 
lifeless adjuncts, and it is the sheer reality of burial that is writ large and rendered 
animate” (38). But in other cases, “there is quite the opposite perspective: the 
pervasive spirit there is one of compassionate involvement, and implies that individual 
human lives have their own full value, subjective though that may be, and that their 
loss is worthy of sorrow”(38). Reddick calls the former point of view the “bird’s eye 
view” and the latter the “worm’s eye view,” respectively, and they may be seen 
throughout Die Blechtrommel at moments that involve death. In each instance, 
Reddick claims, the power of the bird’s eye view eventually undermines that of the 
worm’s eye view. 
But these two “views” are not entirely at odds with each other; rather, they are 
a clear manifestation of the dialectic of empathy and estrangement. The vast majority 
of the time Oskar takes the “bird’s eye view” that is perceptible in the “Fortuna North” 
chapter: distant, cold, and dispassionate. Furthermore, he estranges his reader using 
deception and disgust, until his reader has little choice — or, truly, much desire — to 
remain at ground level with the worms. But even at these moments, empathy for the 
reader is not entirely rejected, even if it is continually undermined. There is a 
dissonance between Oskar’s emotional experience and the reader’s own, and so even 
while Oskar himself may be among the birds and may not have much to offer in the 
way of emotion or empathy, those things are not precluded in the reader. Moreover, 
there are, on very rare occasions, moments in which Oskar and his reader come to a 
place of temporary emotional accord, where we sense that for once, Oskar has joined 
us among the worms and feels as we do. One such moment is the Kristallnacht scene, 
contained in the chapter entitled “Glaube-Hoffnung-Liebe” at the end of Book One. 
But it is precisely at such moments, I argue, that the problematic aspects of empathy, 
and the need for an ethic of empathy to be replaced by one of skepticism, become 
most visible.  
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Faith, Hope, and Love: The Complicity of Emotion 
	   	  
The “Glaube-Hoffnung-Liebe”	  chapter that ends Book One is in many ways 
the thematic and emotional core of Die Blechtrommel. In this passage, the techniques 
of narrative and ethic estrangement that I analyze in this chapter come together. 
Oblique remarks about the rise of National Socialism give way to an explicit 
description of one of Nazism’s earliest triumphs, the desecration and destruction of 
Jewish homes, synagogues, and shops across the German-speaking world on 
November 9th, 1938. But even as the description of Nazism becomes more explicit, 
Oskar’s language, including his characteristic irony, dissolves into fragmented poetry. 
Parsing the many strands at work in this chapter is difficult, for it accomplishes several 
things simultaneously that at first glance seem mutually exclusive. It is the most 
emotional, most empathically inviting passage in the entirety of the novel, but it also 
underscores, as few other passages do, the fundamental ethical issues that are at stake 
with empathy as a mode of moral decision-making. Consequently, it raises —	  almost 
explicitly —	  the need for skepticism and doubt as a mode of narration and 
understanding; indeed, for skepticism as Weltanschauung. Only if we doubt every 
narrative, only if we treat every story we are fed with the deepest of skepticism, only if 
we refuse the facile rewards of emotion, might we avoid a repeat of the disaster that 
was National Socialism. 	  
 From the beginning, the reader senses that the dialectic of empathy and 
estrangement that has been established in the novel through Oskar’s ironic narration, 
refusal to cooperate with his reader, and insistence on subjecting his reader to the most 
disgusting elements of his story, is re-negotiated in this chapter. This re-negotiation 
does not mean, however, that the elements of narrative and ethical estrangement that I 
have already discussed at length are not present. In fact, the opposite is true: both are 
present to a strong degree. In terms of narrative estrangement, Oskar’s repetition of the 
phrase “es war einmal,”	  the classic opening phrase of a German fairy tale, is 
particularly striking. The phrase is, on the one hand, distancing: it indicates distance in 
time but also space, and it also creates narrative distance between Oskar and the story 
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he is telling. But this distance, the reader is aware, is illusory: this is not fairy tale set 
in some faraway place, but one that took place within Oskar’s own lifetime. There 
may be magic here; if Oskar is to be believed, his drum is at least a little bit magic. 
But that magic cannot save him. For on November 9th, 1938, there were very few 
heroes. There were, however, plenty of monsters and plenty of victims. 	  
 Characteristically, the only victim with whom Oskar is concerned is the toy 
merchant, Sigismund Markus. Markus is the supplier of his drums, without which, 
Oskar claims he cannot live:	  
Es war einmal ein Spielzeughandler, der hieß	  Sigismund Markus und 
verkaufte unter anderem auch weißrot gelackte Blechtrommeln. Oskar, 
von dem soeben die Rede war, war der Hauptabnehmer dieser 
Blechtrommeln, weil er von Beruf Blechtrommler war und ohne 
Blechtrommel nicht leben konnte und wollte. Deshalb eilte er auch von 
der brennenden Synagoge fort zur Zeughauspassage, denn dort wohnte 
der Hüter seiner Trommeln; aber er fand ihn in einem Zustand vor, der 
ihm das Verkaufen von Blechtrommeln fortan oder auf dieser Welt 
unmöglich machte.29 (242)	  
Oskar’s concern here appears, at first glance, to be entirely self-interested. He admits 
that as he leaves Markus’s shop, after having watched the Nazis destroy and desecrate 
the store, he takes with him “eine heile und zwei weniger beschädigte Trommeln aus 
dem Trümmern”30 (243) this is a moment of ethical estrangement between the reader 
and Oskar, as Oskar’s evaluation of the scene appears to be entirely alien to the 
reader’s own. Why should Oskar care about his drum at a moment like this? But as the 
chapter unfolds and Oskar’s ironic prose dissolves into poetry, this self-interest begins 
to seem more like self-preservation. 	  
                                                
29 Once upon a time there was a toy merchant named Sigismund Markus, and he sold, among other 
things, white and red lacquered tin drums. Oskar, mentioned above, was the major customer for these 
tin drums, for he was a drummer by trade, and could neither live without a drum nor wished to. He 
hurried away from the burning synagogue to the Arsenal Arcade, for there dwelt the keeper of his 
drums; but he found him in a state that made it impossible for him to ever sell tin drums again in this 
world. (185) 
30 “one undamaged drum and two slightly damaged ones from the debris” (187); 
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 Oskar’s characteristic irony is clearly present in this passage in the third person 
narrative and his refusal to state anything outright to his reader. Notably, however, in 
contrast to other places in the narrative, Oskar does not appear to actually withhold 
information from his reader in this passage; he expects his reader to draw the right 
conclusions about why Markus is no longer able to sell drums in this world. But 
Markus’s death is also the turning point in Oskar’s narration of events in this chapter. 
As he leaves the shops with his three drums in hand, he encounters the Biblical 
quotation that is the title of the chapter: 	  
Draußen war später Novembervormittag. Neben dem Stadttheater, nahe 
der Straßenbahnhaltestelle standen religiöse Frauen und frierende 
hässliche Mädchen, die fromme Hefte austeilten, Geld in Büchsen 
sammelten und zwischen zwei Stangen ein Transparent zeigten, dessen 
Aufschrift den ersten Korintherbrief, dreizehntes Kapital 
zitierte.”Glaube —	  Hoffnung —	  Liebe”	  konnte Oskar lesen und mit 
den drei Wörtchen umgehen wie ein Jongleur mit Flaschen: 
Leichtgläubig, Hoffmannstropfen, Liebesperlen, Guttehoffungshütte, 
Liebfrauenmilch, Gläubigerersammlung. Glaubst du, daß	  es morgen 
regnen wird? Ein ganzes leichtgläubiges Volk glaubte an den 
Weihnachtsmann. Aber der Weihnachtsmann war in Wirklichkeit der 
Gasmann.31 (243-244)	  
As John Reddick has noted, the imagery of the Gasman “immediately brings to mind 
the grossest part of National Socialist savagery: the systematic annihilation of the 
Jews”	  (20). Reddick goes on to say, however, that the Gasman also “shows that the 
outcome was disastrous, too, for the conniving, gullible masses, that the effect on them 
was not just intoxicating but toxic, and that they were left as wrecks by the twelve-
year millennium” (20). 	  
                                                
31 It was a late November morning. Outside the Stadt-Theater, near the tram stop, stood pious women 
and shivering, ugly girls handing out religious tracts, collecting money in tin cans, and displaying 
between two poles a banner with an inscription from First Corinthians, chapter thirteen. "Faith—
Hope—Love"—Oskar read those three little words and played with them like a juggler with bottles: 
faith healer, hope chest, lovebird, Old Faithful, Hope Diamond, Lovers' Leap, with love as always, hope 
to see you again, faithfully yours. An entire gullible nation believed faithfully in Santa Claus. But Santa 
Claus was really the Gasman. (187) 
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 Indeed, what follows this passage is a meditation on the dangers of not only 
gullibility in general but of a form of gullibility that involves thinking solely 
emotionally: of the dangers, in other words, of emotion-based moral reasoning: “Aber 
nachdem such der Glaube an den Weihnachtsmann als Glaube an den Gasmann 
herausgestellt hatte, versuchte man es, ohne auf die Reihenfolge des Korintherbriees 
zu achten kit der Liebe: ‘Ich liebe dich, liebst du mich wirklich? Ich liebe mich 
auch”32 (245). Love and faith here are both rendered complicit in the rise of fascism 
throughout the German-speaking world and in the violence that Oskar has already 
described to us. And hope is hardly let off the hook: “Und als dann Schluß	  war, 
machten sie schnell einen hoffnungsvollen Anfang daraus; denn hierzulande ist Schluß	  
immer Anfang und Hoffnung in jedem, auch im endgültigsten Schluß. So steht auch 
geschrieben: Solange der Mensch hofft, wird er immer wieder neu anfangen mit dem 
hoffnungsvollen Schlußmachen”33 (245) Although this sounds “hopeful,”	  in the 
context of the rest of the chapter, it is quite a dark sentiment, for this sense of renewal 
brings to mind the sentiment of rebirth upon which so much of the appeal of Nazism 
was founded. This passage, perhaps more than any other, explicitly articulates the 
ethic of skepticism that is promulgated throughout Die Blechtrommel. Skepticism and 
doubt are the only possible inoculations against the infection of faith, hope, and love 
to which human beings are entirely too susceptible. It was entirely too easy, this 
passage argues, for German citizens to be swept up by the emotional appeal of 
National Socialism.	  
 Somewhat paradoxically, however, at the very moment that the text’s ethic of 
skepticism comes to the surface in this scene, the ironic distancing that has 
characterized Oskar’s narration even to this point begins to dissolve, opening the door 
to greater empathy from the reader. In the face of such tragedy, even the all-knowing 
and all-seeing Oskar is as baffled as we mere mortals are:	  
                                                
32 “But once belief in Santa Claus turned out to be faith in the Gasman, they tried love, abandoning the 
order of things in Corinthians: I love you, they said, oh, I love you. Do you love yourself too? Do you 
love me, tell me, do you really love me? I love myself too” (188).  
33 “And when the end came, they quickly turned it to a hopeful beginning; for in our country an end is 
always a beginning and there is always hope in any end, even the most definitive of ends. And so it is 
written: As long as man hopes, again and again he will begin anew with endings full of hope” (188). 
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Ich aber, ich weiß nicht. Ich weiß zum Beispiel nicht, wer sich heute 
unter den Bärten der Weihnachtsmänner versteckt, weiß nicht, was 
Knecht Ruprecht im Sack hat, weiß nicht, wie man die Gashähne 
zudreht und abdrosselt; denn es strömt schon wieder Advent, oder 
immer noch, weiß nicht, probeweise, weiß nicht, für wen geprobt wird, 
weiß nicht, ob ich glauben kann, daß sie hoffentlich liebevoll die 
Gashähne putzen, damit sie krähen, an welchem Morgen, an welchem 
Abend, weiß nicht, ob es auf Tageszeiten ankommt; denn die Liebe 
kennt keine Tageszeiten, und die Hoffnung ist ohne Ende, under 
Glaube kennt keine Grenzen, nur das Wissen und das Nichtwissen sind 
an Zeiten und Grenzen gebunden und enden meistens vorzeitig schon 
bei den Bärten, Rucksäcken, Knackmandeln, daß ich wiederum sagen 
muß: ich weiß nicht . . . (245-246)34 
Poetry is the medium of not-knowing in Die Blechtrommel, the evolution of language 
that has lost its meaning in the face of historical tragedy. It is the language of the 
worm’s eye view. In these final paragraphs of Book One, the reader falls with Oskar 
from the position of the birds, high overhead, to find herself among the worms — 
worms that have no idea why they suffer, only that they do.  
 Despite the empathic invitation issued by Oskar here for the reader to join him 
in his Nichtwissen, Oskar ends this passage by underscoring his contempt for faith, 
hope, and love and the need for an ethic of skepticism: “der Mann hieß Saulus und 
war ein Saulus und erzählte als Saulus den Leuten au Korinth etwas von ungeheurer 
preiswerten Würsten, die er Glaube, Hoffnung und Liebe nannte, als leicht verdaulich 
pries, die er heute noch, in immer wechselnder Saulusgestalt an den Mann bringt”35 
                                                
34 As for me, I just don’t know. I don’t know, for example, who hides behind Santa Claus beards today, 
don’t know what Ruprecht his helper has in his sack, don’t know how to wring the necks of gas cocks, 
nor how to choke them off, for Advent is flowing forth again, or flows forth still, and I don’t know if 
it’s some trial run, don’t know for whom, don’t know if I believe in all good faith that they are 
polishing those gas cocks, one hopes with love, so they will crow, on what morn or eve I do not know, 
nor if it matters what hour of day; for Love knows no hour, and Hope knows no end, and Faith knows 
no boundaries, but knowing and not knowing are bound by time and boundaries, and generally end 
before their time with beards, and sacks on back, and almonds that crack, and I say again: I just don’t 
know . . . (188) 
35“there is no Paul, the man was called Saul, and Saul he remained and wrote as Saul to the people of 
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(246). Saul was a conman, Oskar declares, and if something is too good to be true, 
then it probably is. The only possible to way to react to these “low-priced sausages” 
that Saul is peddling is with skepticism. More importantly, however, is the sausage 
imagery, which recalls an earlier moment in the chapter, when Oskar witnesses the 
Nazis desecrating Sigismund Markus’s shop: “Einige hatten sich die Hosen 
heruntergerissen, hatten braune Würste, in denen noch halbverdaute Erbsen zu 
erkennen waren, auf Segelschiffe, geigende Affen und meine Trommeln gedrückt”36 
(242-243). When Oskar refers to the “amazingly low-priced sausages called Faith, 
Hope, and Love,” the scatalogical imagery from the previous scene comes to mind, 
and there is a reflexive moment of disgust, for which the reader has already been 
primed: disgust that occurs simultaneously with the words “Glaube-Hoffnung-Liebe” 
— disgust with the ideas themselves but perhaps also with the people who have 
bought into them. In the end, it is Oskar who concludes that it is faith, hope, and love 
who are responsible for the Gasman. 
 Perhaps more than any other passage in Die Blechtrommel, the “Glaube-
Hoffnung-Liebe” chapter invites its reader to empathize with the novel’s narrator. But 
this invitation is part of the passage’s central paradox: we are invited to empathize 
with Oskar just as the problems inherent in that empathy are made clear to us. 
Empathy and emotion are rendered accessible only for Grass to underscore that they 
are, in fact, unethical in this situation, and not only because Sigismund Markus is a 
victim of fascism. Rather, it is because empathy and emotion — faith, hope, and love 
— were themselves responsible for his death at the hands of the Nazis. It is only the 
ethic of skepticism present throughout the novel but most clearly articulated in the 
“Glaube-Hoffnung-Liebe” chapter that might prevent such a disaster from ever 
happening again. By invoking his reader’s empathy here, Grass in fact turns the tables, 
points the finger back at his reader, and underscores the complicity of our own 
emotional experience of his text. 
                                                                                                                                       
Corinth in praise of those amazingly low-priced sausages he called Faith, Hope, and Love, so easy to 
digest, which, in the ever changing form of Saul, he palms off on mankind to this very day” (190). 
36	  “I	  found	  them	  at	  play	  as	  I	  too	  stepped	  into	  the	  shop	  through	  the	  window.	  A	  few	  had	  pulled	  
down	  their	  trousers,	  had	  deposited	  brown	  sausages,	  in	  which	  half-­‐digested	  peas	  could	  still	  be	  





 Grass’s emphasis on the reader’s own complicity is unsurprising, given that 
Die Blechtrommel was published thirty years before Germany truly dedicated itself to 
the project of Vergangenheitsbewältigung. This project involved a great deal of 
remembering, a great deal of reconstruction of the past, and a great deal of 
narrativizing. Throughout the decades-long process of Vergangenheitsbewältigung, 
however, the question of the ethics of empathy in narrating such stories has remained a 
thorny one. Even today, sixty years after the end of the war and nearly seventy years 
after Kristallnacht, the question remains: With whom may we as readers empathize? 
With whom may writers empathize? For Grass in 1959, it was clear that it was not 
ethically possible for a German writer to empathize with the victims of fascism, and he 
does not try. His emphasis throughout Die Blechtrommel is on those who, like his 
presumptive father Matzerath, had allowed atrocities to occur and perhaps even 
participated. As such, ethical estrangement is crucial in Die Blechtrommel. Grass 
never allows his reader to assume a position of superiority, for his presumed reader — 
a German in 1959 — is likely to be just as guilty as any of his characters. Grass’s 
narrative estrangement, in contrast, demonstrates the need for a new ethic of 
skepticism that works against the emotion-based decision making responsible for the 
rise of fascism. Furthermore, it attempts to inculcate such an ethic within the reader.  
Thirty years later, the situation was quite different. The next writer I will 
consider, W.G. Sebald, was of a different generation from Grass; he was of the 1968 
generation, which condemned their parents for their participation in National 
Socialism. Sebald himself spent most of his life abroad in England precisely because 
of the culture of silence he sensed around these issues. This silence began to break in 
the 1980s, and — perhaps not coincidentally — this is when Sebald began writing. 
With three decades separating him from the actual events of the war, Sebald was able 
to attempt something Grass had not dared: to empathize with the victims of fascism. 
But Sebald recognized that to do so directly would still be a violation of narrative 
ethics. As such, he developed techniques of narrative estrangement that allowed him 
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to explore the experiences of the victims of fascism in more detail than Grass ever 
could, while at the same time maintaining a necessary distance from that experience 
for both himself and his reader. For Grass, therefore, the dialectic of empathy and 
estrangement present in his work is about underscoring his reader’s complicity, 
undermining empathy and emotion as ways of making moral decisions, and 
promulgating an ethic of skepticism. For Sebald, in contrast, it is about an ethical 








. . . sagte Austerlitz: W.G. Sebald’s Mediated Narration and the Ethics of 
Empathy 
  
 Although W.G. Sebald was well known for including images in all of his 
fictional and semi-fictional work, the photo that graces the cover of his fourth and 
final novel, Austerlitz (2001) is perhaps the most iconic and certainly among the most 
striking. The sepia-toned image is of a boy dressed as a page. He is clad all in white, 
aside from his shoes, which are black; he is wearing a cape and holding a plumed hat, 
and he is standing in a nondescript field, clearly posed for the photograph. The boy 
stands out clearly against dark grass, but the photo grows blurry at the horizon, as the 
boy’s blond hair blends into the white of the sky. The boy is looking directly at the 
camera, and the expression on his face is difficult to parse. He is not smiling, but he 
also does not appear unhappy; he seems as though he might be about to smile, as if the 
camera caught him in the second just before it happened. But it is impossible to say for 
sure. The reader must ask: Is he resentful of being dressed like this and then 
photographed? Is he excited about the party he is attending in his costume? It is not for 
us to know for certain. 
This photo reappears fairly late within the text, and it is revealed that the photo 
is of the protagonist, Austerlitz, himself, as a very young boy. The photo was taken 
when he accompanied his mother Agáta to a ball, she as the Rose Queen, he as her 
page. Austerlitz is given the picture by his nanny Vera when he finds her in Prague, 
decades after he was sent to England on a Kindertransport. As the cover of the novel, 
the photo is meant to intrigue readers and prompt us to wonder who the boy in the 
white costume is. Within the text, however, in the context of the larger narrative, this 
photo of Austerlitz serves quite a different purpose. Austerlitz relays to the narrator 
how he stares at the photo once Vera has given it to him: 
Das Bild lag vor mir, sagte Austerlitz, doch wagte ich nicht, es 
anzufassen. [. . .] An mich selber in dieser Rolle aber erinnerte ich mich 
nicht, so sehr ich mich an jenem Abend und später auch muhte. Wohl 
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erkannte ich den ungewöhnlichen, schräg über die Stirne verlaufenden 
Haaransatz, doch sonst war alles in mir ausgelöschte von einem 
überwältigenden Gefühl der Vergangenheit. Ich habe die Photographie 
seither noch vielmals studiert . . . Und immer fühlte ich mich dabei 
durchdrungen von dem forschenden Blick des Pagen, der gekommen 
war, sein Teil zurückzufordern und der nun im Morgengrauen auf dem 
leeren Feld darauf wartete, daß ich den Handschuh aufheben und das 
ihm bevorstehenden Unglück abwenden würde.37 (263-264) 
It is significant that Austerlitz cannot remember the moment in which the photo was 
taken, no matter how long he spends looking at it. For Austerlitz, this boy is a 
messenger from the past who asks to be saved from the “bevorstehenden Unglück” 
that awaited him only six months later, when he was sent to Wales on one of the last 
Kindertransporte, never to see his mother again. But of course, he cannot be saved; 
the boy’s unhappiness cannot be averted, not least by his much older self. But perhaps 
more significant still is the fact that Austerlitz does not understand the boy in the 
photo as being himself, even after being told by Vera that it is him; his connection to 
the photo is mediated by time and the vagaries of memory, even while his compassion 
is stirred by the page boy’s “forschenden Blick.” 
 Austerlitz’s reaction here to the page boy encapsulates two critical issues: the 
mediated nature of narration in Sebald’s work and the importance of photographs to its 
affective impact on the reader. The navigation between text and image renders the 
dialectic of empathy and estrangement that I have identified particularly malleable 
within Sebald’s work. The mediated narration that Sebald favors throughout his 
repertoire disrupts the reader’s instinctive empathic connection with the text, while the 
photographs of faces and eyes that occasionally interrupt the text to startle the reader 
issue an invitation to mindread. I will demonstrate, however, that the interplay 
                                                
37 “The picture lay before me, said Austerlitz, but I dared not touch it. [. . .] Yet hard as I tried both that 
evening and later, I could not recollect myself in the part. I did recognize the unusual hairline running at 
a slant over the forehead, but otherwise all memory was extinguished in me by an overwhelming sense 
of ht long years that had passed. I have studied the photograph many times since . . . And always in 
doing so I always felt the piercing, inquiring gaze of the page boy who had come to demand his dues, 
who was waiting in the gray light of dawn on the empty field for me to accept the challenge and avert 
the misfortune lying ahead of him. (180-182. All English translations are by Anthea Bell.) 
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between the narration and the photographs consistently problematizes this invitation 
and underscores the ethical dilemmas of mindreading in works that, like Sebald’s, take 
up the narratives of the victims of fascism. Empathy is, in such cases, not only an 
inadequate tool, but also an inappropriate or even unethical one, as Sebald’s narration 
and use of photographs emphasizes at every turn.  
In this chapter, I will consider two of Sebald’s novels, Die Ausgewanderten 
(1992) and Austerlitz (2001). Although it would be reductive to call either of these 
novels “Holocaust novels,” critics have paired them since the publication of Austerlitz 
because both novels attempt to navigate the extremely difficult issues of Holocaust 
representation. The issue of empathy in representations of the Holocaust is a thorny 
one, and one that critics generally agree that Sebald negotiated more successfully than 
most writers; indeed, Stuart Taberner notes that Sebald “is almost universally 
presented in English-language criticism as an author whose literary texts and essays 
incorporate an ideal solution to the related problems of how to write about the 
Holocaust and how to ‘write Jewish fates’ as a German without positing an 
inappropriate identification between the perpetrator nation and its victims” (181). The 
methods through which Sebald has, in the view of most critics (though notably not of 
Taberner himself), avoided this problematic identification include forms of mediated 
and what I will call hypermediated narration. Characters, whether real or imaginary, 
living or dead, are rarely allowed to speak for themselves, but rather must speak 
through Sebald’s narrators, with the result that the reader is often three or four steps 
removed from the person whose story they are experiencing.  
This sort of hypermediated narration, while it allows the reader to theorize 
about and understand the emotions that should result from the events that are being 
described, often prevents a more spontaneous emotional reaction on the part of the 
reader. This is particularly true wherever and whenever Sebald dares to narrate the 
story of a victim of fascism, as he does in both Die Ausgewanderten and Austerlitz. 
Sebald therefore uses techniques of narrative estrangement to navigate the ethical 
stakes of his stories, but there is much less evidence of the sort of ethical estrangement 
that is found in either Grass’s Die Blechtrommel or the novels of Thomas Bernhard, 
which I will discuss briefly below. It is perhaps for this very reason that the particular 
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dialectic of empathy and estrangement in Sebald’s work is comparatively less jarring 
to the reader. Empathy is hardly a forbidden concept for Sebald, even if he also 
recognizes the moments in which it is and should be impossible. His work therefore 
does not thwart empathy at every turn, but rather renders the reader constantly aware 
of its limitations and inadequacies as a way of understanding the world. As I will 
show, for empathy to function as a sustainable and appropriate ethical principle in 
Sebald’s world, there must also, always, be skepticism and doubt.  
 
 
Mediated and Hypermediated Narration in Die Ausgewanderten and Austerlitz 
 
Even in his earliest novel, Schwindel. Gefühle (1990), Sebald clearly resists 
what Seymour Chatman calls “nonnarrated stories” — that is, stories in which the 
narrator is invisible, such as in the 19th century realist fiction described by Lilian R. 
Furst in All is True. Rather, Sebald’s work is an example of what Chatman terms 
“mediated narration”; such narration “presumes a more or less express communication 
from narrator to audience” (Chatman 139). Sebald’s narrator, however little he may 
tell us about himself, never lets us forget his presence, even if it is not, strictly 
speaking, his story in which we are most interested. Furthermore, Ben Hutchinson 
argues that “one can trace, through the course of [Sebald’s] books, a gradual 
progression in narrative complexity, a thickening of the filters between the ‘action’ 
and the reader” (171). In other words, one can see, from Schwindel to Austerlitz, a 
dramatic increase in narrative mediation. Speaking about Die Ausgewanderten 
specifically — although I argue that this is equally true of Austerlitz  — Ana-Isabel 
Aliaga-Buchenau notes that the text “incorporates a curious interplay between the 
narrator’s presence and absence, the stability and instability of narration and the 
reliability of proof versus the unreliability of narration and memory” (152). Indeed, I 
would argue that through the texts’ mediated narration, Sebald’s reader becomes 
aware — to an even greater degree than Grass’s reader — of the interdependent 
relationship between narration, memory, and fiction, and the reconstructed and 
therefore unreliable nature of all narration. In this section, I will discuss the impact of 
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this awareness for the reader’s subsequent emotional experience and the equally 
important and equally curious interplay between empathy and estrangement. 
This “thickening” of narration between action and reader is quite deliberate, 
and it is recognizable to those readers familiar with Thomas Bernhard’s work. In an 
interview with Michael Silverblatt, Sebald states that he deliberately and consciously 
borrowed much of his narrative technique from Bernhard: 
[Thomas Bernhard] only tells you in his books what he heard from 
others. So he invented, as it were, a kind of periscopic form of 
narrative. You’re always sure that what he tells you is related, at one 
remove, at two removes, at two or three. That appealed to me very 
much, because this notion of the omniscient narrator who pushes 
around the flats on the stage of the novel, you know, cranks things up 
on page three and moves them along on page four and one sees him 
constantly working behind the scenes, is something that I think one 
can’t do very easily any longer.  (83, emphasis mine) 
This “thickening” of narration is visible in many of Bernhard’s major works, most 
especially Kalkwerk; indeed, this thickening or periscopic narration is even more 
disruptive to the reader’s experience of the story than Sebald’s most extreme moments 
in Austerlitz. While “sagte Austerlitz” is perhaps the most frequent phrase in all of 
Austerlitz, the source tagging in Kalkwerk is often itself reported speech, from which 
the narrator wishes to distance himself: “soll Konrad gesagt haben” [“Konrad is said to 
have said”]. Such source tagging not only constantly reminds the reader that we are 
not privy to Konrad’s mind, but that the information being shared with us may not be 
accurate at all. The mediated narration of both Bernhard and Sebald’s texts allows the 
transmission of narrative, but it is undeniable that things are lost in that transmission.  
 One of those things lost, in both Sebald and Bernhard’s work, is the sort of 
direct connection between protagonist and reader that realist fiction facilitates and 
which Sebald consciously resists. Given that many of Sebald’s non-narrating 
characters are heavily based on people in Sebald’s own past, it is understandable that 
for Sebald, the omniscient narrator of 19th century literature and its descendants 
appears not only manipulative but also presumptive. Yet Sebald’s narration does not 
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completely resist such empathy in the same way that Bernhard’s seems to. Comparing 
the two authors, James Wood points out, “In Thomas Bernhard’s work, extremity of 
expression is indistinguishable from the Austrian author’s comic, ranting rage, and his 
tendency to circle obsessively around madness and suicide. Sebald takes some of 
Bernhard’s wildness and estranges it” (viii-ix). He accomplishes this act of 
estrangement through two distinct methods: through the use of “exquisitely courteous 
syntax” and a diction rendered “mysterious by a process of deliberate antiquarianism” 
(ix). Although this sometimes renders Sebald more linguistically difficult than 
Bernhard, it also renders him more emotionally palatable to the reader. His characters 
are, if nothing else, far easier to like than Bernhard’s. Still, Sebald’s characters’ mental 
states and motivations are always conveyed two, three, or even four steps removed, 
and the narrator rarely, if ever, dares to comment upon emotion without significant 
source tagging (i.e. “sagte Austerlitz,” or, in the German, the form of subjunctive that 
indicates reported speech). 
This mode of narration has distinct consequences for the reader. Mark R. 
McCulloh argues that “Sebald has made [Bernhard’s ‘periscopic form of narrative’] 
his own by assuaging the stinging Bernhardian contempt, limiting the diatribes, and 
heightening the empathy” (133). I would agree with McCulloh in that empathy is 
heightened in Sebald’s work in comparison to Bernhard’s, but there are certain distinct 
limitations. Sebald’s narrator is far more present in his works than Bernhard’s narrator 
generally is, and yet we still know very little about him. Furthermore, although we 
may empathize with the narrator, his narration is still suspect. Ana-Isabel Aliaga-
Buchenau points to three particular elements of Sebald’s narration that invite this 
suspicion: “the use of the subjunctive, the use of translation, and self-critical 
comments” (147). All three of these “point to a strong presence of the narrator and 
emphasize the unreliability of narration” (Aliaga-Buchenau 147). Significantly, it is 
not the narration of Sebald’s narrator that Aliaga-Buchenau labels as unreliable, but 
rather narration in general; Sebald’s mediated form of narration merely underscores 
this more than most other forms. The presence of the subjunctive has a very specific 
distancing effect on the reader, and it indicates that not only is the narrator reporting 
what other people have said, there is also some level of doubt on the part of the 
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narrator. The moments in which the narration switches to the more immediate and 
intimate indicative mode are fleeting; before long the reader inevitably runs up against 
the limitations of Sebald’s narration and is once more reminded that the information is 
curated, edited, and mediated, if not actually fictionalized. 
Sebald’s form of “periscopic” narration invites doubt and skepticism by 
underscoring for the reader, through the methods elucidated by Aliaga-Buchenau, the 
ways in which the story conveyed to us by the narrator might be inaccurate: perhaps 
the narrator has misremembered the story; perhaps the person who related the story to 
the narrator never knew the truth or forgot it; perhaps the facts of the story are true, 
but there is no way to access the emotional truth of the story, nor do we as readers 
have that right or truly understand the characters’ motivations. “Truth” is, therefore, a 
rather shaky concept in Sebald’s work, though not quite as dramatically shaky as it is 
in Die Blechtrommel. Unlike Oskar, Sebald’s narrators do not lie to his reader 
outright; however, they also do not pretend to omniscience the way that Oscar does, 
and indeed, they emphasize at every turn the constructed and reconstructed nature of 
their narratives. Furthmore, that reconstruction must always be incomplete. The 
narrator and, by proxy, the reader may search for answers, but the key mysteries of the 
text, like the face of the boy Austerlitz in the photo that graces the cover, remain 
unresolved and unsolvable. 
One such search for truth may be found in Die Ausgewanderten, Sebald’s 
second novel. Although Sebald’s own history of emigration is only indirectly tied to 
Germany’s violent twentieth century history, the history of emigration and exile from 
Germany in the last hundred years is intimately tied to it. Katja Garloff notes that, 
“Die Ausgewanderten has been hailed as a book that balances the claims of memory 
against the injunction against Holocaust representation, and the desire to understand 
the victims with the necessity to avoid a facile identification with them” (“The 
Emigrant as Witness,” 76). How Sebald manages this balancing act through mediated 
narration is closely related to how the dialectic of empathy and estrangement develops 
in his work, and also to why this dialectic is so crucial to understanding him: “When it 
came to illuminating the saddest spaces of the human spirit, Sebald was an empathetic 
and articulate scribe, yet just as though are limits imposed on the sensible depiction of 
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the Holocaust, one should consider whether there are boundaries around the empathy 
that an author can sensibly display” (Prager 76). Thus, although Sebald’s project, in 
both Die Ausgewanderten and Austerlitz, appears to be one of empathy and 
understanding, he remains aware of the ethical limitations imposed by his position as a 
German writer, limitations of which his German narrator is equally aware. To fully 
empathize with the emotional experience of his subjects and to facilitate that empathy 
for his reader would be in Sebald’s world view, a breach of narrative ethics, a 
transgression of the limitations Brad Prager describes above.  
Sebald lays out his narrative ethics most explicitly in the second story in Die 
Ausgewanderten, which provides an accounting of the life of Paul Bereyter, a 
childhood teacher of Sebald who later committed suicide. In an interview with Carole 
Angier, Sebald said,  
The Emigrants started from a phone call I got from my mother, telling 
me that my schoolteacher in Sontofen had committed suicide. This 
wasn’t very long after Jean Ámery’s suicide, and I had been working on 
Ámery. A sort of constellation emerged about this business of surviving 
and about the great time lag between the infliction of injustice and when 
it finally overwhelms you. (69-70)  
This realization forces the narrator — as it forced Sebald — to investigate the 
circumstances that might have led to Bereyter’s death. He begins with Bereyter’s 
obituary in the local newspaper:  
In einer weiter nicht erläuterten Bemerkung hieß es in dem Nachruf 
allerdings auch, dass Dritte Reich habe Paul Bereyter an der Ausübung 
seines Lehrerberurfs verhindert. Diese gänzlich unverbundene und 
unverbindliche Festellung sowohl als die dramatische Todesart waren 
die Ursache, weshalb ich mich während der nachfolgenden Jahre in 
Gedanken immer häufiger mit Paul Bereyter beschäftigte und 
schließlich versuchte, über die Versammlung meiner eigenen, mir sehr 
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lieben Erinnerungen an ihn hinaus, hinter seine mir unbekannte 
Geschichte zu kommen.38 (42) 
Although the narrator at first tries to accomplish this mission by imagining what 
Paul’s life and death would have been like, in the end he has to admit that “[s]olche 
Versuche der Vergegenwärtigung brachten mich jedoch . . . dem Paul nicht näher, 
höchstens augenblicksweisen, in gewissen Ausuferungen des Gefühls, wie sie mir 
unzulässig erscheinen und zu deren Vermeidung ich jetz aufgeschrieben habe, was ich 
von Paul Bereyter weiß und im Verlauf meiner Erkundungen über ihn in Erfahrung 
bringen konnte” 39 (44-45). These sorts of “unzulässig” or “forbidden” moments of 
emotional insight are, of course, precisely what readers expect from realist fiction. 
However, Sebald’s narrator does not know what it was like to be Paul Bereyter, and 
Sebald does not wish to presume, nor does he want his reader to presume, that they 
know what Paul Bereyter felt or thought as a victim of fascism whose trauma during 
the Nazi period eventually led to his death, decades later. This underscores Sebald’s 
conviction as a writer that our ability to think and feel as others — to empathize — is 
an artificial construction, and perhaps even, at times, an immoral one. Writing on this 
same passage, Jan Ceuppens notes that “[t]he repetition of the verbs ‘imagine’ and 
‘picture’ — in the German original, ‘sehen’ and ‘vorstellen’ — emphasizes what is at 
stake: it is as if the narrator seeks to obey a Bildverbot, a prohibition against picturing 
or imagining another person all too vividly” (253). Furthermore, Cueppens says, “one 
could assume that in the passage quoted, Sebald is formulating a criticism of the kind 
of literature that German ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’ has favoured for some time, or 
indeed of so much of the so-called holocaust literature bordering on kitsch in general” 
(253). By this, Cueppens is referring to literature in which empathy is the primary 
guiding moral — and, indeed, literary — principle. This passage is therefore an 
                                                
38 “Almost by way of an aside, the obituary added, with no further explanation, that during the Third 
Reich Paul Bereyter had been prevented from practising his chosen profession. It was this curiously 
unconnected, inconsequential statement, as much as the violent manner of his death, which led me in 
the years that followed to think more and more about Paul Bereyter, until, in the end, I had to get 
beyond my own very fond memories of him and discover the story I did not know” (27-28).  
39 “[s]uch endeavors did not . . . bring me any closer to Paul, except at best for brief emotional 
moments of the kind that seemed presumptuous to me. It is in order to avoid this sort of wrongful 
trespass that I have written down what I know of Paul Bereyter” (29) 
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explicit articulation of the ethical dilemma at the heart of Sebald’s work. There is, on 
the one hand, an all-too-human impulse to attempt to understand Paul Bereyter, and in 
particular to understand what fascism did to him and why he died. And yet there is 
also the sense that such an attempt, particularly by a German narrator (and author), is a 
violation.  
But even if empathy is both impossible and unethical, the drive toward 
understanding in both the narrator and the reader remains undiminished. The narrator 
therefore turns to an intimate friend of Paul’s, Lucy Landau, to explain aspects of his 
own memories of Paul that the narrator cannot make sense of, particularly the 
Untröstlichkeit or “desolation” that seemed to overcome his beloved teacher at certain 
moments (62). In these sections, Paul’s story is told through Madame Landau; 
Madame Landau’s words are in turn conveyed by the narrator to the reader. Although 
this is not quite as mediated as the narration of Austerlitz’s mother’s story will be, it 
still results in grammatical constructions that force the reader to recognize just how 
removed he or she is from the story at hand: “So habe er ihr auch, sagte Mme. Landau, 
in den ersten Tagen ihrer Bekanntschaft bereits mit einer alles in Leichte und 
Unbedeutende wendenden Ironie berichtet über seinen unlängst erfolgten Versuch, 
sich das Leben zu nehmen”40 (66). Here we have not only the “he told her, she said” 
construction but also indirect speech, as well as syntax that pushes the most important 
information in the sentence to the very end, delaying the reader’s satisfaction as long 
as possible. It leaves us with the knowledge that the Untröstlichkeit that the narrator 
identifies in Paul Bereyter is severe enough to have resulted in at least one prior 
suicide attempt, but the reason for this attempt remains unclear. Indeed, Paul conceals 
his true feelings about the suicide attempt from Lucy Landau — and therefore from 
the narrator and, ultimately, from the reader as well. The narrator, however, has rather 
specific ideas about what they were, ideas that are generally confirmed by Madame 
Landau. Paul was never deported or imprisoned, but the rise of the Nazi Party in 
Germany seems to have been the source of his first bout of depression. Unable to save 
his Jewish fianceé Helen Hollaender from being deported and forbidden from teaching 
                                                
40 “Mme Landau said, he had told her, only a few days after they had met, with an irony that made 
everything seem light and unimportant, of his recent attempt to take his own life” (44) 
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due to his Jewish ancestry, Paul experiences for the first time “jenes unüberwindliche 
Gefühl der Niederlage, das ihn später so oft heimsuchen sollte und dem er jetzt nicht 
mehr auskam”41 (72).  
It is significant that Paul’s tragedy is, according to Madame Landau, a 
specifically German tragedy. Paul’s emigration was short lived; after the war he 
returned to Germany, an event that Madame Landau calls “eine Aberration” (83). He 
might have done better to stay away, but, Madame Landau relates to the narrator, he 
could not, because he was “von Grund auf ein Deutscher”42 (84). Indeed, Paul’s 
complicated relationship with his native country sounds as though it is something that 
the narrator might have been able to empathize with, but the narrator, who does not 
share Paul’s one-quarter Jewish ancestry, does not presume to try.  
In contrast to Paul Bereyter, Max Aurach, the subject of the fourth, last, and 
lengthiest story in Die Ausgewanderten, left Germany during the war, never to return. 
In many ways, Aurach seems to be a precursor to Jacques Austerlitz; at the very least, 
their stories bear a striking resemblance to each other, even if the characters 
themselves are quite different. Aurach is an artist, whom the narrator first encounters 
when he comes to Manchester to study. But it is not for thirty years that the narrator 
finally learns Aurach’s real story from a magazine article about his work: that Max 
Aurach (born Friedrich Maximilian Aurach) left Munich in 1939 when he was fifteen 
to come to England; his parents, who stayed behind, were subsequently deported and 
killed. Appalled that he had not known this sooner, the narrator seeks his friend out 
once more, and their subsequent conversation strongly foretells the conversations that 
the narrator of Austerlitz has with Austerlitz himself. Even Aurach’s ideas about how 
his experiences have affect his memory and his sense of time foretell Austerlitz’s own 
thoughts on the subject: “Es gibt weder eine Vergangenheit noch eine Zukunft. 
Jedenfalls nicht für mich”43 (270). Both characters are unable to imagine their futures 
because they are also unable to imagine their own pasts. Constructing a narrative of 
                                                
41 “that insuperable sense of defeat that was so often to beset him in later times and which, finally, he 
could not shake off” (49) 
42 “a German to the marrow” (57) 
43 “There is neither a past nor a future. At least, not for me” (181). 
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their pasts is exactly what Sebald's narrators are able to do for them, even as those 
constructed pasts remain, in an emotional sense, unimaginable for the author, the 
narrator, and the reader.  
Before the narrator leaves, Aurach gives him a manuscript: his mother’s 
memoirs, which she wrote between 1939 and 1941. Aurach tells the narrator that he 
has read them only twice, and only once meticulously. He cannot bring it upon himself 
to even begin the work of “dem Erinnern, dem Schreiben und dem Lesen” 
[remembering, writing, and reading] (289) that the memoirs require of him, and so he 
asks the narrator to do it for him. The remainder of the novel is largely lifted from the 
memoirs of Aurach’s mother, Luisa Lanzberg, who is allowed to speak for herself in a 
way that Austerlitz’s mother Agáta never is. But this past, too, is explicitly 
constructed, both by the narrator and by Luisa herself. In the first few pages of Luisa’s 
memoirs, the narrator takes care to remind the reader that this is Luisa’s diary by 
frequently adding “schreibt Luisa” [writes Luisa] or “wie Luisa schreibt” [so Luisa 
writes]. But gradually the narrator stops reminding the reader, and the narration segues 
smoothly into a first person account. The memoir is written at first in the present tense, 
as though it is the child Luisa describing her own distinctly Jewish life in the village of 
Steinach at the turn of the century. Only once the adult Luisa breaks in for the first 
time does the narration change into the past tense. “Die Zeit,” Luisa writes, just before 
this shift in narrative style. “In welcher Zeit ist das alles gewesen? Und wie langsam 
neigten sich nicht damals die Tage! Und wer war dieses fremde Kind auf dem 
Heimweg, müde, mit einer winzigen weißblauen Häherfeder in der Hand?”44 (310) 
What Luisa does not say here, nor anywhere else in the parts of her memoir that the 
narrator includes in the text, is that she is writing the memoir because she senses that 
time, which seemed to pass so slowly when she was a child, is about to run out for her. 
Here, Sebald’s narrator reproduces not spoken but written narration. This is 
distinct from both Lucy Landau’s narration of Paul Bereyter’s life and Austerlitz’s 
narration of his mother’s. There are clear differences between writing and speaking as 
mediums, and a major one is the reproducibility and reliability of writing in contrast to 
                                                
44 “Time. What time was all that? How slowly the days passed then! And who was that strange child, 
walking home, tired, with a tiny blue and white jay’s feather in her hand?” (207) 
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speaking. Writing remains on the page long after memory has faded; it is much easier 
to faithfully reproduce what someone has written than it is to faithfully reproduce what 
someone has said. It is therefore conceivable that a diary like Luisa’s might be 
reproduced word for word by the narrator, and in fact we are apparently meant to 
assume that the narrator of Die Ausgewanderten does exactly that. But we are also 
given to understand that her memoirs are not reproduced in full, as indicated when the 
narrator notes, in parentheses, at the beginning of a new paragraph, “Denke ich heute, 
heißt es an einer anderen Stelle in den Aufzeichnungen Luisas, an unsere Steinacher 
Kindheit zurück”45 (311, emphasis mine). Both Paul Bereyter and Luisa Lanzberg’s 
narratives are constructed by those who are left behind to tell their stories; 
furthermore, telling their story is, Max Aurach says clearly, work: It is work of 
writing, reading, and remembering. It is work of reconstruction, and it is, almost by its 
very nature, likely to be imperfect. Ultimately, we have no way of knowing what the 
narrator might have left out, just as we have no way of knowing how Agáta’s story 
might have changed in the telling from Vera to Austerlitz to the narrator to the reader, 
or what role the fallible nature of memory might have played in the reconstructed 
narratives.  
Austerlitz, Sebald’s final work, is the only one of his works that might be 
considered a true novel, and yet it, too, presents the reader with many of the same 
difficulties as Sebald’s less novelistic works. These difficulties are due largely to 
Sebald’s conscious eschewing of many realist narrative conventions even in the most 
fictional of his texts, though it would be an oversimplification to say that Sebald 
eschews realism altogether. In fact, realism scholar Lilian R. Furst calls Austerlitz 
“realism gone wild” (225): 
Austerlitz . . . roams all over the place figuratively as well as 
geographically, overloading readers with an abundance of frequently 
technical details in sentences pages long (one extends over nine pages), 
details that pose a tough challenging to readers’ capacity to process, let 
                                                
45 “If I think back nowadays to our childhood in Steinach (Luisa’s memoirs continue at another point)” 
(207, emphasis mine) 
89 
alone to accommodate them in the totality by means of interpretation. 
(Furst 224-225) 
To this list of textual challenges, I would add the “thickening” of narration: the 
increased distance between reader and narrative subject. Thus, in Austerlitz, the 
relationship between narrator, narrative subject, and reader is rendered yet more 
complicated than it is in Die Ausgewanderten. Narration in Austerlitz is not only 
mediated, but hypermediated. The phrase “sagte Austerlitz” [Austerlitz said] appears 
three or four times per page in certain parts; this serves to remind the reader, at every 
turn, of how removed he or she is from Austerlitz’s mind and how artificially the 
narrative has been constructed. Eventually, such source tags proliferate: it is not only 
Austerlitz telling the story, but also his mother, Agáta, and his former nanny, Vera.  
Strikingly, however, there are moments in Austerlitz where that is not true: 
where the narrator breaks through and invokes strong empathy in the reader, even as 
he continues to tell us almost nothing about himself. Perhaps the most significant of 
these is a scene early in the novel, in which the narrator visits the Belgian fortress of 
Breendonk. This part of the novel is populated by photographs of the real Breendonk 
fortress, as well as a diagram of it, none of which show any people at all. For the 
narrator, however, Breendonk takes on a life of its own as “der breite Rücken, so 
dachte ich mir, eines Ungetüms, das sich hier, wie eine Walfisch aus den Wellen, 
herausgehoben hatte aus dem flandrischen Boden”46 (29), and as “eine einzige 
monolithische Ausgeburt der Häßlichkeit und der blinden Gewalt”47 (31). Perhaps 
most emblematic and disturbing is the photo of a hallway, lit only intermittently by 
inadequate florescent bulbs, disappearing into a complete blackness (34).  
The reactions that the narrator has to the fortress in general are visceral and 
unpleasant, but the room that provokes the narrator’s most extreme reaction is the 
Folterkammer, or torture chamber (36). Upon entering the torture chamber, the 
narrator begins experiencing physical and perceptual distortions; he feels that the “die 
                                                
46 “something hunched and misshapen: the broad back of a monster, I thought, risen from this Flemish 
soil like a whale from the deep” (20) 
47 “a monolithic monstrous incarnation of ugliness and blind violence” (21) 
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Atemluft weniger und das Gewicht über mir größer wird”48 (35-36); then, as he stares 
at the floor of the chamber he has the sensation that the floor of the torture chamber, 
already more than a meter below that of the hallway, is continuing to sink. From this 
“abyss” rises a childhood memory of a butcher shop, and with it further perceptual 
distortions, illusions, or hallucinations: 
Genau kann niemand erklären, was in uns geschieht, wenn die Türe 
aufgerissen wird, hinter der die Schrecken der Kindheit verborgen sind. 
Aber ich weiß noch, daß mir damals in der Kasematte von Breendonk 
ein ekelhafter Schmierseifengeruch in die Nase stieg, daß dieser 
Geruch sich, an einer irren Stelle in meinem Kopf, mit dem mir immer 
zuwider gewesenen und vom Vater mit Vorliebe gebrauchten Wort 
‘Wurzelbürste’ verband, daß ein schwarzes Gestrichel mir vor den 
Augen zu zittern begann und ich gezwungen war, mit der Stirn mich 
anzulehnen an die von bläulichen Flecken unterlaufene, griesige und, 
wie mir vorkam, von kalten Schweißperlen überzogene Wand.49 (37) 
This scene, in contrast to the narration in the bulk of the novel, provokes strong 
empathy; the reader becomes closely aligned with the narrator in this passage through 
his description of his mental state. It is a scene that requires the reader to imagine 
intimately the suffering of the narrator and the reasons behind it, and it invites the 
reader even to experience some of that suffering herself, to the extent that this is 
possible. This effect is amplified when the narrator recalls later reading Jean Ámery’s 
description of the torture he underwent in that same room, particularly how he was “an 
seinen auf den Rücken gefesselten Händen, in die Höhe gezogen hatte, so daß ihm mit 
einem, wie er sagt, bis zu dieser Stunde des Aufgeschriebens nicht vergessenen 
                                                
48 “the air was growing thinner and the weight above me heavier” (24-25) 
49 No one can explain exactly what happens within us when the doors behind which our childhood 
terrors lurk are flung open. But I do remember that there in the casemate at Breendonk a nauseating 
smell of soft soap rose to my nostrils, and that this smell, in some strange place in my head, was linked 
to the bizarre German word for scrubbing brush, Würzelbürste, which was a favorite of my father’s and 
which I had always disliked. Black striations began to quiver before my eyes, and I had to rest my 
forehead against the wall, which was gritty, covered with bluish spots, and seemed to me to be 
perspiring with cold beads of sweat. (25-26) 
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Krachen und Splintern die Kugeln aus den Pfannen der Schultergelenke sprangen und 
er mit ausgerenkten, von hinten in die Höhe gerissenen und über den Kopf verdreht 
geschlossenen Armen in der Leere hing”50 (38). Sebald’s narration then quotes Ámery 
directly, in untranslated French. Thus, although this is a mediated account of torture, 
from Jean Ámery through the narrator and to the reader, Ámery is allowed to speak for 
himself. Furthermore, the description is visceral, particularly the vivid description of 
joint dislocation. As I will show, this vividness is largely missing frsom the narrator’s 
retelling of Austerlitz’s story, and it is perhaps present here only because the narrator, 
still locked in the throes of his own post-traumatic experience, also experiences an 
unsettling flash of empathy for Ámery, who, as one of fascism’s victims, should be 
off-limits in this way. 
The Breendonk passage aligns the reader early on with the narrator, bringing 
their minds into close proximity with each other and emphasizing that his is the mind 
to which we have access. The reader is therefore able to establish an empathic 
connection with him in a way that is nearly impossible with Austerlitz himself, and 
even more so with third- and fourth-line narrators, such as Agáta and Vera. But the 
narrator’s own understanding of his own mind, and therefore our understanding of it, 
is imperfect; from the very first line of the novel, it is established that the narrator does 
not always understand why he does what he does: “In der zweiten Hälfte der sechziger 
Jahre bin ich, teilweise zu Studienzwecken, teilweise aus anderen, mir selber nicht 
rech erfindlichen Gründen, von England aus wiederholt nach Belgien gefahren”51 (5). 
This awareness of his inability to know his own mind is something that the narrator 
has in common with Austerlitz himself, and it is only as the narrative progresses that 
Austerlitz, the narrator, and the reader come to understand how Austerlitz’s past 
suffering affects his present. It is only relatively late in his life that Austerlitz's 
frequent, compulsive visits to Liverpool Station result in a revelation: this is where he 
                                                
50 “hoisted aloft by his hands, tied behind his back, so that with a crack and a splintering sound which, 
as he says, he had not yet forgotten when he came to write his account, his arms dislocated from the 
sockets in his shoulder joints and he was left dangling as they were wrenched up behind him and 
twisted together above his head” (26) 
51 “In the second half of the 1960s I traveled repeatedly from England to Belgium, partly for study 
purposes, partly for other reasons which were never entirely clear to me” (3) 
92 
first met his foster parents when he came to England in the 1940s as a child on a 
Kindertransport. This realization proves key to him unlocking the secret to his past 
and current unhappiness, opening a flood of memories long buried in his unconscious, 
as memories begin surfacing in both dreams and waking moments. From there, 
Austerlitz becomes aware of — as he had not been before — the cognitive effort his 
unconscious put into protecting his conscious mind from these realizations: “Ich 
merkte jetzt, wie wenig Übung ich in der Erinnerung hatte und wie sehr ich, im 
Gegenteil, immer bemüht gewesen sein mußte, mich an möglichst gar nichts zu 
erinnern und allem aus dem Weg zu gehen, was sich auf die eine oder andere Weise 
auf meine mir bekannte Herkunft bezog”52 (201).  
The reader follows this process of discovery as well, but not in the same 
visceral, affective way that she follows the narrator’s grim realization in Breendonk. 
In contrast to Sebald’s vivid depiction of the narrator’s mental state while teetering on 
the edge of the Breendonk torture chamber, the narrator’s reporting of Austerlitz’s 
discoveries, while linguistically beautiful, remain emotionally inaccessible. Perhaps 
the most direct and striking example of this is the scene wherein Austerlitz describes, 
via the narrator, how he suddenly recalled meeting his foster parents for the first time: 
Den Zustand, in den ich darüber geriet, sagte Austerlitz, weiß ich, wie 
so vieles, nicht genau zu beschreiben; es war ein Reißen, das ich in mir 
verspürte, und Scham und Kummer, oder ganz etwas anderes, worüber 
man nicht reden kann, weil dafür die Worte fehlen, so wie mir die 
Worte damals gefehlt haben, als die zwei fremden Leute auf mich 
zutraten, deren Sprache ich nicht verstand.53 (197-198) 
This passage’s true emotion, as so much of the emotion present in Austerlitz, lives in 
the silences; it is “inexpressable,” and the narrator does not venture to aid the reader in 
                                                
52 "I realized then, he said, how little practice I had in using my memory, and conversely how hard I 
must always have tried to recollect as little as possible, avoiding everything which related in any way to 
my unknown past" (139) 
53 As so often, said Austerlitz, I cannot give any precise description of the state of mind this realization 
induced; I felt something rending within me, and a sense of shame and sorrow, or perhaps something 
quite different, something inexpressable because we have no words for it, just as I had no words all 
those years ago when the two strangers came over to me speaking a language I did not understand. 
(137) 
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his or her understanding of Austerlitz’s own emotional state. It is possible, of course, 
that Austerlitz would not be any more forthcoming if he were speaking to his reader 
directly, but the mediated quality of the narration means that emotion that is already 
inexpressable becomes even more inaccessible.  
Moreover, this elliptical inexpression of emotion becomes yet more 
pronounced once Austerlitz begins reporting the story of his childhood nanny, Vera 
and that of his parents. These scenes become, I argue, hypermediated; we are no 
longer receiving accounts second-hand from the narrator, nor even third hand from 
Vera herself, but often fourth-hand from Austerlitz’s own parents. The historical 
narrative that is at the heart of Austerlitz, that of the Nazi occupation of Prague and the 
deportation of the city’s Jews to ghettos and concentration camps, is even more 
heavily mediated than Austerlitz’s own personal narrative. It is not unusual in these 
chapters for a sentence to contain two source tags, reminding the reader that we are 
receiving this information third or even fourth hand through phrases such as “wie ich 
von Vera weiß, sagte Austerlitz”54 (235). This type of narration mutes and muffles the 
narrative’s emotional affect, a phenomenon that becomes particularly pronounced in 
the middle of the novel, during Austerlitz’s accounts of Vera’s memories of the past. 
The narrator writes, for example, “An meinem dritten Tag in Prag, so erzählte 
Austerlitz weiter, nachdem er sich etwas gesammelt hatte”55 (233), without describing 
the emotions that caused the lack of composure or even what it looked like; similarly, 
Austerlitz will note that “[n]ach solchen Bemerkungen Veras trat oft ein längeres 
Stillschweigen ein, als wußten wir beide nicht weiter”56 (293), while giving the reader 
very little clue as to the emotional quality of that silence.  
In fact, these silences and losses of composure are only ever described 
retrospectively, never as they occur. For a narrative with startlingly long sentences, 
Austerlitz is remarkably elliptical, and it forces the reader to fill in those silences and 
ellipses. In so doing, Sebald resists rendering the grief of the victims easy fodder for 
                                                
54 “Vera had told me, said Austerlitz” (162) 
55 “On my third day in Prague, so Austerlitz continued his story, when he had recovered some degree of 
composure” (162) 
56 “[s]uch remarks of Vera’s were often followed by a long silence, as though neither of us knew what 
to say” (205) 
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the reader’s affective experience. One of the most striking examples of this is the 
scene in which Austerlitz’s father Maximilian describes (via Vera, via Austerlitz, via 
the narrator) the state of Germany under Hitler. Here, in one of Sebald’s 
characteristically long, complex sentences, Maximilian describes what it was like to 
watch Triumph des Willens in Munich when it first came out in 1935. The narration 
itself stands in stark contrast to the raw emotion evoked by the film, which I analyzed 
in Chapter 1.  
“Nicht nur seien die von Ehrfurcht geschlagenen Zuschauer Zeugen 
geworden, wie sich das Fluzeug des Führers durch die Wolkengebirge 
allmählich herabsenkt auf die Erde . . . —nein, man sah auch, so, sagte 
Vera, berichtete Maximilian, aus der Vogelschau eine im Morgengrauen 
bis gegen den Horizont reichende Stadt von weißen Zelten, aus denen, 
so wie ein wenig licht wurde, einzeln, paarweise und in kleinen Gruppen 
die Deutschen hervorkam und sich in einem schweigsamen, immer 
enger sich schließenden Zug alle in dieselbe Richtung bewegten, als 
folgten sie einem höheren Ruf und seien, nach langen Jahren in der 
Wüste, nun endlich auf dem Weg ins Gelobte Land.57 (243-244) 
The effect of the mediated narration is amplified here, as it is elsewhere in Sebald’s 
work, by the use of the reported speech. Maximilian speaks through Vera, who speaks 
through Austerlitz, who speaks through the narrator; this is the only way Maximilian 
might speak now, for his death makes it impossible for him to speak for himself. This 
scene, like the one I discuss below, invites empathy to a certain degree; it invites us to 
imagine what it might have been like for Maximilian to watch Triumph des Willens in 
a cinema full of enraptured Germans. But the narration itself undermines this empathy, 
muting the passage’s emotion, and underscoring the degree to which truly empathizing 
                                                
57 Not only did the overawed spectators witness the Führer’s airplane descending slowly to earth 
through towering mountain ranges of cloud . . . — no, said Vera, Maximilian told us that a bird’s eye 
view showed a city of white tents extending to the horizon, from which as day broke the Germans 
emerged singly, in couples, or in small groups, as they all went in the same direction, following, so it 
seemed, some higher bidding, on their way to the Promised Land at last after long years in the 
wilderness. (169) 
95 
with Maximilian — truly feeling as he felt in that Munich cinema — is a narrative and 
ethical impossibility.  
Another such scene that is even more striking in this regard is the one in which 
Vera recalls saying good-bye to Agáta; this scene is particuarly startling given how 
emotional one would expect it to be — indeed, how emotional the scene is, to a certain 
point:  
Agáta bat mich bald, sie zu verlassen. Beim Abschied umarmte sie mich 
und sagte, dort drüben ist der Stramovka-Park. Würdest du dort 
manchmal spaziergehen für mich? Ich hab dieses schöne Gelände so lieb 
gehabt. Vielleicht wenn du in das dunkle Wasser der Teiche schaust, 
vielleicht siehst du an einem guten Tag mein Gesicht. Ja und dann, sagte 
Vera, bin ich nach Hause gegangen.58 (257)  
As in so much of the novel, the emotion of this passage lives in what is not said: that 
Agáta does not expect to return, and that, if Vera does see her face “in das dunkle 
Wasser der Teiche,” it will not be because she is there beside her, in the flesh. It will 
be instead (the imagery implies) because the pools themselves are linked to the 
unfathomable, dark places of our own minds, and maybe even to the world beyond 
this one. The poetry and imagery of this scene draw the reader in, but Agáta’s 
declaration is followed immediately by, “Ja und dann, sagte Vera, bin ich nach Hause 
gegangen” [“Well,” said Vera, “and then I went home.”] This transition — sudden and 
incredibly short for Austerlitz — disrupts the emotion that started to build during 
Vera’s reporting of Agáta’s final words to her. I argue, however, that as in Vera’s 
recounting of Maximilian’s description of Triumph des Willens, the disruption does 
not entirely undermine the emotional effect of the passage. We may not have access to 
Agáta’s mind, but we have enough access to Vera’s to imagine how this must have 
affected her at the time. It affected her enough that she still remembers Agáta’s words 
all these many years later.  
                                                
58Agáta soon asked me to leave her. When we parted she embraced me and said: Stromovka Park is 
over there, would you walk there for me sometimes? I have loved that beautiful place so much. If you 
look into the dark water of the pools, perhaps one of these days you will see my face. Well, said Vera, 
so then I went home” (179). 
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These sorts of empathic moments are not unique to Sebald; indeed, I have 
argued with Grass and I will argue with Haneke that moments of intimacy, of 
tenderness, of empathy are present in even the most estranging of their works. But 
each of them also consciously and consistently undermines these moments, albeit in 
different ways. In the case of Sebald, his ethical issues with realist representation and 
the invocation of empathy prompts him to prevent direct connection between reader 
and narrator through mediated narration, thereby forcing the reader to acknowledge 
that ultimately, it is impossible to understand the minds of others; indeed, under 
certain circumstances, it is unethical even to try. The narrator and Austerlitz both 
accept that there is much they cannot understand; they themselves remain skeptical 
about their own motivations and their own understandings of their own and each 
other’s minds. However, I argue that it is almost impossible to read in a purely 
skeptical mode; we as readers are too accustomed to experiencing empathy as we read. 
Furthermore, Sebald is not entirely discouraging of such our attempts at empathy, 
even if they inevitably fail. Indeed, while Sebald’s mediated narration deliberately 
thwarts mindreading and empathy, other aspects of the texts, particularly the 
photographs that are interspersed throughout the narrative, invite it. 
 
	  
Reading the Mind Behind the Eyes: The Faces of History 
 
At the beginning of my first chapter, I described how the reader turns a page 
very early in Austerlitz and is confronted by a series of four photographs. Each is a 
pair of eyes, two of nocturnal animals such as those in the Nocturama of Antwerp Zoo, 
and the other two are of human eyes — specifically, they are the eyes of artist Jan 
Peter Tripp and and philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. In my first chapter, I argue that 
these photographs represent a mindreading exercise for the reader, and that the 
photographs are meant to prompt the reader to pause and linger, attempting to see in 
them the effects that the narrator describes. Wittgenstein, I mentioned, is particularly 
significant, for it is over his face that we are meant to superimpose Austerlitz himself, 
and it is therefore his eyes upon which we are asked to expend the most cognitive 
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energy. But that effort to read Wittgeinstein’s eyes, like so many mindreading 
exercises in Sebald’s texts, is an inevitable failure. 
 In this section, I shall consider a variety of photographs from both Die 
Ausgewanderten and Austerlitz; in particular, I am interested in moments like the one I 
have just described, in which the reader turns the page of the novel and encounters a 
face or a pair of eyes. This early scene in Austerlitz is perhaps the most memorable 
instance of this, but it is hardly the only one. While critics have expended a great deal 
of energy discussing the photographs and their place within Sebald’s work, there has 
been, on the whole, little attention paid to the empathic function of the photographs: 
that is, to the fact that the photographs invite the reader to partake in a mindreading 
exercise with people who are, on the whole, already long dead. Furthermore the nature 
of their deaths often problematize or even preclude the possibility of real empathy on 
the part of the reader, who cannot understand the suffering that the photographic 
subject will endure but has not yet endured at the moment in time in which the 
photograph was taken.   
Given that the inclusion of photographs were one of the most striking and 
unusual features of his texts, Sebald was often asked in interviews about their origin 
and their meaning. Most of the photos, he claimed, came from “the albums that . . . 
middle-class people kept in the thirties and forties. And they are from the authentic 
source. Ninety percent of the images inserted into the text could be said to be 
authentic, i.e. they are not from other sources used for the purpose of telling the tale” 
(Wachtel 40-41). In terms of their purpose, Sebald identifies two main ones: 
verification (that is, verification of the story that Sebald’s narrator is relating to the 
reader) and the “arresting of time” (Wachtel 41). Photographs, in other words, slow 
down a reader, causing them to linger, to question, to think; I argue that when a 
photograph is of a person, particularly a face, a reader is even more likely to slow 
down, and to attempt not only to connect the photograph with the text, but also to read 
some deeper meaning within the photograph itself. To return to my first example, it is 
no great feat of interpretation to connect the four photos of eyes to the text, which 
explicitly mention the animals in the Nocturama and their resemblance to “certain 
painters and philosophers.” But the reader then pauses over the photographs of the sets 
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of human eyes. Perhaps he or she recognizes the eyes; the photograph of Wittgenstein 
from which the eyes were taken is relatively well known. It is more likely, however, 
that the reader does not immediately recognize either Tripp or Wittgenstein, and is 
caught simply by the invitation to mindread, to see within the eyes what Sebald’s 
narrator has seen. 
Sebald alludes to other functions of the photographs in that same interview, 
when he says, “I have always had at the back of my mind this notion that of course 
[the dead] aren't really gone, they just hover somewhere at the perimeter of our lives 
and keep coming in on brief visits. And photographs are for me, as it were, one of the 
emanations of the dead, especially these older photographs of people no longer with 
us” (39-40). The “spectral” presence of the dead in photographs is perhaps most 
palpable when we are looking at photographs of people we, personally, knew, but the 
fictional narrative in which we find these photographs provides its own context and its 
own ways of “knowing” — its own forms of intimacy and empathy. For some critics, 
this is a positive development; J.J. Long for example, writing on family photographs 
and their relationship to Marianne Hirsch’s concept of “postmemory” writes that, 
“[t]he combination of narrative and photography in Die Ausgewanderten can thus be 
seen as an attempt, at the level of form, to counteract the dispersal, dissipation, and 
rupture inherent in the historical process. For Sebald . . . it is only through such 
aesthetic strategies that history can possibly be redeemed” (137).  
For other critics, however, such as Taberner, this is highly problematic. Some 
history, after all, should not be redeemed. In his own piece on photographs in Die 
Ausgewanderten and Austerlitz, Taberner writes: 
The photographs are thus the visual equivalents of the constant textual 
allusions to objects that tender a split second’s insight into the 
quotidian normality destroyed by the Holocaust. These markers are all 
that remains of people and places catapulted into the horrors of the 
present, now assembled and redesignated as traces of the prehistory of 
the Holocaust. This is a designation that they attempt to resist, but 
which, for us, is indispensable. Because, in the wake of the Holocaust, 
we cannot grasp them in the integrity of the moment in which they 
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actually existed in context, as the moment is unrecoverable to us, we 
can only comprehend them, albeit inadequately, within a teleological 
reading of history. And teleology, it might be argued, is simply another 
word for fate. (184) 
For Taberner, then, Sebald’s narrative traps the photographic subject like a fly in 
amber; unlike the fly, though, the subject is not perfectly preserved at that moment in 
time, but rather imbued with meaning from the “fate” that awaits them, ten, twenty, or 
thirty years later. This lends the subject’s death an air of inevitability: They did not 
know it then, but their death has always already awaited them, even at the moment 
they were photographed, in Theresienstadt or Auschwitz. This teleological view of 
history is problematic not least for the way in which it strips history of its connection 
to human agency, rendering it part of natural history — a history over which we have 
no control. What neither Taberner nor Long acknowledges, however, is the 
importance of the photographs for the reader’s affective experience of the text: 
specifically, the extent to which our affective reactions are predicated upon the 
knowledge we have that the subjects do not. When we turn the page in the fourth and 
final section of Die Ausgewanderten to find Max Aurach’s parents, Luisa and Fritz 
(326), staring up at us, our reactions cannot preclude our knowledge of how they died.  
It is therefore impossible to read these photos in isolation, or to pretend that 
our emotional reactions to them are not almost inevitably based on the teleological 
sense of history that Taberner identifies. But I argue that the reader’s emotional 
reaction is also predicated upon her shock at turning the page and finding a 
photograph, particularly that of a face or a close-up of an eye, looking back at us. At 
first glance, the photographs stand in stark contrast to the mediated or even 
hypermediated narration I discussed in the first part of this chapter. Although the 
narration itself distances us from its subject or subjects, the photographs provide an 
invitation to mindread and, moreover, to a more affective form of empathy. This 
appears to shift the dynamic between empathy and estrangement within the text. 
Deeper analysis, however, reveals that the presence of photographs does not shift the 
dynamic so far that unmitigated empathy may ever truly take place. Even while they 
represent an invitation to empathy, the photographs also represent a caesura in the 
100 
text: what Maya Barzilai labels “a disruptive force that relentlessly severs the narrative 
flow” (217). This disruption, and the sense of the uncanny that accompanies many of 
the photographs (Barzilai 211), forces the reader to doubt his or her own ability to read 
the minds behind the eyes of the photographic subjects and to question, in the most 
extreme cases, whether the face we are attempting to read masks the right mind. The 
photographs thus serve as an invitation to an empathy that is subsequently thwarted, 
thereby underscoring the problematic and limited ability of empathy to serve as a way 
of understanding the figures in the photographs. 
The first set of photographs that I will discuss appears in the section of Die 
Ausgewanderten about Paul Bereyter. Pages 70-71 actually contain three photos in the 
German edition: a photo of the pupils in one of Paul’s very first classes as a teacher, a 
photo of his fiancée Helen Hollaender, and a triptych of Paul and Helen together. This 
section is narrated by Paul’s friend Madame Landau, who provides the narrator and, 
by extension, the reader, with some guidance toward an interpretation of the 
photographs. But this must remain her interpretation only, for the photographs allude 
to a story Madame Landau has no way of knowing fully:  
Die um paar ein paar Monate ältere Helen . . . ist für die Paul, einer 
Mutmaßung, Mme. Landau zufolge, nicht weniger als eine Offenbarung 
gewesen, dann wenn diese Bilder nicht trügen, sagte sie, dann war die 
Helen Hollaender freimütig, klug und zudem ein ziemlich tiefes Wasser, 
in welchem der Paul gerne sich spiegelte.59 (71-72) 
The photographs here serve as a proxy for that which cannot be known, which in this 
case is not only or even primarily factual information, but emotion. Paul and Helen are 
both dead by the time Madame Landau tells their story to the narrator; the facts may 
be known — though even they are somewhat questionable — but no one, not even 
Madame Landau herself, knows the emotional truth of their story without the 
photographs themselves.  
                                                
59 “Helen, who was a month or so older . . . came as a veritable revelation to Paul; if these pictures can 
be trusted, she said, Helen Hollaender was an independent-spirited, clever woman, and furthermore her 
waters ran deep. And in those waters, Paul liked to see his own reflection.” (48) 
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Indeed, even with the photographs, that truth is, as Madame Landau herself 
points out, highly suspect; she is careful to insert the caveat “wenn diese Bilder nicht 
trügen.” Of course, the photos are suspect not because they outright lie, but because 
there is no way to interpret them that is not speculative. It is therefore up to the reader 
to seek out the emotional truth behind Lucy Landau’s narrative in the triptych of the 
couple at the bottom of the page and in the picture of Helen just above it. The three 
photos at the bottom are clear demonstrations of Paul and Helen’s happiness, and they 
evince a sense of carefree whimsy that seems almost cruel when viewed 
retrospectively, through Stuart Taberner’s teleological lens. But the most interesting 
photograph by far is the one of Helen seated on a grassy field, looking not at the 
camera but off to the side. The reader pauses here, searching Helen’s face for the deep 
waters Lucy Landau spoke of, for her independent spirit, for her cleverness. Though 
we know little about Helen beyond her brief relationship with Paul and her eventual 
deportation, the photograph gives us far more than the text would without it. In the 
end, we cannot say any better than Madame Landau what Helen was thinking or 
feeling at the moment the photograph was taken. The empathy we might feel for Helen 
is necessarily tempered by doubt at our own ability to read the mind behind the eyes in 
her photograph. 
This feeling of an emotional mystery that can never be solved is not unique to 
the photo of Helen Hollaender in Die Ausgewanderten. It may also be seen in two very 
striking photos in Austerlitz, both of which may be of Austerlitz’s mother, Agáta. The 
first photo is actually a still from a film about the ghetto of Theresienstadt, where 
Austerlitz knows his mother was for some time after being deported from Prague; the 
second is of a photograph of an actress that Austerlitz finds in the Prague theatrical 
archives. Both photos consist primarily of a face rising out of the dark. Austerlitz 
describes the face of the woman in the first photo, which is actually a still from a film 
about the ghetto of Theresienstadt, as “fast ununterschieden von dem schwarzen 
Schatten, der es umgibt”60 (354). Austerlitz stares at the women’s face, 
                                                
60 “barely emerging from the black shadows around it [the face]” (251) 
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“gleichermaßen fremde und vertraute”61 (355), until it begins to match his memories 
of his mother. But it is impossible for him to say whether it is truly Agáta’s face, or 
whether the face in the still from the film has become superimposed over his faint and 
faded memories of his mother, much as Wittgenstein’s face is imposed over both 
Austerlitz and Sebald’s own. Indeed, Vera tells him that the woman in the film is not 
Agáta. It is another resident of Theresienstadt, who, though unimportant to 
Austerlitz’s story, likely met the same end that Agáta did. This begs the question of 
why, if the woman it shows is not Austerlitz’s mother, Sebald chose to include the 
photograph at all.  
In order to answer this question, I will turn now to the second photograph, 
which consists of a pale face, beautiful and sad, against a black background (253). 
Brad Prager, who calls this photograph “one of the work's most haunting ones” (100), 
compares it to French photographer Christian Boltanski’s Holocaust photographs, 
Altar to Lycée Chases. For this installation, Boltanski re-photographed the faces of 
students in a class photograph from a Viennese Jewish school, and then subjected the 
photographs to harsh light, giving the photographs the same sort of “haunting” or 
“ghostly” effect as the photograph of Agáta. Prager notes that Andrea Liss praises 
Boltanski’s work for the way it “resists empathy by presenting the dark and alienating 
physiognomies of the dead” (100). According to Liss, Boltanski’s photographs “refute 
the strategy of facile identification between the viewer and the memory of the picture” 
(Liss qtd. in Prager 100); in other words, Liss argues that these sorts of photographs 
disrupt the empathy that photographs usually inspire in the reader. However, Prager 
takes issue with Liss’s argument: 
Boltanski's photographs, which deliberately avoid the representation of 
atrocity, horror, and genocide and which work through implication, 
gestures, and the sense that they mildly unsettle the viewers, can 
potentially be misunderstood and viewed more as sentimental than 
provocative. There is no guarantee that such images avoid the issues 
that accompany the awakening of empathy in viewers or readers. (101) 
                                                
61 “both strange and familiar” (251) 
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Here, I must agree with Prager: there is nothing about the photograph itself that 
renders empathy impossible, and indeed, the apparent sadness in Agáta’s face may 
raise in the reader an answering sense of empathic melancholy. Like the photo of 
Helen Hollaender that I discussed earlier, however, it is impossible to know for sure 
what Agáta was thinking when the photograph was taken; indeed, it is impossible to 
know for sure that the photograph is of Agáta at all. In fact, the apparent inauthenticity 
of the first photo also calls into question the authenticity of the second, even if Vera 
confirms, “zweifelfrei” [“beyond a shadow of a doubt”] that the second photo is 
Agáta. I argue that it is this uncertainty, more than anything about the photograph’s 
composition, that distances the reader from true empathy with the woman in the 
photograph. If we could know for certain that this was Agáta, Austerlitz’s mother, 
then we might be more inclined toward the sort of empathy that Taberner and Prager 
both find problematic; but, although our impulse toward mindreading is reflexive, that 
sliver of doubt pushes a wedge of estrangement between the reader and the woman in 
the photo. This uncertainty, Maya Barzilai says, asks us to “realize . . . the limits of 
our ability to know what took place in the past, especially when that past encloses a 
traumatic experience” (217). The photo of Agáta thus serves as a microcosmic 
representation of the ethic of skepticism and doubt that counterbalances our impulse 
toward empathy throughout Austerlitz, reminding us at every turn that empathy and 
emotion are not to be trusted.  
 
 
Conclusion   
 
The progression from the photo of Helen in Die Ausgewanderten to the photo 
of a woman who might be Agáta in Austerlitz may very well represent a renegotiation 
in Sebald’s work of the relationship between empathy and estrangement, as well as 
between narrative and image. There is no reason to doubt that the image in Die 
Ausgewanderten is truly Helen Hollaender. Although we receive that information 
second hand from Lucy Landau, the reader is not asked to question its authenticity; 
Lucy, after all, received the information directly from Paul Bereyter himself. The 
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uncertainty contained in the photo of Helen is emotional: we know what happened, 
insofar as that is possible, but we cannot guess at what Helen (or Paul) thought or felt. 
Notably, this photo of Helen is also an image of everyday life: Helen’s whole body is 
visible and fully present in a relatively mundane setting. In contrast, the image of 
Agáta, if it is Agáta, is forcefully ambivalent and also strikingly spectral; her white 
face comes to us out of the darkness, a true “emanation of the dead.” It is haunting in a 
way that Helen Hollaender’s photo simply is not, and it disrupts the text in a way that 
Helen’s photo does not. Moreover, the uncertainty contained in the photo of Agáta is 
factual: Is it Agáta at all? Like Austerlitz, Vera, and the narrator, the reader cannot 
ever know for certain. In this way, Austerlitz demands both greater empathy and 
greater uncertainty from its reader. It primes us for empathy with the eyes at the very 
beginning of the text, and then aligns us closely with the narrator through the scene at 
Breendonk. But the hypermediated narration and the uncertainty that surrounds certain 
key photographs forces distance between the reader and Austerlitz. Though our minds 
constantly seek to understand his, we are always doomed to fail.  
The dialectic of empathy and estrangement present in Sebald’s works is less 
jarring that that which is present in Grass’s or in the films of Michael Haneke, which I 
will consider in my next and final chapter. Neither Grass nor Sebald eschews empathy 
altogether; indeed, empathy plays an enormous role in both their narratives, just as it 
does in Haneke’s work. But when Sebald estranges his reader, he does so less 
violently than either Grass or Haneke. There appear to be in Sebald many more 
moments at which the reader might empathize with the narrator or even with 
Austerlitz himself. But with many more invitations to empathy come many more 
opportunities to fail at it. This failure is important, for it is when we fail to empathize 
that we are forced to seek another form of understanding. Through its mediated and 
hypermediated narration, through the disruptive use of photographs of faces and eyes, 
and through the pervasiveness of uncertainty, Sebald’s work, like Grass’s Die 
Blechtrommel, constructs an ethic of skepticism and doubt. But Grass and Sebald do 
so to very different purposes. In Die Blechtrommel, skepticism and doubt are a 
necessary part of the resistance to the emotional elements of German society that 
allowed fascism to flourish; gullibility is the major sin for Grass, as is visible in the 
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“Glaube-Hoffnung-Liebe” chapter at the end of Book One. It is empathy’s narrow and 
biased nature that Grass wishes to undermine. In contrast, for Sebald — writing much 
later than Grass — skepticism and doubt provide a way of imagining trauma, memory, 
and the historical past while avoiding the violation of certain narrative ethics. There 
are things we may not imagine directly. Empathy and emotion are therefore suspect 
ways of experiencing a narrative when left to their own devices, but they become 
possible when tempered by skepticism and doubt. For Haneke, I will show, 
estrangement is a way of underscoring the fascist aspects of empathy in visual media 
and the viewer’s own complicity in reproducing structures of power. And yet, 
Haneke’s most recent film Amour (2012) reverses this aesthetic entirely and 











Dark Fables, Impossible Puzzles, and Franz Schubert: 
 
The Redemption of Empathy in the Films of Michael Haneke 
 
The opening titles to Michael Haneke’s 2001 La Pianiste come nearly eight 
minutes into the film, after a violent and shocking altercation between the protagonist 
Erika Kohut and her mother has already taken place. The titles themselves are very 
small white text on a black background. The film cuts repeatedly between the silent 
titles and pairs of disembodied hands on a piano. Unlike the silence of the titles, these 
shots contain layers of sound: the piano itself, as Erika’s students play first Chopin, 
then Schubert’s Winterreise, and over the sound of the piano, Erika’s voice, loudly 
berating her students for their poor playing. “The music is not purely descriptive,”	  she 
declares. “It is not indifferent and drenched in Viennese sentimentality.” Exasperated, 
she takes over and we see Erika’s hands demonstrating to her student how she wants 
the Schubert played. From this scene, the film cuts without transition to a shot of Erika 
on a break, eating a sandwich while staring out the window; only traffic sounds are to 
be heard here. Finally, with equal abruptness, the film cuts to her standing at a 
different window, listening as yet another student exasperates her with his inferior 
abilities, this time applied to one of Beethoven’s sonatas.62	  
These opening titles provide a clear window into what renders Haneke’s films 
both powerful and extremely difficult. Nothing occurs as expected: the film begins 
before the titles, leaving the viewer unanchored and rudderless; noise and silence work 
together to sow discord, estrangement, and disorientation; and the voice in the 
background, disembodied like the hands, is harsh and judgmental. Although Erika is 
berating her students, the audience may also feel berated. If they know Haneke’s work 
at all, they will not expect something “drenched in Viennese sentimentality.”	  Indeed, 
for Haneke, there appears to be no worse sin in filmmaking than that of sentimentality, 
and he has, on the whole, striven to shrive it from his work, much as Erika attempts to 
                                                
62	  All	  musical	  notations	  are	  as	  described	  in	  Die	  Klavierspielerin:	  Drehbuch,	  Gespräche,	  Essays.	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shrive it from her students’	  playing. Charles Warren argues that in these opening 
scenes, particularly when the camera is focused on the set of hands on the piano, 
“Haneke in effect gives his camera to Erika, suggesting that the film is her projection, 
that she is its director, or that he is she —	  try thinking of every shot as Erika’s, her 
point of view away from herself, or her self-regard —	  it is possible”	  (506). This 
opening sequence collapses Haneke and Erika together in their striving for artistic 
perfection —	  a perfection as devoid of sentimentality as humanly possible. This 
methodical stripping away of sentimentality can make watching Haneke’s films 
challenging for a viewer whose expectations have been established through 
mainstream Hollywood cinema, but this challenge is Haneke’s point. The empathy 
that mainstream film invites is, for Haneke, deeply problematic, and renders the 
viewer complacent, passive, and complicit in myriad cinematic violences. The forms 
of estrangement found in Haneke’s films force the viewer into active participation, 
reflection, and awareness of the ways in which they themselves participate in on-
screen violence —	  in, indeed, structures of power that might be considered fascist. 
Haneke’s films are therefore consistent in their use of estrangement, for it is an ethical 
necessity when one is in the position of cinematic voyeur. But that does not mean that 
the dialectic between empathy and estrangement in Haneke’s texts has remained static 
over time. Indeed, I will show in this chapter that this dialectic has been constantly 
renegotiated both within unique films and over the course of Haneke’s larger oeuvre. 
Moreover, Haneke’s most recent films evince an unexpected turn toward empathy as a 
mode of storytelling with its own shock-value. 	  
 My interest in this chapter is primarily on Hanake’s work since 2001. 
However, in order to understand the ways in which his work has changed, it is 
necessary to briefly examine his work from the 1990s. Haneke’s earlier films place 
great emphasis on estrangement of both the narrative and ethical varieties. In Haneke’s 
1992 film Bennys Video, Benny, a young teenager, murders a girl after repeatedly 
watching a film in which a pig is slaughtered. There is no one in the film with whom 
the viewer wishes to empathize, and the emotions that the film evokes are violently 
estranging: disgust, revulsion, horror, contempt, indignation. But in addition to being 
ethically estranging, Bennys Video is also estranging from a narrative perspective. In a 
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filmic version of Sebald’s embedded narration, the film contains embedded “gazes”: 
Haneke’s camera, Benny’s camera, and Benny himself. Bennys Video collapses the 
gazes of all the observers together and turns the camera lens back on itself. The 
viewer, then, who cannot or will not look away, is rendered complicit in the fictional 
violence being perpetrated. 	  
Bennys Video is clearly a polemic against the sort of numbness perpetuated by 
regular doses of on-screen violence. Haneke elucidated his own position in an essay 
entitled “Violence and Media,”	  in which he stated: “The question is not: ‘What am I 
allowed to show?’	  but rather: ‘What chance do I give the viewer to recognize what it is 
I am showing?’	  The question –	  limited to the topic of violence –	  is not: ‘How do I 
show violence?’	  but rather: ‘How do I show the viewer his own position vis-à-vis 
violence and its portrayal.’”	  Haneke takes this argument to another level in Funny 
Games (1997), in which an apparently normal bourgeois family is tortured by a pair of 
sociopaths who show up randomly at the door of their vacation home. Although the 
embedded gazes of Bennys Video clearly implicate the viewer in the on-screen 
violence, Funny Games drives the point home even harder. Here, Haneke plays games 
with its viewer in much the same way that the sociopaths play games with their 
victims. One of the killers, Paul, frequently breaks the fourth wall to speak directly to 
the audience, and he also continually invokes narrative conventions of Hollywood 
films as the reason for his actions, which are otherwise senseless. At one point, when 
one of the victims appears about to “win,”	  Paul rewinds the film and prevents it, 
dashing the audience’s hopes for a “good”	  outcome. Stephen Holden, reviewing the 
film for the New York Times, said, “Posing as a morally challenging work of art, the 
movie is a really a sophisticated act of cinematic sadism. You go to it at your own 
risk.”	  	  
More than twenty years after Bennys Video and fifteen after the original Funny 
Games63, there is still considerable “risk”	  involved in going to see a Haneke film: risk 
that one will see things one does not wish to see, or feel things one does not wish to 
feel; risk that one will be exposed to excessive onscreen violence without resolution or 
                                                
63	  It	  was	  remade	  for	  an	  American	  audience	  in	  2007.	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consolation. Since 2000, however, there has been a significant shift in Haneke’s film 
making. Whereas Haneke’s earlier work is violently estranging, his work since 2000 
demonstrates an empathic evolution, even as he continues to problematize empathy 
through both ethical and narrative estrangement. In this chapter, I am principally 
interested in three films he has made since 2001: La Pianiste (2001), Das weiße Band 
(2009), and Amour (2013).	  
 
 
Cognitive Film Theory Revisited 
 
In Chapter 1, I provided a brief overview of the field of cognitive film theory, 
with particular attention paid to Murray Smith’s concepts of alignment and allegiance, 
both of which are crucial for a viewer’s experience of a film. Alignment Murray has 
defined as “the process by which spectators are placed in relation to characters  in 
terms of access to their actions, and to what they know and feel”	  (Engaging 
Characters 83);  in other words, alignment is the process through which we are able to 
read a character’s mind and to empathize with them. Allegiance often but not always 
results from alignment; it is generally the result of positive moral evaluation by the 
viewer of the character. Once a character is granted our allegiance, we have the 
tendency to assume her goals as our own and to want her to succeed. Our emotional 
investment in the film is close intertwined with her success. I will argue in this chapter 
that Haneke continually disrupts processes of alignment and, where alignment exists, 
the viewer’s ability to truly grant any single character his allegiance. The means by 
which he does is are both narrative and ethical, and they have to do with the following 
three areas: character action, iconography, and music (or, more generally, sound). 	  
Character Action 
The importance of character action to moral orientation and the establishment 
of allegiance may seem obvious, but Murray Smith notes the neglect that has been 
paid to this crucial aspect of film. This neglect is particularly unfortunate, given that in 
what Smith calls “classical Hollywood cinema” and I call “immersive texts,” character 
and character action are conflated and collapsed into each other. For most movie-
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goers, in other words, what a character does is entirely congruent with who a character 
is. Character actions in immersive films tend to be fairly unmistakable in their moral 
signification, and they require very little conscious effort to interpret on the part of the 
viewer. Smith, drawing on Noël Carroll, notes that “the behavior of major characters 
towards minor characters” is a particularly important device, especially when those 
minor characters are weaker than the major characters, either physically or socially 
(Engaging Characters 190). A remarkable number of Hollywood films orient their 
viewers morally in this way, using clear provocations of either sympathy or antipathy 
to establish their viewers’ allegiances early in the narrative.  
However, the films by Haneke that I will examine refuse all such easy 
establishment of allegiance. Although recognizable characters certainly perform 
actions within the context of the narrative, the moral significance of these actions for 
the characters is often ambivalent and requires conscious effort on the part of the 
viewer to parse; indeed, they may only be able to parse the moral significance of 
character actions retrospectively. This lack of clarity is especially acute, I argue, in the 
moments wherein violence erupts onscreen. Indeed, the eruptions of violence — often 
unseen — that punctuate Haneke’s films serve as a crucial estrangement device, 
particularly as they often interrupt long periods where almost nothing happens. In all 
three films, these eruptions serve to startle the viewer; however, perhaps more 
crucially, they are often sources of bafflement for the viewer, as the character actions 
that lead to these moments of violence are unclear. Indeed, in some cases, particularly 
in Das weiße Band, it is somewhat unclear who has committed the violence at all.  
Iconography 
Iconography, or the physical appearance of the actor, is yet another aspect of 
film whose importance for the moral orientation of the viewer has been largely 
ignored. Smith notes that iconography’s impact on a film’s moral structure is 
“pervasive but only peripherally perceptible” (Engaging Characters 191). The effects 
of iconography are often culturally embedded and difficult to discuss, but it is no less 
important in postmodern films than it is in mainstream Hollywood cinema, since the 
unconscious preferences of an audience severely affect their reaction to particular 
physical presences on the screen. Physical description in novels, in contrast, does not 
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have the same effect. A novelist generally paints a character’s physical description in 
broad strokes, leaving the reader free to imagine any face or body she would like, but 
there is no such imaginative space given to viewers of most films. 
Smith also notes that the actor him- or herself is of grave importance, for it is 
he or she who delivers the performance, that is, the body language and facial 
expressions. While authors may certainly have fans in a way that is not dissimilar to 
how filmmakers have fans, and while fictional literary characters may certainly have 
fans as well (which we might understand as real people who feel an unusually strong 
sense of allegiance toward them), there is no literary equivalent to an actor: a physical 
presence that carries over across multiple works that are unrelated apart from that 
actor him- or herself. Smith notes that “whatever else stars may be, they are . . . 
embodied clusters of (often conflicting) traits” (193), and these traits are extremely 
important for how viewers react to a particular character. Indeed, Smith goes on to 
argue that “[s]tar ‘charisma’ . . . can obviously be used to direct our sympathies. 
Indeed, this is another technique by which the spectator can be brought to entertain 
sympathetically actions, characters, and domains of experience that they might 
otherwise reject” (193-194). Some of Haneke’s actors and actresses, such as Susanne 
Lothar and Isabelle Huppert, have appeared repeatedly in his work, and indeed appear 
repeatedly within the three films that I will discuss. Huppert, in particular, is striking 
in her role as Erika Kohut in La Pianiste; I argue that her face, recognizable to most 
viewers, invites greater empathy than an unknown actress might. This is particularly 
significant given the lingering close-ups of Erika’s face that occur sporadically 
throughout La Pianiste — close-ups that recall Carl Plantinga’s “scenes of empathy,” 
which I discussed in Chapter 1. The subtle play of emotions across Huppert’s face and 
the viewer’s ability to interpret them are crucial to the viewer’s experience of the film. 
In the end, however, while such shots are a clear invitation to attempt an empathic 
connection with Erika, the result is at best ambiguous and ambivalent.  
Music and Sound 
Perhaps nearly as crucial as the actor’s physical presence, if rather less obvious 
to the viewer, is the presence of music in film. Jeff Smith identifies five ways in which 
film music functions within a film: “Film music 1) provides a sense of continuity, 2) 
112 
reinforces formal and narrative unity, 3) communicates elements of setting, 4) 
underlines the psychological states of characters, and 5) establishes an overall 
emotional tone or mood” (156). Smith argues that is the last three that are particularly 
important for understanding the viewer’s emotional experience of the film. He is 
careful to note that by definition film music does not exist in isolation, and many of 
the arguments about the provocation of emotion that have been applied to “pure” 
music simply do not apply to film music, since film is a representational medium and 
instrumental music is not. The affective responses that a viewer experiences in 
response to film music, which Smith argues is a combination of physical arousal and 
cognitive judgment, “are not properly assigned solely to the music, but rather to the 
combination of film music and narrative, each of which will have its own emotional 
valence” (156). In fact, Smith argues that the emotional valence of the music and the 
narrative may change in relation to each other; film music cannot wholly change the 
emotional tone of a narrative, but it may heighten it.   
Jeff Smith is careful in his work to refer to “film music,” and not the 
“underscore”; he does not specifically talk about the differences between diegetic and 
non-diegetic music, but the five purposes of film music that he describes are, notably, 
generally served by non-diegetic music. If we consider Jeff Smith’s theories about 
film music alongside Murray Smith’s theories of alignment and allegiance, we may 
conclude that music provides the viewer with greater subjective access, particularly 
when combined with other structures of alignment, such as a sequence of POV, 
reaction, and close-up shots. In the case of immersive films, non-diegetic music 
generally aids us in deciding who is worthy of our allegiance, as certain musical 
conventions accompany motifs for good characters versus evil ones. In this way, non-
diegetic music greatly enhances our ability to read the minds of characters by 
providing a sort of emotional road map to the film itself: a road map that we are 
largely unaware of but which is critical nonetheless. The absence of non-diegetic 
music renders a film much more difficult for the viewer emotionally; with no 
underscore to guide our emotional experience of the film, we must rely more heavily 
on conscious processes to make the necessary moral judgments.  
Haneke, however, refuses to assist the viewer in this way. His refusal to use 
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non-diegetic music is well known, and it contributes significantly to the emotional 
ambiguity of the work; furthermore, the lack of underscore contributes to the feeling 
of abruptness within his films, as sharp cuts, not softened by music, “jerk” the reader 
suddenly from one scene to the next. Nevertheless, while non-diegetic music may not 
be present, diegetic music certainly is. Schubert is a particular favorite of Haneke’s, 
and his piano sonatas show up in all three films, most notably in La Pianiste, 
providing continuity not only within the films themselves but also across his oeuvre. 
Music is, in fact, crucial to Haneke’s work, even if he refuses to use it to facilitate 
facile emotional interpretations of what is happening on the screen. But perhaps 
equally important to Haneke is ambient sound and — perhaps most of important of all 
— silence. Indeed, Lisa Coulthard has argued that, for Haneke, “silence is not the 
background against which sound is defined but rather a recurrent acoustic theme” (8). 
Cuts between music or sound and silence such as I describe in my analysis of the 
opening of La Pianiste are one of Haneke’s favorite devices, albeit one that he uses 
sparingly; it is a particularly jarring estrangement device.  
As even this brief analysis has shown, Michael Haneke is not a director whose 
work is easy to like. From an ethical perspective, even those who find his films 
compelling admit that “[his] body of work is discomfiting, impatient, and sometimes 
as infuriating as it is infuriated”	  (Price and Rhodes 2). From a narrative perspective, 
Haneke’s films all evince many aspects of what cognitive film theorist David 
Bordwell calls “dedramatization.”	  Bordwell uses this term to describe post-World War 
II European film that avoids many of the techniques common to Hollywood films. 
Hallmarks of the “dedramatized film,”	  according to Bordwell, include: no non-diegetic 
music or POV structures; longer shots of figures in large, open spaces; silence and 
“dead time,”	  in which nothing much important or dramatic occurs; a muted acting 
style; what Bordwell calls “dorsality,”	  or the turning of the characters’	  backs to the 
camera at particularly intense moments (14). Taken together, these techniques result in 
films that are emotionally non-immersive, and which deliberately frustrate and 
estrange viewers who are accustomed to more mainstream cinematic techniques. But 
for filmmakers like Haneke, frustration and estrangement are indeed the point. 	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My decision to situate Haneke at the very end of my dissertation is closely 
related to this perceived “difficulty,”	  which I trace back to his use of both narrative 
and ethical forms of estrangement. But as I already noted, there has been an evolution 
in his use of empathy in his texts in the last fifteen years; his films have become, in a 
sense, more watchable, if not, strictly speaking, enjoyable in the same way that 
immersive Hollywood film is enjoyable. Haneke’s recent oeuvre opens up questions 
about empathy’s shifting position within the cultural landscape. If postmodern 
literature undermines empathy in order to invite an ethic based on skepticism and 
doubt, rather than emotionality and gullibility, then what does a turn toward empathy 
even in the work of one of Europe’s most estranging directors mean at this cultural 
moment? This chapter will therefore bring me to the final question of my dissertation: 
Is the early twenty-first century seeing a redemption of an ethic of empathy? If so, 
how have those ethics altered in the last sixty years —	  if indeed, they have at all?	  
	   	  
	  
La Pianiste: Empathy and Estrangement Renegotiated 
 
Haneke’s 2001 film La Pianiste is an adaptation of Austrian novelist Elfriede 
Jelinek’s 1983 Marxist-feminist novel Die Klavierspielerin. For Haneke, it was a 
breakout film. It was his first film in French rather than German, and it also reached a 
much wider audience than any of his earlier films. It won best actress (for Isabelle 
Huppert), best actor (for Benoît Magimel), and best film at the Cannes Film Festival in 
2001. More surprising than the critical success of the film, however, was its relatively 
large amount of popular and financial success. This may have been partly due to the 
marketing of the film as a scandalous French romance, with a poster, for example, that 
displays Huppert as Erika and Magimel as her student Walter Klemmer, locked in an 
embrace on the floor of a public restroom. But as Jean Ma points out, “La Pianiste . . . 
invites such expectations only to betray them, as the film vigorously and mercilessly 
deconstructs the very conventions of romance, critiquing both the signifiers of 
heterosexual love in which it traffics and the ideologies of sex and gender upon which 
its gratifications are founded”	  (511).  	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These critiques of heteronormative, capitalist, and indeed fascist power 
structures are familiar to readers of Jelinek’s novel, which is even more merciless than 
the film in its Marxist-feminist deconstruction of them. The forces in the life of 
Jelinek’s Erika have shredded her sense of morality, and although the reader is aligned 
with her, it is impossible for him to grant her his allegiance. In his film, Haneke has 
created a more sympathetic portrait of Jelinek’s protagonist Erika Kohut; although 
Haneke employs techniques of dedramatization —	  specifically, Isabelle Huppert plays 
her as very closed-off and self-contained —	  I argue that the film’s use of lingering 
close-ups and especially of music renders her more empathic and understandable than 
Jelinek’s Erika. It is not that Haneke and Huppert’s Erika is necessarily more 
accessible than Jelinek’s; Jelinek's Erika is, in fact, extremely accessible, as the reader 
is often told in no uncertain terms what she is thinking and feeling. But indeed, the 
bald terms in which the reader is informed about Erika’s inner life preclude true 
empathic understanding. There is no mind reading challenge in Die Klavierspielerin. 
With Haneke and Huppert’s Erika, who is far more ambiguous and enigmatic than 
Jelinek's, we do want to solve the mind reading puzzle; we want to understand her, 
even when we find her difficult or unpleasant. For that reason, we as viewers are able 
to grant her at least partial allegiance. 	  
Both Haneke’s film and Jelinek’s novel relate the story of Erika Kohut, a 
Viennese piano teacher whose own artistic career has been continually frustrated. She 
lives with her mother, who is controlling and narcissistic and who views Erika’s 
artistic ambitions largely in materialistic terms: She wants them to buy an apartment. 
In both texts, Erika begins a relationship with a student, Walter Klemmer, through 
which she attempts to act out her sado-masochistic fantasies. This attempt is, in the 
novel as in the film, a complete disaster. One of the biggest alterations that Haneke 
makes to Jelinek’s text is the paramount importance of Erika’s relationship with 
Walter Klemmer; in the novel, as Haneke himself points out in an interview, the “love 
affair”	  between Walter and Erika “is more implicated in the mother-daughter 
relationship. Walter only triggers the catastrophe”	  (Sharrett 585). For this reason, 
Haneke says, he attempted to make Walter “more interesting and attractive”	  in the 
film, which in general is — in Haneke’s view at least —	  less “cynical”	  than Jelinek’s 
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novel (Sharrett 585). This intention can be seen most clearly in his casting of Benoît 
Magimel in the role. Magimel’s Walter is classically handsome, youthfully energetic, 
and generally likable, even if he is shallow in comparison to Huppert’s Erika, whose 
still waters run deep and dark. 	  
I would argue that what Haneke states in his interview with Christopher 
Sharrett is true of all three protagonists: Walter, Erika, and Erika’s mother. Although 
the mother in both texts is controlling and narcissistic, Jelinek’s mother is clearly 
monstrous, almost a caricature of a controlling mother. Her motto —	  declared by the 
narrator — is, “Vertrauen ist gut, Kontrolle ist dennoch angebracht”64 (10). One might 
interpret the mother as representing fascism itself; certainly she is totalitarian in her 
control of her daughter. In the novel, nothing is Erika’s that is not also her mother’s, 
not even her thoughts: “Die Mutter schraubt, immer ohne vorherige Anmeldung, 
IHREN Deckel ab, fährt selbstbewußt mit der Hand oben hinein, wühlt und stöbert. 
Sie wirft alles durcheinander und legt nichts wieder an seinen angestammten Platz 
zurück”65 (30). In the film, Erika appears to be more successful in her attempts to 
establish some independence from her mother, who appears sad, pathetic, and largely 
ineffective in her attempts to control her daughter. Indeed, in the film Erika’s music 
career is forbidden territory for her mother, while in the novel, the two of them 
together “spray acid”	  [“Säure verspritzen”] at Erika’s students (14). Neither of them 
wishes for any of Erika’s students to be more successful than she has been. Her 
mother tells her, “Du selbst hast es nicht geschafft, warum sollen es andere an deiner 
Stelle und noch aus deinem pianistischen Stall erreichen?”66 (15) In the film, however, 
Erika refuses to engage in this sort of talk, telling her mother that her musical career 
and her teaching is not her business. Even in Haneke’s film, however, their 
relationship is permeated by Freudian dysfunction: although Erika has a room of her 
                                                
64	  “Trust	  is	  fine,	  but	  control	  is	  better	  [appropriate]”	  (5).	  
65	  “Mother,	  without	  prior	  notice,	  unscrews	  the	  top	  of	  HER	  head,	  sticks	  her	  hand	  inside,	  self-­‐
assured,	  and	  then	  grubs	  and	  rummages	  about.	  Mother	  messes	  everything	  up	  and	  puts	  nothing	  
back	  where	  it	  belongs”	  (21).	  	  
66	  “You	  didn’t	  make	  it	  -­‐	  why	  should	  others	  reach	  the	  top?	  And	  from	  your	  musical	  stable	  to	  boot?”	  
(9)	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own, albeit with no lock on the door, she shares a bedroom and a bed with her mother, 
and at one point attempts sexual relations with her.	  
Although the characterizations of both Walter and the mother undergo changes 
in Haneke’s hands, it is Erika who is most transformed. Jelinek’s novel is not told 
from Erika’s point of view; her narrator is omniscient and only slightly more 
sympathetic toward Erika than toward her mother. Erika as she is portrayed in the text 
is not only neurotic, but also vindictive and mean. In one striking episode early on the 
in the text, Jelinek’s Erika purposefully harms fellow riders on the trolley car, hiding 
behind her veneer of cultured politeness in order to get away with it, and then refuses 
to give directions to a confused old woman: 	  
SIE wendet sich mehrmals nach der vollkommen desorientierten Dame 
um, bevor SIE einen vertrauten Weg in ein vertrautes Zuhause 
einschlägt. SIE grinst die Dame dabei an, vergessend, daß	  SIE in ein 
paar Minuten under der heißen Flamme des mütterlichen 
Schneidbrenners zu einem Häufchen Asche verbrennen wird, weil sie 
zu spät nach Hause gekommen ist. Dabei wird die ganze Kunst SIE 
nicht trösten können, obwohl der Kunst vieles nachgesagt wird, vor 
allem, daß	  sie eine Trösterin sei. Manchmal schafft sie allerdings das 
Leid erst herbei.67 (31-32)	  
This passage makes clear that Erika is cruel to others because it makes her forget her 
own pain, but knowing that does not make the reader wish to empathize with her by 
taking on her pain, fury, and vindictiveness. Haneke’s Erika certainly does have 
moments in which she makes morally reprehensible decisions; of particular note is her 
decision to place cut glass in the coat pocket of a promising student to whom Walter 
has paid attention, so that the student will be injured and unable to perform. But this is 
framed in La Pianiste as a crime of passion, so to speak; she does it out of jealousy. 
                                                
67	  SHE	  peers	  back	  several	  times	  at	  the	  completely	  disoriented	  woman	  before	  setting	  off	  on	  the	  
familiar	  road	  to	  her	  familiar	  home.	  SHE	  smirks	  at	  the	  woman,	  forgetting	  that	  a	  few	  minutes	  from	  
now,	  SHE	  will	  feel	  the	  hot	  flame	  of	  her	  mother’s	  blowtorch	  and	  SHE	  will	  be	  burned	  to	  a	  pile	  of	  
ashes	  because	  SHE	  is	  late	  in	  getting	  home.	  No	  art	  can	  possibly	  comfort	  HER	  then,	  even	  though	  art	  
is	  credited	  with	  many	  things,	  especially	  an	  ability	  to	  offer	  solace.	  Sometimes,	  of	  course,	  art	  creates	  
the	  suffering	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  (23)	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While the viewer still condemns the action —	  after all, Erika’s has deliberately 
harmed one of her students and for no reason other than the fact that Walter was kind 
to her —	  it is more understandable than her behavior toward the old woman in 
Jelinek’s text. 	  
The passage quoted above from Die Klavierspielerin also clarifies that Erika’s 
music does not ameliorate her pain; she has very little interest in music as anything 
other than a means to earn her living. Thus, the classical music that permeates 
Haneke’s film and adds an element of beauty to what is, admittedly, a rather ugly story 
is entirely missing in Jelinek’s novel. Charles Warren points out that Haneke’s Erika 
“is deeply interested in music. She identifies herself through it. [. . .] Music is a 
presence in the film —	  like Huppert herself —	  as it is not in Jelinek’s novel”	  (506). 
Haneke’s film certainly has ugly moments, and as the violence of Erika’s relationship 
with Walter creeps in, the music recedes. But the presence of it from the beginning 
and its obvious importance to Erika —	  that is, the fact that Haneke’s Erika does find 
solace in it —	  creates a space within the film for an empathic connection between the 
viewer and Erika that is entirely closed off in Jelinek’s novel. Although music’s role in 
La Pianiste is not without its ambiguities, it is deeply tied to Erika’s identity and her 
psychological state, and it is one of the viewer’s main points of emotional access to 
her. In the terms of cognitive film theory, although both texts align their reader and 
viewer, respectively, with Erika, it is considerably easier for the audience to grant 
Haneke’s Erika their allegiance. Her love of music and her relatively morally 
comprehensible (even when not laudatory) actions render her far more emotionally 
palatable than Jelinek’s character. And yet, as I will show, the audience’s allegiance is 
mediated by moments of remarkable ambiguity. 	  
 Much has been written about the function of music in La Pianiste, and 
particularly the importance of Schubert’s Die Winterreise. Lisa Coulthard puts it 
succinctly: “Repeated and foregrounded, ‘Im Dorfe’	  (‘In the Village’) holds a central 
place in the film: Erika is clearly aligned with Schubert's lonely and weary wanderer 
as the music fleshes out the emotional range and melodramatic crises of the 
protagonist”	  (2). In Jeff Smith’s terms, by being present at certain critical points, 
Schubert —	  often, but not always, Die Winterreise	  —	  provides a sense of continuity, 
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as well as an overall emotional tone. But it does so in ways that demand far more 
interpretation from the viewer than a traditional underscore. 	  
 In the following section I will discuss two scenes that demonstrate the function 
of music in the film; in both, music is linked to sexuality, a connection that is hardly 
new or innovative in film. However, Haneke’s use of music in relation to Erika’s 
sexuality defies all expectation. In this vein, Jean Ma argues that the music plays a 
crucial role in the “strategy of cognitive dissonance”	  (512) perpetrated by the film: 	  
In La Pianiste classical music functions both diegetically in the 
description of repression and suffering and structurally as a key to 
comprehending the film’s strategy of disrupting heterosexual romantic 
norms from within their cultural lexicon. [. . .] In the conjunction of 
aesthetics, sexuality, and violence, then, we can begin to discern the 
distinction between obscenity and pornography, between the critical 
and the affirmative valences of shock, a distinction that is crucial of a 
work that endeavors to condemn by showing. (513)	  
In other words, although the music provides some continuity and psychological 
access, it does not serve to render empathy for the “heroes”	  of our film facile. Indeed, 
the presence of it in certain scenes is meant to deliberately shock the reader, not 
“affirmatively”	  but “critically,”	  as Ma says. 	  
The clearest example of this is also one of the most shocking scenes in the 
film: Erika, having told her mother that she has a late rehearsal, visits a magazine store 
in a shopping mall, where, for a fee, a customer is able to watch a pornographic film in 
a video booth. Although this scene is clearly meant to be morally shocking, what is 
perhaps most discomfiting is that the music from Erika’s rehearsal — Schubert’s 
“Piano Trio in E Flat”	  (Scharrett 588) —	  continues to play in the background as Erika 
enters the store, pays for her time in the booth, and then waits with a group of clearly 
uneasy men for a booth to come free. The strains of the cello clash briefly with the 
sounds and music from the menu of four pornographic films Erika has to choose from, 
until the rehearsal music cuts off abruptly. This leaves the viewer with only the sounds 
from the film that Erika has chosen. The booth is dark, but the camera is focused on 
Erika in a static close-up shot. The viewer can see her face clearly enough as she 
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watches the film for a few seconds, and then reaches forward to find a tissue, 
discarded by one of the booth’s previous occupants, and raises it to her nose to smell, 
breathing in deeply. It is here that music — this time, Schubert’s Winterreise —	  re-
enters the scene. The noises from the film are not quite drowned out by the singer’s 
voice. Yet, as Andrea Bandhauer says, in contrast to Jelinek’s novel, “in [Haneke’s] 
cinematography, through the close-up of Huppert's face, both the beauty and the sense 
of deep sadness of Schubert's song remain intact”	  (277). The music cannot counteract 
entirely the obscenity of the film, but it can —	  and does —	  change the emotional 
valence of the scene. 	  
 This scene is the first time in the film that anything about the nature of Erika’s 
sexuality is revealed to the viewer. Previous to this, she seems emotionally repressed 
and rather sexless, and to discover that this upright and cultured woman visits 
pornography booths and indulges in smelling used tissues left behind by men is 
shocking and more than a little disgusting. But for all the scene’s blatant sexuality, it is 
not meant to titillate. There is very little in Erika’s face to indicate arousal or pleasure; 
even here, it is hard to say what she is thinking or feeling. But this is unsurprising, 
given Haneke’s own view on the difference between the obscene and the 
pornographic. It is his view that “anything that could be termed obscene departs from 
the bourgeois norm”	  (Sharrett 587), and in this sense this particular scene is certainly 
obscene, especially given Erika’s staid bourgeois demeanor in the rest of her life. But 
pornography, according to Haneke, has to do with the rendering of the unusual into a 
commodity, something “consumable”	  (Sharrett 587). In this scene, the film that Erika 
watches is pornography, but the scene itself is not. The viewer is unable to consume 
the scene the way that Erika appears to consume the film that she watches; if I 
extended the metaphor, I might say that the viewer chokes on it. This metaphorical 
choking is particularly important, given the centrality of empathy for the sexual 
function of pornography: a very different version of this scene would invite the viewer 
to empathically take part in Erika’s consumption of the pornographic film. Instead, 
Haneke deliberately disrupts the empathic connection between the viewer and Erika 
by way of the invocation of disgust and the extreme impassivity of Huppert’s 
performance. At the same time, however, the presence of music at the very beginning 
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and the very end of the scene allows Haneke to retain a certain amount of beauty and 
genuine emotionality in what would otherwise be a crass and ugly moment. 	  
In comparison, Walter’s audition for Erika’s master class is much less 
shocking. It is a classic example of what Carl Plantinga calls “a scene of empathy”: 
that is, a close-up of a single character, too protracted to be explained in terms of plot 
or the conveyance of information. In fact, both the audition scene and the scene in the 
video store might be labeled “scenes of empathy,”	  at least from a structural point of 
view; both are close-ups that linger too long to feel “natural.”	  However, neither scene 
has the effect on the viewer that is expected from such a scene. In the audition scene, 
Walter plays a series of pieces for Erika and her colleagues: first Schönberg, followed 
by Rachmaninov, and finally a Schubert sonata. The musical changes happen abruptly, 
with no fading, and which each new piece we zero in on Erika. Although Walter is 
playing, she is the focal point of the scene: the camera shows us only her face, against 
a mundane background of chairs and an uninspiring wall. Erika’s face is all we have to 
look at, and look at her we do for an unusually long period of time —	  nearly two 
minutes. But Erika’s face offers very little to the viewer, and the changes in music, 
which would generally signal emotional changes of some sort in the character whose 
face we are watching, are equally baffling, for they lack any sort of continuity. While 
the close-up invites the reader to read the scene as one whose sole purpose is to invite 
empathy, Huppert’s performance makes it nearly impossible. Her hands and mouth 
move minutely; her eyelids flutter; none of it is rendered easily legible to the reader. 
This “scene of empathy”	  is therefore becomes its exact opposite: a dedramatized 
scene. This does not mean that the scene is entirely without emotion; particularly as 
the music softens during Walter’s Schubert performance, there is the sense that her 
impassivity hides deep turmoil. Walter has chosen his music carefully in order to woo 
Erika specifically, but Erika appears not to want to be wooed; indeed, at this point she 
appears to find Walter’s pursuit of her threatening, and she attempts to reject Walter as 
a student before being overruled by her colleagues. Or so the viewer might assume; at 
this point, the viewer is as in the dark as Walter himself about what Erika wants from 
him. 	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   What Erika does want from Walter eventually becomes clear, and the presence 
of music in the film lessens as Walter and Erika’s relationship progresses. Moreover, 
the importance of ambiguity in the film increases considerably. Unlike other works I 
have discussed in previous chapters, and unlike, for example, Das weiße Band, there is 
no immediately obvious narrative ambiguity in La Pianiste; the events of the film 
appear to have “really happened”	  as they are portrayed. But the meaning of these 
events is left deliberately ambiguous. This ambiguity is especially visible when the 
viewer, aligned with Erika and having granted her his tentative allegiance, most 
wishes to understand her. Although she is an enigmatic character even in the very first 
scene, she becomes even more so in the second half of the film, when she reveals to 
Walter that she does not desire the same heteronormative romantic relationship that he 
does; rather, she desires to fulfill with him a mix of sadistic and masochistic fantasies 
that she writes down for his perusal. Walter reacts with revulsion to Erika’s 
instructions, telling her that she is “sick”	  and in need of “treatment.”	  She asks him to 
hit her, and he replies with palpable disgust: “I don’t want to soil my hands. No one 
would touch your sort, even with gloves on. I swear I loved you. You don’t even know 
what that is. Right now you repulse me. Fuck it.”	  Walter’s shock and disgust is both 
visceral and moral, and it opens up within him a cruel streak that the viewer has not 
previously glimpsed —	  a cruelty that appears to mirror, in many ways, Erika’s own 
thoughts about herself. The viewer, in contrast, while perhaps disgusted or at least 
unnerved by the scene, cannot be entirely surprised by Erika’s requests, coming as 
they do after scenes of genital self-mutilation that imply that pain is the only way 
Erika may be granted sexual release. 	  
	   After this moment, Walter and Erika’s positions of power are reversed; in their 
first sexual encounter, which takes place before Walter finds out the nature of Erika’s 
desires, he pursues her and she is in control, but once her fantasies are revealed to him, 
it is she who pursues him. In their final encounter, he fulfills to the letter the fantasy 
that she revealed to him, beating her and finally raping her while her mother remains 
locked in the next room, shouting impotently for him to stop. This scene, as Jean Ma 
notes in her analysis of it, “has been the subject of much debate, understood by some 
[such as Catherine Wheatley] as a fulfillment of Erika’s masochistic desires and by 
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others as a violation of her desire”	  (515). Ma states forthrightly that she believes the 
latter, but she also acknowledges the scene’s ambiguities: “The challenges that the 
rape scene poses for the understanding of the audience lie in its familiarity: What 
shocks is not only the sudden intrusion of violence into the realm of intimacy, but also 
the uncanny echoing of Erika’s fantasies in Walter’s actions”	  (515). Indeed, Walter 
quotes exactly from Erika’s letter even as she begs him to stop. Thus, Ma says, the 
film does not offer its viewer “the comfort of a morally unambiguous perspective from 
which to condemn the violence she sees”	  (515). I am less interested here in the 
question of whether Walter’s rape of Erika is a violation or a fulfilment of her desires 
than I am in the ambiguity of the scene itself and the eruption of violence into the 
narrative. The violence, while sudden, is not precisely unexpected; there have been 
hints of it all along, from Erika’s treatment of her students, to her genital cutting, to 
her harsh treatment of Walter in their first sexual encounter. But in this final scene, 
Erika, who has thus far been primarily the perpetrator of violence, is suddenly its 
victim. Indeed, according to her clearly stated wishes, this is exactly what she wants. 	  
What does Erika want? is the question that the viewer, aligned with Erika 
throughout the film, most wishes to solve; it is the film’s central mind-reading puzzle. 
It becomes most urgent during the scene in which Walter rapes Erika, for it is unclear, 
through Huppert’s performance in this scene, whether she truly wanted what she asked 
for. And if she did want it, does that mean that we, too, as the viewers of the film, 
must also want it for her? I have argued that La Pianiste represents a renegotiation of 
the dialectic of empathy and estrangement in Jelinek’s novel. In the first half of the 
film, this negotiation takes place largely through the presence of music, particularly 
Schubert, and the use of close-ups of Erika. But the violence of the ending represents 
one last such renegotiation, shifting the balance toward estrangement at the last 
possible moment. The mind-reading puzzle of La Pianiste cannot be solved; it is 
impossible to know what Erika wants, and therefore impossible to say who is the 
monster and who the victim in the film. In fact, it would be very like Haneke to imply 
that everyone —	  including the viewer himself —	  is both. While Haneke has 
renegotiated the dialectic of empathy and estrangement present in Jelinek’s text, and 
while the fascist power structures present in the novel are less obvious, they are still 
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present, and Haneke characteristically prompts the reader to consider the role that 
everyone in the film plays in perpetuating them. Ultimately, therefore, The Pianiste is 
not so unlike Haneke’s earlier work from the mid-1990s: the film still demonstrates to 
the viewer his own complicity in the violence perpetrated on screen. But the film is all 
the more powerful for the partial allegiance we grant to Erika and the empathy, 
however problematic, that we feel for her.	  
 
 
The seeds of fascism sown early: Das weiße Band 
	   	  
Das weiße Band: Eine deutsche Kindergeschichte [The White Ribbon: A 
German Children’s Story] (2009) is the only historical film that Haneke has made thus 
far. It is, as John Orr says, “a radical departure from his previous films”	  (259): “Where 
we perhaps always assumed that Haneke was by inclination a colour director he 
changes format. Where we always thought his films were dark fables about the present 
or the future, he goes back to the past. Where we had become accustomed to the 
aggressive reflexivity of his media-conscious narratives in the electronic age, this is 
practically a pre-motorized world”	  (259). Despite these immediate differences, the 
film is still quintessentially Haneke in the way it exposes the dark underbelly of the 
human condition, and in its concern about the corruption inherent in structures of 
power and about the complicity of the observer. The simplest reading of Das weiße 
Band is that it is about the seeds of fascism, sown in Prussia at the turn of the century 
and harvested in Munich and Berlin in 1933. However, Haneke himself has argued 
that it is not truly meant to be about German history —	  notably, only the German 
version of the film contained the subtitle, Eine deutsche Kindergeschichte —	  but about 
totalitarianism more broadly. To interpret the film as being about specifically German 
fascism, Haneke says, “would be a misinterpretation”	  (Haneke, qtd in Grundmann 
596), as the film cannot hope to name all the causes of German fascism. In this sense, 
then, Das weiße Band is indeed “a dark fable.”	  As a dark fable, the film resists facile 
forms of psychological realism; indeed, there is a sense of surreality throughout the 
film, aided and abetted by cinematographic choices that prevent the viewer’s full 
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immersion in the text. Furthermore, like La Pianiste, Das weiße Band provides the 
viewer with a mind reading puzzle that can never be definitively solved. It is a 
“whodunnit”	  with no solution, a mystery without resolution. Doubt and skepticism are 
therefore an ethical necessity in Das weiße Band. 	  
Haneke says that for him, refusing definitive solutions is a way of giving back 
to his viewers their own interpretive freedom (Grundmann 605-606). For his viewers, 
however, this interpretive freedom can feel like a burden. Like all the texts I have 
analyzed in this dissertation, Haneke’s films are considered “difficult,”	  for they go out 
of their way to estrange the viewer from any sense of immersion within the text. Part 
of this is the lack of definitive resolution, which, as I will discuss, is foregrounded 
from the very beginning of Das weiße Band; part of it is also Haneke’s 
cinematographic choices, many of which recall Bordwell’s discussion of 
dedramatization: the use of black and white film; an acting style that is extremely 
reserved; characters often shot in wide open spaces; and the use of music and sound to 
“create an acoustically jarring cinematic experience”	  (Coulthard 6). Unlike in La 
Pianiste, there is no one protagonist on which to focus; even the schoolteacher, who 
provides the voice over, is not really the focus of the action. There are no scenes like 
the audition scene, in which the camera lingers on a single character for longer than it 
takes him or her to finish speaking. Das weiße Band, in other words, is a film devoid 
of Carl Plantinga’s “scenes of empathy.”	  Despite these clear techniques of 
estrangement, moments of tenderness that invite empathy on the part of the viewer are 
more obviously present in Das weiße Band than in any of Haneke’s earlier films; 
although the fictional town of Eichwald where the film takes place is terrible in many 
ways, it is not entirely devoid of love or beauty or joy. 	  
Das weiße Band begins with a voice in the darkness: that of a narrator, a much 
older version of the village school teacher. He tells the viewer: “Ich weiß	  nicht, ob die 
Geschichte, die ich Ihnen erzählen will, in allen Details der Wahrheit entspricht. 
Vieles darin weiß	  ich nur von Hörensagen und manches weiß	  ich auch heute nach so 
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vielen Jahren nicht zu enträtseln, und auf unzählige Fragen gibt es keine Antwort.”68 
Despite his own uncertainty, he says, he is telling this story in the hope that it may 
throw “ein erhellendes Licht”	  on events that occurred later in that country. The 
narrator does not name these events that may be illuminated. The most immediate 
historical event of the film is the outbreak of World War I, which happens toward the 
end of the narrative. But the ominous tone of the narration, and the fact that the 
narrator seems reluctant to put a name to the events at all, prompts the viewer to 
suspect that he is in fact talking about the rise of fascism in Germany and the events of 
World War II, including the Holocaust. He never alludes to any of these events again, 
even indirectly. But this preliminary voiceover primes the viewer to think of the film 
in that context from the very first frame, and to connect the events of the film to the 
events of the 1930s and 1940s in Germany. 	  
Without this initial voiceover, Das weiße Band might be a disturbing film 
about a creepy and oppressive northern German town. With it, however, the ethical 
stakes of the film and the mystery at its heart are upped considerably. From 1913 to 
1914, a number of strange and ultimately inexplicable events occur in Eichwald: the 
town doctor is injured in a riding accident when his horse encounters a trip wire; a 
tenant farmer’s wife falls to her death in the sawmill; the son of the local baron is 
kidnapped and tormented; the baron’s barn is deliberately torched; and the mentally 
handicapped son of the local midwife is kidnapped, tortured, and almost blinded. Over 
the course of the film, it becomes clear that many of the terrible things are being 
deliberately perpetrated by someone who wishes to punish people whom they deem 
immoral: the doctor, for example, has been engaged in an abusive, extramarital affair 
with the midwife; in addition, he has apparently been sexually abusing his daughter 
for many years. For one or both of these sins, he is punished. But other victims, such 
as the baron’s son Sigi and the handicapped boy Karli, appear to be innocent of any 
wrongdoing themselves; they are, instead, punished for the sins of their fathers. These 
                                                
68	  “I	  don’t	  know	  if	  the	  story	  I’m	  about	  to	  tell	  you	  is	  entirely	  true.	  Some	  of	  it	  I	  know	  only	  by	  
hearsay.	  After	  so	  many	  years,	  a	  lot	  of	  it	  is	  still	  obscure	  and	  many	  questions	  remain	  unanswered.	  
But	  I	  think	  I	  must	  tell	  of	  the	  strange	  events	  that	  occurred	  in	  our	  village.	  They	  could	  perhaps	  clarify	  
something	  things	  that	  happened	  in	  this	  country.”	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acts of punishment reveal to the viewer the fundamentally corrupt structures of power 
at work in the community, embodied by the baron and the pastor. Feudalism and 
religion emerge in the film as sources of oppression, suffering, and, eventually, 
fascism itself. The white ribbon of the title is tied around the arm or in the hair of 
wayward children —	  specifically, the pastors’	  eldest —	  as a reminder of their purity 
and innocence. But the trope is ironically subverted by the film as the school teacher 
—	  and the viewer with him —	  strongly suspects that it is these very same children 
who are behind at least some of the acts of cruelty in the film. The viewer does the 
math: these children, perhaps twelve or thirteen in the film, would have been in their 
early thirties in 1933, when Adolf Hitler was elected chancellor of Germany. The film 
therefore traces the origins of fascism back to other power structures that might be 
considered “proto-fascist.”	  
The voice over in Das weiße Band is perhaps the most unique element of the 
film; neither La Pianiste nor Amour has one, and in fact, Roy Grundmann points out, 
it is much more common to Haneke’s literary adaptations, particularly of modern and 
postmodern works (594). Grundmann argues:	  
The use of a narrator in a film based not on a novel but on Haneke’s 
own original script is in and of itself an important gesture. It not only 
implies the significance Haneke accords to the aesthetic tension 
between voice and image . . . but to the implicit tradition of 
fragmentation, pluralism, and dissent embodied in various ways by 
modernist and postmodernist literature. (594-595) 	  
Fragmentation, pluralism, and dissent are all messy concepts; they render coherency 
impossible and viewer satisfaction highly suspect. It is for this reason that Haneke 
states in his interview with Grundmann that the voiceover exists in the service of 
alienation (599), another word for what I have called, throughout this dissertation, 
estrangement. This is somewhat unexpected, as voiceovers are generally used to 
ground the viewer within the narrative and move the plot along. But that is in fact the 
exact opposite of how Haneke uses voiceover in Das weiße Band; rather, he uses it to 
“[signal] that one should distrust the reality of what is shown and claimed”	  (Haneke, 
qtd. in Grundmann 600). The narrator and Haneke invite the question of whether we 
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are receiving the story as it “happened,”	  or as the narrator believes it to have 
happened. The readers are left wondering: Are these scenes “truths”	  in the context of 
the film? Are there any “truths”	  at all? What can we believe? The voiceover therefore, 
rather paradoxically, both establishes the historical stakes of the film by linking its 
events to those of the 1930s and 1940s, while at the same time undermining this very 
argument by calling into question its own reliability. Perhaps it was the children who 
did these terrible things; perhaps it was not. Perhaps we might draw a conclusion 
about the origins of fascism and totalitarianism from this fable about 1913 Prussia; 
perhaps we may not. 	  
The use of black and white film also has a paradoxical function in the film. As 
John Orr has noted, Das weiße Band is the only one of Haneke’s films to appear in 
black and white. It was not shot that way; rather, it was shot in color and then 
converted, allowing Haneke to oversaturate his black tones (“Pre-War Trauma,”	  
Stewart 43). This means that the dark scenes of the film are very dark indeed, and that 
anything white —	  such as the white ribbon of the title and the many other white 
ribbons that appear throughout the film —	  stand out with startling clarity. Haneke 
himself describes the purpose of the black and white footage as two-fold: it is, first of 
all, “meant to give spectators easier access to the time period”	  (Grundmann 600), since 
any images we have of that era are in black and white. However, Haneke says, it is 
also true that “the black-and-white always constitutes a certain stylization, which, 
rather than pretending to be a naturalist image of reality, emphasizes the prototypical 
character of the story. It is an artifact and is being presented as such”	  (Grundmann 
600). In other words, the use of black and white film emphasizes the film’s 
artificiality. For all that it makes historical claims, it is not a historical document, and 
the very nature of its artificiality calls its own authenticity and accuracy into question.	  
	   In contrast to La Pianiste, music does not function as the primary point of 
emotional access in Das weiße Band. Like all of Haneke’s films, there is no 
underscore; there is, however, diegetic music present periodically throughout the film, 
though not to the same extent as in La Pianiste. Lisa Coulthard points out the 
“complicity between music and power”	  in the film, though she also notes that this “is 
not total and music itself is not rendered suspect”	  (6-7). Music is also present as a 
129 
soothing or pleasant presence, such as in the scene in which the school teacher woos 
the Baron’s nanny Eva (Coulthard 7). Indeed, one of the scenes that Coulthard cites as 
an example of the complicity between music and power also serves this function: 
although the Baroness does force her son’s tutor to endure “the musical tyranny of 
Schubert practice”	  (6), for herself, playing Schubert is pleasurable: “Die Variationen 
sollten Sie mehr üben. Sonst macht’s keinen Spaß.”69 The Baroness’s exasperation 
with the tutor, whose musical acumen does not match her own, calls to mind Erika’s 
exasperation with her students; indeed both women are isolated and lonely, yet stoic in 
their misery. But unlike Erika, the Baroness eventually succeeds in rescuing herself; 
she leaves Eichwald and what she calls its “Böswilligkeit, Neid, Stumpfsinn und 
Brutalität”70 with her children. Thus, for the tutor, who has no choice in whether he 
plays with the Baroness or not, Schubert is a tyranny; but for the Baroness herself, he 
is a pleasurable comfort and allows her to reach beyond her isolation in the 
community. In this way, Schubert is a part of the inner landscape that eventually 
allows her to escape. This paradox mirrors in many ways one of the central ethical 
paradoxes of the film: feudalism and religion have given life in Eichdorff meaning and 
provided its citizens with comfort. But for many of its residents, these societal 
structures are tyrannical, and the film itself portrays them as the forerunners of 
fascism. They have also produced the children of Eichwald, who are equally 
tyrannical in their moral judgment of others. 	  
This type of paradox is also present at the end of the film, when the children’s 
choir sings Martin Luther’s famous hymn, “Ein’	  feste Burg ist unser Gott.”	  Much has 
been made of this hymn in the critical literature surrounding the film. The words of the 
hymn certainly invoke images of religious war, which are particularly resonant given 
the outbreak of World War I and the viewer’s knowledge of the war in which all of 




                                                
69	  “Practice	  the	  variations	  or	  it’s	  no	  fun.”	  
70	  “malice,	  envy,	  apathy,	  and	  brutality.”	  
130 
Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott,	  
ein gute Wehr und Waffen;	  
er hilft uns frei aus aller Not,	  
die uns jetzt hat betroffen.	  
Der alte böse Feind,	  
mit Ernst er’s jetzt meint,	  
groß	  Macht und viel List	  
sein grausam Rüstung ist,	  
auf Erd ist nicht sein gleichen.71	   	   	   	   	   	  
Martin Blumenthal-Barby argues that “[g]iven the outbreak of the war alluded to by 
the narrator, it appears safe to say that the notion of the adversary is to be conceived 
here more broadly, including the political enemy, the enemy of the state. [. . .] A new 
enemy outside German borders has been found. The internal enemy, who instigated 
the various crimes, is forgotten; the communal order, as the last shot insinuates, is 
reinvigorated”	  (111). This interpretation is in line with Haneke’s own (Haneke, qtd. in 
Grundmann 604). But the words of the hymn also invoke the the idea of a moral 
enemy that must be vanquished, lest Satan gain the upper hand. It is significant that 
this hymn is sung by the children whom the teacher believes were behind the crimes, 
and that the children are, as Lisa Coulthard points out, ironically positioned above the 
rest of the congregation, in the so-called “moral high ground”	  (7). The hymn and the 
film end with a fade-to-black that is typical of Haneke’s oeuvre. But Coulthard notes 
that it is not that the hymn fades out but rather that “silence fades in”	  (8). This silence, 
Coulthard says, is not like the silence of other scenes; “it is not the quiet of the 
everyday but an overwhelming presence that becomes equated with the dawning of 
catastrophe and the anticipated death of war”	  (8). Coulthard argues that the film ends 
“with a tragic sense of inevitability: the war will rage, lives will be lost and there will 
be a horrific second war to follow two short decades later. The fading to silence thus 
does not jar so much as it leaves us with a gradual sense of the image and the music 
dying off, a fade that undermines the fighting spirit of the song's message”	  (7). 	  
	   Coulthard’s reading is predicated upon the same teleological view of history 
that Stuart Taberner argues against in his reading of Austerlitz, a view of history that 
                                                
71	  A	  mighty	  fortress	  is	  our	  God	  /	  A	  bulwark	  never	  failing;	  /	  Our	  shelter	  He,	  amid	  the	  flood	  /	  Of	  
mortal	  ills	  prevailing.	  / For	  still	  our	  ancient	  foe	  /	  Doth	  seek	  to	  work	  us	  woe;	  /	  His	  craft	  and	  pow'r	  
are	  great,	  /	  And,	  armed	  with	  cruel	  hate,	  /	  On	  earth	  is	  not	  his	  equal.	  (Trans.	  Hedge)	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sees all historical events as inevitable, and which collapses human history and natural 
history together, thereby stripping it of all sense of agency. This, I argue, is not the 
view of history offered by Das weiße Band. The film does not deny the events that are 
to come, just as it does not deny the presence of evil in the community. But it also 
does not view those events or that evil as inevitable. In fact, Das weiße Band stands 
out in Haneke’s oeuvre for the distinct moments of love, kindness, and joy that exist 
within the film. There is very little tenderness to be found in Haneke’s earlier films, or 
even in La Pianiste, but Das weiße Band, despite its ugliness, also has scenes that 
appear to exist purely to demonstrate that this is not a world devoid of goodness. 
Although there are no “scenes of empathy”	  as defined by Plantinga, there are scenes 
that resist the generally dedramatized style of the film. These scene invite the viewer 
to feel empathy for the characters and to resist the teleological lens of history —	  the 
idea that both world wars and fascism itself was fated for Germany. Among those 
scenes are those between the doctor’s daughter Anna and her much younger brother 
Rudi, to whom she is extremely maternal, as well as the scenes of courtship between 
the schoolteacher and Eva, nanny to the baron’s youngest children. The teacher’s 
relationship with Eva is one of the few sources of humor in the film, as they are at 
times quite awkward with each other. If there is anything for the viewer to “root”	  for 
in the film, it is the school teacher’s relationship with Eva. Significantly, however, we 
are not given any information on the resolution to this relationship in the final voice 
over to the film; we are told that after returning from the war, the school teacher opens 
a tailor’s shop in the nearby city, but not whether he and Eva ever married.   	  
Scenes between Eva and the schoolteacher are probably the most frequent of 
these intimate, tender scenes. The most striking of them, however, is the one in which 
the pastor’s youngest son Gustav comes to him with a bird he has nursed back to 
health and offers it to his father as a replacement for his own bird that has died.	  “Weil 
der Herr Vater traurig ist,”72 the boy says, offering his father the bird’s cage. His 
father replies, “Danke,”	  and the boy responds simply, “Bitte, Herr Vater”	  before 
turning and leaving. This exchange is ten words in total, and it is governed by the rules 
                                                
72	  “Because	  Father	  is	  sad.”	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of extreme politeness and respect that govern all interactions in the pastor’s household. 
And yet the emotion shines through clearly in the scene: the boy has been moved by 
empathy to reach out to his father and offer him the bird; the pastor is clearly taken 
aback by the gesture but also touched by the boy’s kindness. Indeed, in the final 
frames of the scene, the pastor appears on the verge of tears and wrestles visibly with 
himself. The scene is very emotionally moving. But over it hangs knowledge of how 
the pastor’s first bird died, at the hands of the pastor’s eldest daughter Klara, who 
killed it with a pair of scissors and left it arranged like a crucifix for her father to find. 
If we follow the logic of progression, Klara killed the bird because her father 
humiliated her by berating her in front of her confirmation class. This is not an 
isolated incident; in fact, all of the terrible things that happen in the film appear to 
have their origins in the moral upbringing the pastor has provided his children, which 
has taught them that moral failings are to be met with swift and severe physical 
punishment, rather than forgiveness. 	  
Indeed, none of the relationships I discussed above are left untouched by the 
evil atmosphere of the town. The shadow that hangs over Anna and Rudi’s 
relationship has mainly to do with their father’s sexual abuse of Anna, which seems to 
have begun after his wife died. The shadow that hangs over the school teacher’s 
relationship with Eva, on the other hand, is more difficult to pin down; indeed, the 
school teacher himself does not seem to understand it. But Eva, as a young woman in 
this society, sees it all too well. It is most clearly demonstrated in a scene in which the 
two of them take a carriage ride together, and the teacher suggests that they have a 
picnic by the stream. “Das möchte ich nicht,”73 Eva says. She will not tell him why. 
When he says, “Aber ich will nichts Unstatthaftes von dir. Ich wollte dir nur eine 
Freude machen mit dem Essen,”74 she replies only, “Bitte.”	  Eva’s fear in this scene 
seems to be misplaced. But given the sexual violence that permeates the rest of the 
film as part of the dysfunctional structures of patriarchy that dictate life in the town, it 
is also understandable. The kiss that the two of them share at the end of this scene and 
                                                
73	  “I’d	  rather	  not.”	  
74	  “I	  had	  no	  improper	  intentions.	  I	  just	  wanted	  you	  to	  enjoy	  the	  picnic.”	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their obvious joy in each other do not diminish the viewer’s own awareness of how 
vulnerable Eva is and how little she may trust even her future husband.	  
These moments of tenderness often feel disjointed or disruptive in a film that, 
overall, works toward the viewer’s estrangement through techniques of 
dedramatization. Narrative techniques such as the paradoxical use of the voiceover, 
the muted acting style, the use of black and white film, and the disruptive and 
discordant presence or absence of music work in tandem with the viewer’s horror and 
disgust at certain characters’	  actions —	  not only the children’s, but also the doctor’s, 
the pastor’s, and the baron’s. Furthermore, the ending of the film arrives without 
resolution and without certainty. All of this prevents an immersive cinematic 
experience for the viewer, and indeed, that is Haneke’s explicit intention. Yet the 
moments of of tenderness that I describe above, in which love, kindness, and joy is 
shown to exist in Eichwald after all, are crucial to the viewer. These moments are, in 
many ways, more inexplicable than the children’s acts of cruelty. If the pastor’s 
household has produced Klara, how has it also produced Gustav? By inviting the 
viewer’s empathy in the midst of a generally estranging experience, these moments 
complicate the viewer’s understanding of Eichwald. Without these moments, the 
viewer might perceive the fate of Eichwald as having been written already; without 
these moments, the eventual decline of this society into fascism would seem 
inevitable. But these moments of kindness, joy, and love —	  small and disjointed 
though they are —	  demonstrate that despite the narrator’s hypothesis, there is no 
inevitability to the fate of the residents of Eichwald —	  or to the fate of the German 
nation for which it stands.  	  
I argue, however, that Das weiße Band calls something far more fundamental 
into question. Viewers, like the children of Eichwald, occupy “the moral high 
ground.”	  They sit in judgment on characters; in fact, the cognitive film theory that I 
discussed in Chapter 1 and which I have revisted in this chapter, argues that that is 
how we grant characters our “allegiance,”	  and that granting characters our allegiance 
is how we are able to enjoy film —	  and narrative more broadly —	  at all. Films like 
Haneke’s that resist allowing us to grant our allegiance to one character or another are 
more difficult to enjoy. Das weiße Band, however, calls our entire experience of 
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narrative into question, for is there not something about our own moral judgment, like 
the children’s, that is itself tyrannical, particularly when conducted from “on high”? 
Would a more ethical form of moral judgment be from “on the ground,”	  so to speak, 
within the story itself? Such a form of ethical judgment would by its very nature 
necessitate a more empathic mode of experiencing narrative —	  a mode that Haneke 
appears to have largely rejected. And yet, the moments of tenderness I have discussed 
gesture toward the possibility of redeeming empathy as a mode of narration —	  a 
gesture that comes to full fruition in Haneke’s next and most recent film, Amour.	  
 
	  
Amour: The Shock of Empathy 
	   	  
In an article that appeared in The New Yorker shortly after Haneke’s most 
recent film, Amour (2012), won the Oscar for Best Foreign Language Film, Hannah 
Goldfield confesses that she almost did not make it through the film:	  “It wasn’t that I 
wasn’t prepared. I knew what the movie was about and, having seen several other of 
Michael Haneke’s movies and read about his work, was familiar with his sadistic 
tendencies as a filmmaker.”	  Goldfield had been prepared by people she knew who’d 
seen the film for it to be “depressing.”	  But Goldfield says that films rarely depress her, 
and so she was utterly unprepared for her own reaction: 	  
Amour depressed me. It depressed me to the point that my chest felt 
tight, that fat tears streamed down my face as I struggled to keep my 
shoulders from heaving too noticeably. It depressed me to the point that 
I seriously contemplated escaping to the bathroom to have it out and 
collect myself, and considered leaving the theatre altogether.	  
What follows in Goldfield’s article is a consideration of love and aging, and what one 
means for the other, inspired by a combination of Haneke’s film and her own 
grandparents. She writes, “[M]y sadness arose from how close to home Amour hit: this 
was how much my grandparents had loved each other. The sad fate that Anne and 
Georges were meeting onscreen was the fate that my grandparents had met.”	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 Goldfield’s article demonstrates the essential differences between Amour and 
Haneke’s other films. Far from being violently estranging, Amour might instead be 
characterized as violently empathic. But as Asbjorn Gronstad points out in one of the 
few academic discussions of Amour yet published, it is still, without a doubt, a Haneke 
film in its largely dedramatized style: in its lack of an underscore (though, notably, 
Schubert is once again present diegetically); in its long stretches of cinematic time in 
which nothing much happens; and in its visual style, which consists of many long, still 
shots of the interior of the couple’s Paris apartment (Gronstad 191). There remains as 
well a typically Haneke interest in ethics, though not in any conventional sense, and 
two particularly memorable moments of “disruptive violence”	  (Gronstad 191). But 
there is very little sign of what Goldfield calls Haneke’s “sadistic tendencies.”	  
Although the film is at times hard to watch, there are few moments that make the 
reader flinch in the same way that Erika Kohut sniffing the wad of used tissues in the 
pornography booth or cutting her own genitals does. As Goldfield’s article shows, the 
difficulty of Amour comes from its familiarity. Few people would identify with Erika 
Kohut, Walter Kammer, or any of Haneke’s large cast of characters from Das weiße 
Band (with the exception, perhaps, of the school teacher and Eva). The moments in 
which our empathy is invited in both La Pianiste and Das weiße Band are notable 
primarily for their scarcity. But Amour is different; Amour does not set out to alienate 
its viewer. Although not everyone will have Hannah Goldfield’s reaction, it is crucial 
to note that the shock value of the film for her came not from its estrangement —	  
which Goldfield had expected, based on Haneke’s other work —	  but from her own 
surprising empathic reaction. The primary mode of narration in Amour is one of 
empathy, rather than estrangement, and for those like Goldfield who are familiar with 
Haneke’s other work, the effect is shocking.	  
	   Amour tells the story of Anne and Georges, an elderly French couple who 
share a beautiful Parisian apartment. Their relationship is affectionate and loving after 
many years of marriage, and they share a love of art and especially of music, as Anne 
was once a piano teacher. The early scenes of the film give us glimpses into Anne and 
Georges’	  comfortable life together, aligning us with them and provoking our 
allegiance by showing us how well they treat each other. Theirs is a marriage to which 
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many couples only aspire. Our alignment with them makes it all the worse for the 
viewer when when Anne suffers a stroke and her mind and body begin degenerating, 
putting to an end their comfortable life. After an initial hospitalization and an 
unsuccessful surgery, Anne forces Georges to promise her that she will not go back to 
the hospital. The decline of her condition is humiliating for her and for Georges, and 
the two of them isolate themselves from their friends and even from their daughter, 
Eva (played by Isabelle Huppert).The ending of the film is inevitable; in fact it is 
foretold from the opening scene, in which Anne’s body, covered in flowers that cannot 
disguise the stench of decay, is found when the fire department breaks into the 
apartment. But it is only later that the film reveals how she died, smothered by 
Georges months after she asked him to end her suffering. 	  
	   Although aging has become a somewhat more prominent theme in western 
literature and film in the last ten or fifteen years, it is rarely handled with as much 
“unrelenting determination”	  (Gronstad 186) and honesty as Haneke handles it here. 
Nor is it often handled in such a way that reminds the viewer —	  as it reminded 
Hannah Goldfield —	  that this is the inevitable ending of the narrative of heterosexual 
romance and marriage with which western culture has long been obsessed. As 
Gronstad points out, Amour is not about the question of whether Anne will die; 
Haneke establishes in the very first scene that she will. Rather, the focus is on “life as 
it is lived with the awareness of death fast approaching”	  (Gronstad 188). When Eva 
asks about her mother’s condition, Georges replies, with a frank honesty that does 
nothing to cushion the blow for his daughter, “It will go steadily downhill for a while, 
and then it will be over.”	  
 Haneke is just as uninterested in cushioning the blow for his viewer as Georges 
is in sparing Eva. Over the course of the film, we watch Anne deteriorate by 
increments from an elegant older woman into helplessness: She becomes unable to 
walk, feed herself, clean herself, and finally unable to speak. But she is never unaware 
of her own condition; that would be a mercy, and one that Haneke does not allow her 
or his viewer. In this, too, the film is very much of Haneke’s oeuvre: “True to his 
reputation, Haneke grants us no relief; as viewers we have no choice but to be 
consumed by this claustrophobic and intensely private world for the duration of the 
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couple’s ordeal”	  (Gronstad 190). This sense of claustrophobia, of being trapped, 
allows for what Gronstad argues is the development a new ethics between Georges 
and Anne. In this way, Gronstad says, the film demonstrates how the sense of 
approaching death is, itself, transformational, and it seeks to subject the viewer to this 
transformation as well through the discomfort that it inflicts (194-195). But this 
discomfort, I argue, is not the discomfort of estrangement, as is so often the case in 
Haneke’s films, but rather that of an extreme empathy. We are locked into Anne and 
Georges’	  situation with them; we are too closely aligned to escape. We can only wait 
and witness as the situation slides inexorably downhill, knowing that at some point, it 
will be over. 	  
 When that moment arrives, it is shocking. Georges sits on the edge of the 
hospital bed in their bedroom and tells Anne a story from his childhood, about the 
time he was at summer camp and caught diphtheria. During his telling of the story, 
Anne, who had been moaning loudly, quiets. He looks at her, and then, with very little 
warning, he pulls a pillow over her face and smothers her, bending over so that his 
own face is buried in the pillow, almost as though he is smothering himself as well. 
She fights and kicks; muffled noises are audible. But she is very weak and quickly 
goes silent and still. This is no less than she has already asked of him, but Georges had 
heretofore refused. Indeed, her refusal to drink water only a short time earlier resulted 
in the film’s only other eruption of violence: He slapped her out of frustration. His 
decision to smother her seems sudden, if not inexplicable, to the viewer. Why now? 
And why such a violent form of euthanasia? With all of the medications that Anne is 
certainly on, there must be a more peaceful way to ease her death. Although she has 
asked for death many times before, Anne fights him in this scene, and that, in and of 
itself, is disturbing. But after everything that has come before, even this eruption of 
violence into the film is not estranging in the sense that violent moments in La 
Pianiste or Das weiße Band are. This is the culmination of the new ethics of Anne and 
Georges’	  relationship. It is a decision that is both understandable —	  it would be 
difficult, though perhaps not impossible, to condemn George for it after having 
watched his and Anne’s struggles in intimate detail for two hours — and, yet, jarring.	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The film does not end with Anne’s death, just as, Haneke makes clear, Anne 
and Georges’	  relationship does not end with it. Indeed, as Gronstad points out, the film 
is at least as interested in George’s reaction to losing Anne as it is in Anne’s slow 
decline (190). Accordingly, after Anne’s death, Georges’	  grief is shown to us in as 
much detail as her illness was. For days, Georges remains alone with Anne’s body in 
their apartment, speaking to no one. This part of the film is nearly silent, with only 
occasional audible interventions when a phone rings or someone runs water in the 
sink. What Bordwell calls “dorsality”	  —	  the turning of the protagonist’s back to the 
camera —	  is particularly noticeable in these scenes. The scene in which Georges 
smothers Anne is shot in profile, but once the deed is done, Georges turns his face 
away from the camera and toward the window, looking away from his now deceased 
wife and from the viewer. Even when we do see his profile, the backlighting means 
that it is in shadow. In the following scenes, this directorial choice is even more 
pronounced: Georges’	  back is to us when he stands at the sink, snipping the flowers 
with which he will decorate Anne’s body; his back is to us as well, when he chooses 
the clothes in which he will lay her out. His profile is partially visible as he seals the 
door to their bedroom, Anne’s tomb, but it is shot at a distance and his face is often 
obscured either by his body angle or by a lamp shade. There are no scenes of empathy 
here, and these scenes are, in one sense, distancing; it is impossible for the viewer to 
feel what Georges feels, nor does the viewer really have that right. However, despite 
the distinct presence of dedramatized elements, these scenes are deeply moving. 
Although we have no right to empathize with Georges in his grief for Anne, we also 
have no choice but to try. Georges is alone in his grief, and the viewer is left alone 
with him. Anne’s life is over, but Georges’	  is not, and all that is left for the viewer to 
do is to watch him grapple with what it might mean for him to live without her. 	  
A Haneke film would not be a Haneke film if major questions were not left 
unanswered, and what happens to Georges after the ending of the film is the biggest 
one in Amour. In the end, it is only a vision of Anne herself that prompts him to leave. 
Lying on his bed in the library, he hears the sound of running water in the kitchen: the 
same sound that heralded the onset of Anne’s illness in the scene wherein she has her 
initial stroke. He shuffles out of the study and into the kitchen, where he is shocked to 
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see Anne doing the dishes —	  not Anne as she was when she died, but Anne as she was 
at the beginning of the film, healthy and elegant. She says she’s “almost done”	  and he 
should put his shoes on. He puts his shoes on in the hallway, and she comes out of the 
kitchen. She gets ready to leave as well, and he helps her on with her coat. She says, 
“You’re not taking a coat?”	  and he returns to get one. Then he follows her out, 
shutting off the lights. Garrett Stewart notes that if this final scene between Georges 
and Anne “raises the question ‘Does he die too?’	  there is only one answer. Of course 
he does. Or say: Of course he will”	  (“Haneke’s End Game,”	  21). But it is unclear 
where Georges goes once he leaves the apartment. This scene is followed by a series 
of long, still shots of the abandoned apartment —	  of the remnants of Georges and 
Anne’s life together. Then their daughter Eva enters. She walks through the apartment, 
sits in her father’s chair in the library, and stares out the window. Stewart writes, “Eva 
is last caught seated stock still in a framed recess staring left toward the windows, 
unseen now, through which she had previously and repeatedly looked away from her 
father’s pain and anger”	  (“Haneke’s End Game,”	  21). It is hard to say what Eva is 
feeling in that moment: grief, almost certainly, but perhaps she also feels confusion, 
anger, and regret. But whatever has happened, it is all over now. The film fades to 
black. 	  
Although there is much in Amour that a Haneke aficionado might find 
surprising, upon deeper consideration what is perhaps more surprising are the number 
of ways in which the film is quintessentially Haneke. The techniques of 
dedramatization that Haneke has used in all of his films that have elsewhere worked to 
estrange the viewer and either prevent or disrupt empathy —	  such as the absence of an 
underscore, the proliferation of long, still shots, the sudden eruption of violence into 
the narrative, glaring questions left deliberately unresolved —	  here result in empathy 
that shocks the viewer. It is all the more shocking for those who, like Hannah 
Goldfield, thought they knew what to expect from a Haneke film. But Goldfield’s 
statement is, in and of itself, telling: estrangement is no longer shocking when it is 
expected, and seventy years after the end of World War II and the rise of estrangement 
as a mode of narration, we have come to expect it. Perhaps the ethical value of 
estrangement comes from its ability to shock, and once that ability is gone, because it 
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has become an expected feature of our aesthetic landscape, the dialectic must once 
more be renegotiated. Amour represents, I argue, such a renegotiation in Haneke’s 
own work, just as La Pianiste represents a renegotiation of the dialectic in Jelinek’s 
Die Klavierspielerin. With Amour, we see empathy redeemed as a mode of narration, 
and we see that it, too, has the power to shock us. For the empathy that we see in 
Amour is not the facile one of popular culture; it is one that it presents a cognitive and 
emotional burden for the viewer, demanding as much if not more of us than Haneke’s 





My decision to situate the chapter about Michael Haneke’s work last in my 
dissertation was not purely about chronology. From the inception of this project, I 
have thought of Haneke as a microcosm of my broader argument. His films synthesize 
and distill many of the themes that I have discussed in my other chapters, particularly 
the relationship between narrative and ethical estrangement; they also demonstrate 
how the relationship between empathy and estrangement is rarely static, but is rather 
constantly renegotiated in both individual texts and across a particular writer or 
director’s oeuvre. Ultimately, for Haneke, this renegotiation has resulted in a 
surprising return to empathic modes of narration, thus demonstrating that empathy has 
the power to challenge the viewer or reader in ways similar to the techniques of 
estrangement I have described. This is a challenge, I argue, that Haneke issues in each 
of the films discussed in this chapter. Haneke’s work challenges us to empathize with 
characters we cannot like, in situations where we have little hope of the traditional 
rewards of cinematic empathy. In this, his work echoes the fundamental challenges of 
empathy in real life.	  
For this same reason, Haneke’s work also challenges the primacy of moral 
judgment in our experience of fiction. Like Grass’s protagonist Oskar Matzerath, 
judging Haneke’s characters is an exercise in frustration. Erika Kohut does not seem 
to operate according to any ethical framework with which the viewer might be 
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familiar; the changes in Anne and Georges’	  relationship invite, according to Gronstad, 
“a new ethics”; and in Das weiße Band, a story in which moral judgment might seem 
at first to be quite obvious, it is problematized, for it is because of moral judgment that 
the horrors in the town are perpetrated. In a sense, Haneke’s oeuvre asks us to justify 
ourselves as viewers. It demands, Who are you to judge? in a way that is more than 
hypothetical. This is not so different from the ways in which Bennys Video and Funny 
Games render the viewer complicit in the onscreen violence, but for all its 
comparative lack of gore, Haneke’s later repertoire actually goes much further in 
unseating the viewer from his perch above the narrative. His tool for this unseating is, 
somewhat ironically, empathy. Ultimately, we cannot judge Georges for the act of 
murder that ends Anne’s suffering; we have been drawn too far inside the story to 
judge him at all. The renegotiation of the dialectic of empathy and estrangement that 
occurs within Michael Haneke’s most recent film therefore asks whether a redemption 
of empathy as a mode of narration might, in fact, be possible, and whether in the right 




















Critical Empathy and the Humanities Classroom 
 
Michael Haneke’s most recent film Amour (2012) leaves us with the vexing 
question of the position of empathy in the twenty-first century. I noted at the 
beginning of this dissertation that it has been given, in many regards, a position of 
paramount importance; we need more empathy, many people argue. We need to 
expand our circle of empathy to encompass as much of humanity – and, indeed, the 
environment and non-human animals with which we share the earth – as possible. 
There is something seductive and enticing about this argument; certainly many people 
would like to believe that it is possible to infinitely expand human kindness. And yet 
research into how we experience empathy calls into question whether it is actually 
possible to do this via empathy. Empathy, by its very nature, has long been a way of 
dividing the “us” from the “them” – those who are worthy of kindness from those who 
are not. Nazi Germany provides only one dramatic example of a moment in which 
empathy, and the emotion-based decision-making it tends to result in, failed 
dramatically. Empathy is therefore strongly implicated in fascist structures of power 
themselves, as my reading of Triumph des Willens in Chapter 1 demonstrates. The 
narrative techniques that Günter Grass, W.G. Sebald, and Michael Haneke develop to 
negotiate the dialectic of empathy and estrangement I identify in their works might 
therefore be classified most simply as anti-fascist narrative strategies. 
These strategies, I have shown, are many and varied, but there are several that 
carry across multiple texts and authors: narrative unreliability or non-cooperation, 
such as in Grass’s Blechtrommel and Sebald’s Austerlitz; mindreading puzzles that can 
never be solved, as in Sebald’s Ausgewanderten and Haneke’s La Pianiste; moments 
of intimacy and empathy that are deliberately thwarted, such as in Sebald’s Austerlitz 
and Haneke’s Das weiße Band; and the presence of the disgusting or the grotesque in 
the text, as in Grass’s Blechtrommel and Haneke’s La Pianiste. These techniques 
refuse us as readers the usual pleasures of the text; they prevent immersion within the 
text itself, and they force us to question the reliability of all human narrative to the 
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point that we must adopt, in many cases, an ethic of skepticism. In other words, these 
texts disrupt our usual empathic approach to fictional narration. But Haneke’s Amour 
disrupts this disruption. It represents an empathic evolution in Haneke’s traditionally 
estranging work. But it also demonstrates that it is possible for a highly empathic work 
to avoid falling into certain empathic fallacies. An empathic work, Amour 
demonstrates, need not be pleasurable in a traditional sense; it also need not be facile 
or, indeed, fascist.  
It is therefore perhaps not so much that empathy is being redeemed in our 
present moment as that our understanding of it has matured. Empathy is not a panacea 
for all of humanity’s ills, but neither is emotion-based decision-making to blame for 
all of them. We need both empathy and skepticism in our present moment – both the 
ability to emotionally invest and to recognize when emotional investment is leading to 
moral decisions that may only be justified with retrospective mental gymnastics. In 
Jonathan Haidt’s terms, it is important to recognize when the moral dog is wagging the 
rational tail. I have come to believe that it is the labeling of a moral position as rational 
when it is, in reality, an emotional one that is dangerous, rather than the existence of 
that emotion itself. For in labeling certain positions “rational” and “irrational,” we 
actually recuse ourselves from having to understand the other side at all. After all, they 
are being irrational; we, who truly understand the issue and have taken the rational 
position, cannot be expected to empathize with or understand the position of people 
who are, clearly, irrational.  
Similarly, it is important that we understand the limits of empathy that Paul 
Bloom has articulated so well, even while acknowledging that cutting ourselves off 
from it is both impossible and undesirable. I will not go so far as to say that empathy 
is what makes us human, but it has certainly played an integral role in some of 
humanity’s greatest achievements – though also, as I showed in Chapter 1, in some of 
its greatest disasters. I would therefore like to introduce a new concept at this late 
stage, and call for what I would like to term “critical empathy”: that is, an empathy 
that is self-reflective and self-critical. Critical empathy understands is skeptical of 
itself and does not assume that it is necessarily leading to a better world. The type of 
empathy that one finds in the works I have discussed is precisely this kind of empathy. 
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Its role is complex and problematized, but it is still very much a force that drives the 
narrative and – perhaps more importantly – the reader’s experience of that narrative. 
When it comes to texts like Die Blechtrommel and La Pianiste, that experience may be 
one of frustration, aggravation, disgust, and annoyance. 
My interest in the role that empathy, specifically critical empathy, plays in how 
we experience such emotionally difficult texts has led me to consider a number of 
questions outside the immediate scope of this dissertation. One area of interest to me 
has been the role of empathy and estrangement in texts, especially television shows, in 
which the protagonist is explicitly designed as a moral antagonist — and yet also 
explicitly designed to invite a high degree of empathy from the viewer. These types of 
shows, the most stand-out of which is probably Netflix’s House of Cards, have 
become increasingly popular. Through techniques such as a direct address of the 
camera, the protagonist renders himself emotionally and morally legible to the viewer, 
who adopts the character’s goals and perhaps even his morality as her own for the 
duration of the show. The question of what these shows are accomplishing from 
aesthetic, moral, and cognitive angles remains to be fully investigated, as does their 
appeal in our particular historical and political moment. Is the empathy invoked by 
these shows truly critical? This is one direction that my research might take in the 
future, for although this dissertation has focused on postmodern texts, I remain 
convinced that popular texts are often just as complex and often more important, 
precisely because of their popularity, than their more aesthetically difficult cousins. 
The second question, which I will address in this conclusion, is one that has 
been central to my own graduate education: humanities pedagogy and the place of the 
humanities in the public sphere. There has been much talk in recent years of the 
purpose and value of the humanities; passionate “defenses” of the humanities have 
been raised, and the dearth of students in humanities classrooms has been lamented. 
These defenses and lamentations have taken many forms, but empathy, I mentioned in 
Chapter 1, is often a crucial part of these discussions. The research by Raymond Mar 
and Keith Oatley, among others, that says that people who read fiction are more 
empathic has been pointed to by those who would like a scientific basis upon which to 
ground their claims that reading fiction makes us better people. This involves a 
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fundamental misunderstanding of what empathy is and is not: it is an understanding of 
what other people are thinking and feeling; it is not the feeling of being moved to help 
someone in distress. I noted in my first chapter that Paul Bloom points out that 
empathy is a narrow, biased emotion; Bloom also points out that it leads to distress on 
the part of the empathizer, which can actually lead to a lack of action, as the 
empathizer’s main goal often becomes to diminish her own distress, rather than help 
the person in need. Empathic feeling is no guarantee of real-world action. I therefore 
believe that if we are going to use empathy as an argument in favor of the humanities, 
we should not claim that reading makes us better people. There is simply no evidence 
that it does.  
 But that does not mean that empathy does not play an enormous role in the 
humanities classroom. Both my research and my teaching have convinced me of the 
importance of students’ emotional experience of a text; we tend to avoid too much 
discussion of this experience in the classroom, as it veers too close to “appreciation” 
for our comfort. And yet perhaps we should not dismiss appreciation quite so readily. 
If we can help students better appreciate a text like Die Blechtrommel, then that is an 
enormous accomplishment. I therefore would like to argue here for two particular 
changes in how we approach texts in the humanities: first, a deeper engagement with 
students’ emotional experiences of texts as a way of teaching them the kind of critical 
empathy I have outlined here; and second, the slow reading of very difficult texts.  
 
 
Feeling Sorry for Gregor Samsa 
 
In Fall 2014, I co-taught a seminar on philosophical, psychological, and 
literary approaches to empathy at Hope House, a halfway house for women recovering 
from drug and alcohol addiction. This presented rather different challenges from the 
typical Stanford undergraduate classroom. My students at Hope House ranged widely 
in educational level, from those who had never finished high school to those with 
Bachelor’s degrees. Most of them had not set foot inside a classroom in many years. 
Many of them did not believe they were up to the challenge of the course. I knew 
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when I put Kafka’s The Metamorphosis on the syllabus that it would be our most 
difficult text, but I believed our students to be up to the challenge — and they were. 
For ninety minutes, we had a lively discussion about empathy in the text and the ways 
in which empathy fails and how that failure contributes to the process of Gregor 
Samsa’s dehumanization. 
At the very end of the discussion, one of my students raised her hand. “I have 
to ask,” she said. “You said this is one of the most important texts in German 
literature. But why do you read it? What do you get out of reading a story about a guy 
who turns into a bug?” 
I was a little taken aback by the question, though it was not the first time that 
one of the students had disrupted the Socratic method to ask my co-instructor and I 
what we thought about something. There were a number of answers I could have given 
her: The Metamorphosis is a major work of German Expressionism and one of 
Kafka’s best works; it is also a work about modernity and its effects on individual 
agency that feels as relevant today as it did when it was published in 1915. But I had 
the feeling that was not the sort of answer the student was hoping for, and it also was 
not entirely true; those are very good reasons for reading The Metamorphosis, but if I 
am honest, they are not my reasons. 
“I read The Metamorphosis,” I finally said, “for the same reasons we read it 
today: I find the problem of empathy in the text to be interesting. And I feel sorry for 
Gregor Samsa.” 
Around the room, my students nodded. They, too, had felt sorry for Gregor 
Samsa; indeed, they had had a lot more empathy for Gregor than most Stanford 
students with whom I have read the text, many of whom have found him too passive 
and condemned him for being the architect of his own misfortune. But my Hope 
House students, feeling perhaps that they, like Gregor, had been misused by the people 
closest to them at times, felt deeply for him. 
Literary texts provide us with ways to think about history, philosophy, 
psychology, and language, but for most readers, their emotional reaction to the text is 
the basis upon which they will love or hate it. Sometimes our emotional response to a 
text is pleasant: we find ourselves “transported” or “immersed,” and reading seems 
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effortless. Other times, however, our emotional response to a text is quite challenging. 
Students may become frustrated, disgusted, or simply bored. These are the moments in 
which a teacher is most important; they are also the moments in which a traditional, 
large-group discussion may fail to produce the intellectual results that both students 
and teachers hope for. But it is possible, I argue, that those intellectual results do not 
happen in spite of students’ emotional reactions, but rather because of their reactions. 
My students at Hope House were able to engage with The Metamorphosis because 
they felt sorry for Gregor Samsa, and because they saw in his situation some shadow 
of their own. Students’ emotional experience of a text can often be a good place to 
begin, and can be used to encourage engagement with a text’s thornier passages by 
asking, “Where in the text were you frustrated or discouraged? Let’s start there.” 
Particularly with texts that deliberately provoke strong, negative emotions, this can be 
a fruitful point of departure for students. It can lead into much deeper discussion of 
intentionality within texts, of what texts can do in the world, and of what texts can do 
to us as readers. This type of reading, in other words, makes a strong argument for the 
power of fictional texts and therefore for the humanities.  
This type of reading also, however, makes an argument for reading differently 
in the humanities classroom, where “critical thinking” has long been touted as one of 
the areas in which the humanities excel. I do not argue with this, though I think STEM 
fields might take offense at the idea that they do not also practice critical thinking 
skills. But since the advent of theory in the 1980s, critical thinking in the humanities 
has become more and more critical, to the point where many students feel that reading 
has been “ruined” for them by their English classes. What they mean by that, I am 
increasingly convinced, is that they are no longer able to read with as much empathic 
enjoyment as they once were. In one striking example of this, in a “How I Think about 
Literature” address in October 2013, John Hennessy, president of Stanford, mentioned 
a number of books that he was “tortured” with in high school that he later came to 
love. Hennessy, a professor of computer science, attributed the change in how he felt 
about these texts mostly to a maturation of his own mind and an accumulation of 
experience that allowed him to appreciate novels such as Moby Dick. There certainly 
might be something to that; Die Blechtrommel is not a novel for young teenagers, or 
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perhaps even older teenagers. But this also indicates to me that there needs to be a 
shift in how we teach literature: reading need not be torturous, and it also need not 
ignore students’ desire for empathic engagement. Perhaps, then, “critical empathy” 
should be the flagship offering of the humanities classroom, rather than critical 
thinking.  
What would such a “critical empathy” approach to texts look like? It would, 
first of all, seek to utilize students’ emotional experiences of texts — especially 
difficult ones — thereby rendering those texts more meaningful, if not precisely more 
accessible; after all, the point I have made repeatedly in this dissertation is that many 
texts are not easily accessible, nor should they be. But the humanities at their best help 
students find more and greater meaning in texts than they would be able to find on 
their own, and empathy is a major aspect of that process; it is not one that we can 
afford to dismiss, particularly, I argue, when it comes to difficult texts. Moreover, 
reading difficult texts is an intellectual accomplishment on par with the challenges 
posed in STEM courses, and it is a challenge that requires training to tackle properly. 
It also requires time. In order to make these very difficult texts meaningful for students 
and give them the sense of accomplishment they crave, we must move away from the 
voluminous reading lists that have characterize many humanities syllabi and move 
toward methods of slow reading that encourage both intellectual and emotional 
engagement. When students are forced to consume – a word I use deliberately – a text 
like Die Blechtrommel as quickly as possible, then it is a very small wonder indeed 
when they do not feel as though they have accomplished much. But reading and 
understanding a text like Die Blechtrommel, even in translation, is very much an 
intellectual accomplishment  
I therefore believe we must find ways to teach literature that make use of 
students’ emotional experiences of texts, especially when that experience is difficult; 
doing so, I argue, will also render the interpretive challenges posed by these texts 
more rewarding. Rendering the reading experience both intellectually and emotionally 
rewarding is crucial, for if we do not do this, very few students will remain who enjoy 
reading – and I wager that no one ever became a humanist who did not like to read.  
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This approach to humanities pedagogy leaves a number of questions open, 
among them: How do we know how deeply students are engaging with texts? How do 
we give them that sense of accomplishment? How do we monitor their emotional 
engagement as they read? Strangely, up to now there has been no reliable way to 
assess reading in the humanities, even though in many fields it is our primary practice. 
Rather, we have assessed reading via writing through assignments such as term 
papers. Writing an argumentative paper is certainly a skill worth developing in its own 
right, but it does not necessarily help the instructor measure students’ engagement 
with the reading overall in the course, since good readers are not necessarily the best 
writers and vice versa.  
At this point, however, digital tools are in development for use in the 
humanities classroom that may allow us to measure students’ engagement more 
accurately and to encourage them to engage more deeply with texts. For the last two 
years, I have been privileged to work on a research team developing one such tool. 
Lacuna Stories is a digital annotation tool designed for use in a humanities classroom, 
in which students are able to annotate texts, view other students’ annotations, and 
“sew” their annotations together to track themes across texts. Reading on such a 
platform is no longer the solitary activity that it has traditionally been. Lacuna Stories 
transforms reading into a social activity, and it encourages the instructor to employ a 
learning-centered approach that is focused more fully on the students’ interests and, 
indeed, their emotional reactions. Furthermore, Lacuna Stories allows students to react 
to each other’s reactions, and to bring those reactions out of the digital space and into 
the physical realm of the classroom.  
In winter quarter of 2015, as a member of the Lacuna Stories team, I observed 
Professor Amir Eshel and graduate student Brian Johnsrud’s course “Futurity,” which 
used the Lacuna Stories platform. One of the texts that students read was Air Raid by 
Alexander Kluge. Air Raid depicts the destruction of Halberstadt, Germany at the very 
end of World War II in an American bombing campaign. It is a linguistically, 
cognitively, and emotionally difficult text that utilizes many of the estrangement 
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techniques I identified in this dissertation and deliberately avoids the invocation of 
empathy even for its point of view characters. In the opening scene, Frau Schrader, 
ticket seller and theater manager of the Capitol Cinema, walks through the streets of 
Halberstadt, after an afternoon screening of Heimkehr is disrupted by a bombing raid. 
Kluge’s prose is detached, and his cataloguing of Frau Schrader’s reactions is often 
unbelievable and estranging, as demonstrated in the following passage:  
This was probably the most powerful shock that the cinema had ever 
experienced during the time Frau Schrader was in charge, the effect 
triggered by even the best films is hardly comparable. For Frau 
Schrader, a seasoned cinema professional, however, there was no 
conceivable shock, which could call in question the division of the 
afternoon into four fixed screenings (or six with matinee and late 
show).75 (3) 
Kluge’s irony here is more subdued than Grass’s in Die Blechtrommel, but the passage 
itself recalls Oskar Matzerath. The narrator — who is not Frau Schrader — describes 
neutrally the immunity she has developed to shock through years of exposure to 
narrative violence, but her lack of emotional reaction triggers a counter-reaction in the 
viewer. This is not unlike the reaction triggered by Oskar’s refusal to be disgusted – or 
to express disgust – at things his reader finds disgusting. Frau Schrader’s lack of 
shock, like Oskar’s lack of disgust, creates significant emotional dissonance between 
the text and the reader. 
This emotional dissonance is a crucial aspect of texts like Air Raid and Die 
Blechtrommel; I have hypothesized about its significance a number of times 
throughout this dissertation. However, in the end, the readings I offered about such 
moments of dissonance were my readings, and the emotional dissonance that I 
described was my own; my investigations were necessarily based in the text itself. I do 
not believe that there is necessarily a problem with such an approach, but it is limited 
in that it assumes a model reader, and there are always readers for whom the readings I 
offered will not resonate. Tools such as Lacuna Stories have implications for 
                                                
75 I quote here from the version of Air Raid that the students in “Futurity” read, which is the English 
translation by Martin Chalmers. 
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humanities education, but also, I believe, for the field of cognitive cultural studies. 
They render visible the readings and emotional reactions of others more readily. In 
examining the annotations of students who used Lacuna Stories to read Air Raid, it is 
possible to see the emotional dissonance I described “in action” and to see, 
qualitatively, their emotional reactions to the text.  
As a brief example of what such analysis might look like, I will take as an 
example students’ annotations of the passage I quoted above, which was one of the 
more heavily annotated passages in the text. It was annotated publicly by six different 
students, roughly 50% of the class. Some of these students, as graduate students in the 
humanities, are what we might call “professionally trained readers”; others, however, 
as undergraduates in a variety of disciplines, are not. As a whole, students expressed 
disbelief at Frau Schrader’s emotional reactions, with comments such as: 
“So, her indifference is a result of being a ‘seasoned cinema 
professional’? Unconvincing” 
“Is this all to say that Frau Schrader is more moved/impacted by 
dramatized and fictional scenes depicted in film than by a real-life 
incident like an explosion..?” 
“Wow this seems hard to believe. ‘No conceivable shock’?” 
Students’ irritation, disbelief, and emotional dissonance is clearly visible here. 
Although several of the students noted the irony in the passage, they still attempted to 
understand and empathize with Frau Schrader and were subsequently thwarted by the 
text itself. Students could not reconcile Frau Schrader’s reactions with what they 
imagined their own would be in the same situation. Their annotations render highly 
visible the disruption of empathy in the text and the subsequent estrangement of its 
readers. Perhaps most revealing, however, is an annotation slightly further along in the 
text on the following sentence: “She walked, shattered by now, all the way to the 
'Long Cave' where, in the company of the Wilde family, who had fled there during the 
raid, she chewed a sausage sandwich and they took turns spooning preserved pears 
from a jar. Frau Schrader felt 'no good for anything any more’” (Kluge 4). Upon this 
sentence, one of graduate students in the class remarked: “Finally some signs 
indicating emotional distress.” This student’s relief at some sense of emotional 
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legibility is clear, despite her relatively high level of training as a reader. Frau 
Schrader’s lack of emotional distress, like Oskar Matzerath’s lack of disgust, is itself 
emotionally distressing and estranging. This is true, it seems, even when a reader is 
able to acknowledge the irony of the text, and therefore understands that the text will 
not offer them a straightforward exercise in empathy the way a more realistic novel 
would.  
As one might expect, students’ irritation with Air Raid bled over into the 
classroom discussion, where the instructors used students’ emotional reactions to steer 
them toward thinking about reader expectations in relationship to genre. Although the 
instructors certainly did not stop at students’ emotional reactions, their access to 
students’ annotations gave them particular insight into how students felt as they read 
the text, and they were able to use this information for a conversation that made use of 
students’ irritation and feelings of estrangement. Indeed, the very first place they 
began was with this passage, because so many students had expressed such strong 
feelings about the lack of the emotion in the text itself. The discussion began not 
where the instructor was interested in starting, but where the students themselves were 
at in their reading, and it began with an approach that emphasized the importance of 
critical empathy. Students were asked to catalogue what they felt, where they felt it, 
and why they were frustrated. With texts such as Air Raid, the acknowledgment of 
frustration and irritation as important reactions in their own right is, I believe, critical 
to the advancement of students’ understanding of a text, and to their feelings of 
intellectual accomplishment in reading it, even if they do not come to love it.  
It is almost inevitable in a long project like a dissertation, one will be left with 
things one wishes one had done differently. One of mine is that I wish I had been able 
to read Die Blechtrommel (possibly in translation) with a group of students over the 
course of a quarter, using Lacuna Stories, to see how these techniques of slow reading 
and emotional engagement play out in a classroom, and to test students’ reactions 
against my own hypotheses. Certainly there remains valuable research to be done at 
the intersection of cognitive science, textual analysis, and pedagogical research that 
has the potential to transform the humanities classroom into a more student-centered 
and emotionally engaged place than it currently is. My research over the last three 
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years has made me aware of the value and limitations of empathy as a mode of ethical 
reasoning; at the same time, however, it has emphasized to me just how crucial 
emotions are in moral decision-making of all kinds. In the end, I do not find myself 
arguing “against empathy” with Paul Bloom, but rather in favor of critical empathy: 
empathy that is self-aware, self-reflective, and self-skeptical, but which does not 
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